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Abstract
In Immunizing Communities: The Biopolitics of Vaccination and its Historical 
Alternative, Carol-Ann Galego turns to the history of medicine in response to one of 
the most pertinent questions in the contemporary study of biopolitics: is it possible to 
promote life without inadvertently undermining it? She traces the development of two 
alternative methods of preventing epidemics: vaccination and the prophylactic use of 
homeopathy. Although both methods were developed in the same year and advanced 
with the common goal of mitigating the effects of infectious disease, vaccination and 
homeoprophylaxis are nevertheless worlds apart. While vaccination was ushered into 
mainstream practice through risk analysis and retroactively validated by later 
developments in modern immunology, homeopathy was motivated by the medical 
maxim to “first do no harm” and rendered meaningful by a romantic conception of 
disease as a dynamic interaction between an organism and its environment. Galego 
argues that the differences between these two preventative strategies signal nothing 
less than a fundamental difference in our understanding of how we, as living 
organisms, live in and interact with the world and, no less radically, of how we should 
best navigate our limited capacity to understand these complex interactions. She 
finds in the history of homeopathy and its roots in German romantic medicine an 
alternative trajectory to modern developments in immunology and risk analysis, which 
have come to define our relations with others—indeed our very existence—as an 
inevitable negotiation of risk. Uniquely positioned to expose the limitations of the 
modern effort to immunize ourselves against the world, this untold chapter in the 
history of medicine considers alternative ways of living in and fostering healthy 
community. 
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1Preface: Edward Jenner and the Case for Cowpox
Despite persistent contemporary debates surrounding the question of 
vaccination and the ongoing assumption of risks that it requires, Edward 
Jenner's (1749-1823) method of inoculation with cowpox is widely celebrated 
for beginning a process that would eventually result in the successful 
eradication of the smallpox virus in 1980. The English country doctor first 
started to entertain the idea that inoculation with cowpox could forever shield a 
person from the scourges of smallpox in the early 1770s, when he began to 
take note of a striking coincidence: sufferers of cowpox did not contract 
smallpox, in some cases not even many years after the initial infection. While 
Jenner's early observations were made a century before the rise of modern 
immunology – which would retroactively provide a physiological explanation 
for this pattern – the observation that survivors of smallpox were resistant to 
subsequent encounters with the disease is ancient1 and it was with this 
understanding of “immunity” that Jenner considered the protective properties 
of cowpox. In this context, when “immunity” was used in a medical sense it did 
not yet invoke defensive images of antibodies or macrophages; it simply 
referred to the empirical observation that some people, places, and groups 
appear to manifest disease less frequently and less severely than others 
(Cohen 175). 
Jenner started compiling information related to this phenomenon and, 
1 As early as 430 B.C, survivors of smallpox were summoned to care for the afflicted (Gross and 
Sepkowitz 55).
2over time, accumulated several case studies of individuals known to have 
suffered from cowpox who later resisted contracting smallpox (Hays 126).2 He 
was inspired by his findings to investigate this phenomenon, which was also 
well-established folk knowledge at the time: cowpox preserved milk maidens' 
unblemished skin by saving them from the ravages of “the speckled monster.” 
Jenner hoped that further insight into the phenomenon could help protect 
others—others who were not dairy maids—from the virulent disease. 
And so, when he learned that the dairy farmer, Sarah Nelmes, had 
contracted cowpox, Jenner seized the opportunity to test his hypothesis that 
this minor affliction could have protective properties against smallpox. In a 
famous experiment that would later be recorded as the first vaccination, on 14 
May 1796, Jenner inserted matter taken from a sore on Nelmes' hand into two 
superficial incisions he had made on the arm of James Phipps, “a healthy boy, 
about eight years old” (Inquiry 51). From the seventh to the ninth day following 
vaccination, Jenner observed the course of a mild illness in his young patient
—including a loss of appetite, slight headache, and restlessness—and was 
confident that the inoculation had effectively transmitted the cowpox disease 
from Nelmes to Phipps. The more pertinent question for Jenner, however, was 
whether the boy, after exhibiting the systemic effects of cowpox ever so 
2 The first case Jenner outlines in his Inquiry, for example, details the experiences of John Merret, a 
farmer who had contracted cowpox in 1770 and failed to respond to variolation in 1797, when the 
entire population of Berkeley was inoculated with smallpox in anticipation of an approaching 
epidemic. Jenner himself tried to variolate Merret, but the procedure failed to elicit the symptoms 
characteristic of smallpox. During the whole time that his family members had smallpox, one of 
whom had it severely, the man received no injury from exposure to the contagious disease (9-10).
3slightly, would consequently be rendered insusceptible thereafter to smallpox. 
In order to test the protective properties of inoculated cowpox, six weeks later 
Jenner inoculated Phipps with variolous matter that he had immediately 
extracted from a smallpox pustule: 
Several slight punctures and incisions were made on 
both his arms, and the matter was carefully inserted, but 
no disease followed. The same appearances were 
observable on the arms as we commonly see when a 
patient has variolous matter applied, after having either 
the Cow Pox or Small Pox. Several months afterwards he 
was again inoculated with variolous matter, but no 
sensible effect was produced on the constitution (Inquiry 
53).
Observing in Phipps the same immune response as those with recorded 
histories of either cowpox or smallpox, Jenner believed it was safe to assume 
that the young patient's medically acquired immunity offered the same 
protection observed in those who had encountered the disease the 
“traditional” way, that is, by milking cows. More specifically, he concluded that 
“the disease produced in James Phipps by vaccination with the cowpox matter 
taken from Sarah Nelmes had the same properties as the disease produced 
by direct contact with the infected cow” (Hays 30). Apparently unmindful of the 
fact that, as a milk maid, Nelmes was regularly exposed to cowpox, Jenner 
4expressed confidence that extracting disease material from its immediate 
context and inserting it into the arm of someone remote from that context was 
sufficient to convey a bona fide state of immunity. He was implicitly operating 
under an assumption that would later become emblematic of modernity's 
enclosure of the body from the outside world: he understood protection 
against disease as a state of being that could be achieved within an individual 
body, rather than as an ongoing, dynamic interplay among living organisms. 
This was arguably the aspect of Jenner’s thesis that allowed the 
practice of vaccination to spread as rapidly as it did: the possibility of person-
to-person transmission of cowpox significantly reduced dependence on 
animals as a source of vaccines and provided a means of transporting 
inoculation material to countries in which vaccination would have been 
otherwise impossible.3 Although others before him had observed the 
protective properties of cowpox, it was Jenner’s contention that direct cow-to-
person transmission was not necessary to acquire cowpox—and by extension 
its lifelong protective properties—that made it possible to envision vaccination 
as a universal solution to the smallpox problem (Jannetta 30).4
3 Vaccines could be transported over short distances or in cool climates by preserving the disease 
matter, for example, between sheets of glass. For longer distances, particularly in warmer climates, 
the vaccine was maintained by weekly arm-to-arm transmission through volunteers or children. This 
method was used to spread cowpox through the British forces in India and to distribute vaccine 
from the Spanish Empire to Central and South America (Baxby, “Jenner Bicentenary,” 8). For a 
detailed study on the early transmission of vaccine material, see Rusnock's “Catching Cowpox.” 
4 Though he continues to be celebrated for this contribution, some claim that Jenner’s fame is the 
result of political opportunism rather than genuine discovery. See, for example, Horton's “Myths in 
Medicine; Jenner Did Not Discover Vaccination.” While the relevance and impact of Jenner's 
contributions to the history of vaccination is a contentious subject, he is generally acknowledged 
(for better or for worse) for introducing scientific testing to this commonly held belief, 
disseminating his results widely, and introducing the arm-to-arm method of transmission. For 
5After waiting nearly two years to reproduce the results observed in the 
Nelmes-Phipps transmission (that there were no cases of cowpox to be found 
in Gloucestershire in 1797 attests to the disease’s rarity), Jenner inoculated a 
series of children, transmitting the mild cowpox disease from child to child. 
Impressed that the children also exhibited the characteristic signs of 
resistance to subsequent attempts at exposing them to smallpox, in 
September 1798, he published his results in An Inquiry into the Causes and 
Effects of the Variolae Vaccinae, declaring that “What renders the Cow-pox 
virus so extremely singular, is that the person who has been thus affected is 
for ever after secure from the infection of the Small Pox; neither exposure to 
the variolous effluvia, nor the insertion of the matter into the skin, producing 
this distemper [smallpox]” (16). He encouraged his colleagues to test and 
verify the experiments that supported this bold claim and promised to continue 
his own research, hopeful that pursuing this line of inquiry would prove to be 
essentially beneficial to humankind (96).
By substituting smallpox material with cowpox, Jenner promised to 
provide a better alternative to the prominent method of inoculation at the time, 
which involved using a non-virulent strain of smallpox material, a technique 
referred to as variolation, in the hope of preventing a severe case. In using 
material that caused only a mild reaction in humans and was not easily 
contagious from person to person, Jenner addressed two of the main 
balanced accounts on this issue, see Baxby's “Edward Jenner's Role” and Ridel's “Edward Jenner 
and the History of Smallpox Vaccination.”
6objections to variolation: despite efforts to select disease material from a 
relatively safe manifestation of the disease, variolation proved, first of all, to be 
sometimes fatal to individuals, and secondly, occasionally responsible for 
triggering full-blown epidemics (Durbach Ch. 1, location 435, par. 15; Razzell 
ix). In either case, variolation kept the smallpox disease in circulation. As such, 
although variolation had reduced the lethal impact of smallpox in many 
countries during the late eighteenth century, it was intrinsically incompatible 
with the goal of disease eradication. By using a related virus that protected 
inoculated persons against smallpox but was not transmissible to contacts, 
Jenner's innovation made the goal to forever free the world of smallpox seem 
like an attainable one (Fenner vii).
Though Jenner claimed to have achieved the same prophylactic ends 
as variolation, that is, lifelong immunity against smallpox, the widespread 
acceptance of his innovation inhered in his method’s promise of entailing little 
or no apparent risk of harm to both the patient and the population. Indeed, he 
continues to be celebrated by many for his insight that “it was possible to use 
a related, mild infection to immunize against a different severe one” (Wilkinson 
93), but his early claim that vaccination provided lifelong protection has long 
since been challenged, even by his most loyal supporters. Today the general 
consensus seems to be that “Jenner rashly argued that one vaccination 
conferred life-long immunity to smallpox, and only gradually did his supporters 
realize that that was not so” (Hays 127). No longer convinced that a single 
7encounter with disease can generate lasting protection, contemporary 
scientists are more inclined to recognize the importance of continual re-
exposure to disease in the achievement of long-term immunity.5 
Over time, the gradual acceptance that immunity eventually wanes was 
addressed by the implementation of revaccination. Abandoning the early 
promise that vaccination could immediately convey lifelong immunity, health 
authorities remained hopeful that a universal program of vaccination and 
revaccination could effectively rid the world of smallpox. They recognized that 
if, at any given time, a sufficient portion of the population was immune to it, the 
disease’s circulation would be interrupted. No longer invested in granting 
lasting immunity, health authorities refocused their efforts on eradicating the 
disease worldwide. They interpreted the problem of waning immunity not as a 
prompt to find other, non-defensive, strategies for co-existence with 
pathogens, but as confirmation that the only way to assure lasting protection is 
by annihilating the enemy. But as we will learn, the promise of eradication 
proved just as difficult to keep as the promise of life-long immunity it was 
designed to replace. Both failed to recognize that efforts to prevent infection 
often have the perverse effect of making us even more susceptible to the 
diseases from which we seek protection.
5 From this perspective, some suggest that the discrepancy between Jenner's observations of vaccines’ 
lasting efficacy and the many documented cases of waning immunity can best be understood in light 
of the fact that Jenner regularly “challenged” (i.e. re-exposed) his subjects with smallpox 
inoculation in order to test his vaccines. While such testing was for the expressed purpose of 
verifying patients’ susceptibility to smallpox, it was also a form of boosting patients’ level of 
protection as compared to the eventual majority of those who received vaccines without being 
challenged. 
8Though Jenner himself was not prepared to publicly accept the 
possibility that the efficacy of vaccines might be temporary,6 he maintained 
that even if the immunity they conferred was not as long-lasting as he had 
foreseen, vaccination remained an advantageous alternative to variolation 
insofar as the latter method risked considerably more harm to those seeking 
protection. He was assured by the fact that he had never heard of a 
dangerous or fatal case of cowpox and accordingly “left no doubt about his 
conviction that, in time, inoculation with cowpox virus would prove far superior 
to even the most cautiously administered variolation” (Jannetta 32). Jenner 
was not alone in making this assessment, and after vaccination became well 
established, acceptance of variolation declined and, in some cases, the 
practice was completely outlawed. The British Parliament, for example, 
criminalized variolation in 1841 out of fear that the practice contributed to, 
rather than arrested, the spread of smallpox (Durbach Ch.1, location 451, par. 
17). Although the use of variolation had been previously defended as a 
rationally safer gamble than succumbing to natural smallpox, when 
vaccination was introduced as an even safer alternative, the risks of 
variolation could no longer be justified. 
While Jenner's innovation was widely accepted in his time as an 
improvement upon the old method of inoculating with smallpox material, his 
6 According to Baxby, the closest that Jenner came to admitting that vaccines might not provide 
lifelong protection was in a letter written by Jenner in 1805: “The security given to the constitution 
by the vaccine inoculation is exactly equal to that given by the variolous. To expect more from it 
would be wrong. As failures in the latter are constantly presenting themselves . . . we must expect to 
find them in the former also” (qtd. in Jenner's Smallpox Vaccine 145). 
9hope of entirely mitigating the risks of prophylaxis were never fully realized. 
His method of arm-to-arm transmission allowed vaccination to reach 
geographic areas that would otherwise have been impossible to reach, but 
cowpox was not the only disease being conveyed in the process. Cowpox 
itself was not a fatal illness, but the practice of lancing lesions to collect 
diseased lymph would expose patients to other potentially very dangerous 
infections. By the mid-nineteenth century, some physicians began to argue 
that diseases such as erysipelas, tuberculosis, syphilis, and leprosy could be 
transmitted this way (Biddiss and Cartwright 78; Rusnock, “Catching Cowpox,” 
29). Even after vaccination no longer involved the exchange of bodily fluids, 
bacterial contamination remained a problem (Biss 17). In short, while the 
transition to vaccination alleviated some of the concerns associated with 
variolation, it also generated new suspicions about other unforeseen albeit 
harrowing side effects. Although it represented a significant technological 
development in the history of immunization, vaccination could not entirely 
break away from the rhetoric of risk that had surrounded variolation. 
More than two hundred years later, the same controversial question 
that attended the early practice of immunization continues to press upon us: is 
it a risk worth taking? The specific risks of the medical procedure have, no 
doubt, changed over the years. Eula Biss observes that “[n]ow our vaccines 
are, if all is well, sterile.” (17). So now it is the additives and adjuvants, she 
argues, that people worry about in vaccines: “Our witches brew is chemical” 
10
(17). But what remains for the most part remarkably unchanged is the fact that 
we continue to approach the decision for or against immunization in terms of 
risk analysis (Blower 286).7 Despite years of technological advances, 
contemporary medicine has still not succeeded in manufacturing vaccines 
deemed to be completely safe. As Paul Fine and Jacqueline Clarkson write: 
“Though contemporary vaccine preparations must pass rigorous criteria for 
safety, it is unlikely that any vaccination procedure will be absolutely safe, in 
particular when administered routinely to large populations” (1012). We have 
learned simply to accept that no preventative medical intervention is 
completely risk-free. 
What is more, we have come to accept the political conflicts implied in 
using a prophylactic strategy that imposes a burden of risk on the very lives it 
intends to protect. When the risks of vaccination are distributed throughout the 
population—for example, when they are assigned to designated 
demographics or individual bodies of a certain kind—problematic tensions 
between the multiplicity of singular individuals and the community at large 
become apparent. In this way, the persistent presence of risk in our efforts to 
eradicate disease has been formative not only within the domain of public 
health. At a very deep, one might say cellular, level, the injection of risk into 
the project of immunizing communities has infected our very understanding of 
7 In her commentary on Daniel Bernoulli's calculations, for example, Sally Blower argues that 
Bernoulli's emphasis on the population-level benefits of public health intervention—for example, 
the addition of 25 000 useful “Civil Lives” (as opposed to the risks faced by babies who do not 
actively contribute to the State's welfare)—continues to be the primary focus in contemporary 
public health initiatives (287).
11
what it means to live in relation with others. Providing a vivid portrayal of the 
competing interests that can emerge in a public health enterprise, vaccination 
is often, as we shall see, referenced as a paradigmatic expression of the 
conflicts at the heart of the social contract. As such, the question of 
vaccination is never simply a medical question but always also a political one. 
And, as I hope to convey with the following work, when we consider the 
historical conditions that gave rise to the modern formulation of vaccination in 
view of a historically-situated medical alternative, we are well poised to 
displace what has become one of the most powerful modern metaphors for 
understanding the politics of life. 
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Introduction: Same Old Story, in a Different Way
The beginning of this story is well known. It borrows from one of the most 
frequently cited chapters in the history of medicine: the development of the 
first vaccine. In the pages that follow, I detail the ways in which the early 
medical effort to prevent smallpox was completely transformed by the 
mathematical analyses undertaken to legitimize the risks of prophylactic 
intervention. I then consider how the public controversy that followed this 
development – whether to privilege the health of the individual or the safety of 
the community – persists to the present day. As such, this is a story as much 
about the present as it is about the past, providing insight into the political 
challenges that we continue to face, not only in our efforts to mitigate the 
effects of contagious disease, but also, more generally, in our attempts to 
safeguard life without inadvertently endangering it. 
The continuation of this story is lesser known, and it is less a 
continuation than an alternative perspective from which to consider the 
political implications of immunizing communities. I supplement my reading of 
vaccination and its political implications by returning to Jenner's experiments 
with cowpox inoculation, in order to trace another trajectory in the history of 
medicine. Although Louis Pasteur (1822-1895), Robert Koch (1843-1910), and 
the founders of modern immunology retrospectively claimed Jenner as their 
predecessor, and medical mathematicians of the time were eager to 
demonstrate the numerical advantages of implementing his procedure on a 
13
social scale, Jenner's contributions were largely empirical and do not betray 
any overt philosophical or political motivations (Cohen 85). Indicative of its 
underdetermination,8 the observed efficacy of vaccination was not only 
appropriated by later developments in immunology; it was also rendered 
meaningful by another, radically different, medical tradition. 
German physician, Samuel Hahnemann (1755-1843), the founder of 
homeopathy, celebrated Jenner's method of inoculating with cowpox—a 
disease similar to, though much less virulent than, the smallpox it was 
intended to prevent. He recognized it as confirmation of his own observation 
that an organism can never have two similar diseases at the same time, and 
endeavored to develop this prophylactic principle further in his use of specific 
remedies to prevent other contagious diseases.9 Motivated by the medical 
maxim to “first do no harm” and by the recognition that inoculated disease 
material does not always elicit a response in patients, Hahnemann thought 
that it would be both safer and more effective to extend the principle of 
Jenner's method to include the use of specially prepared remedies, which he 
believed capable of inducing artificial states of disease. In this way, he 
endeavored to provide the protection associated with vaccination without the 
8  'Underdetermination' refers to the insufficiency of evidence to determine theoretical explanation. 
The same evidence can, for example, be used to confirm two competing theories. 
9 Hahnemann's method of preventing contagious diseases by prophylactically administering diluted 
remedies that induce symptoms similar to those associated with the disease to be prevented, 
homeoprophylaxis, is often thought to have influenced the development of homoprophylaxis, the 
use of diluted disease material, 'nosodes,' to prevent communicable diseases. Today, this distinction 
is often overlooked and most instances of 'homeoprophylaxis' cited in the scientific literature and 
offered in practice are in fact homoprophylaxis. See Decker and Verspoor, “Nosodes,” 70;  Papsch, 
“Nosoden,” 74-77 and Vieracker, “Jenners Vakzination,” 38-40.
14
risks. 
Hahnemann's response to infectious disease was informed by his 
understanding of disease as a dynamic interaction between an organism and 
its environment that could not be reduced to material causes. He accordingly 
tended to both the disease agent as well as the unique susceptibility of the 
exposed individual. As such, his approach was inherently at odds with the 
numerical analyses that helped legitimize inoculation by generalizing the risks 
of disease – whether naturally or artificially induced – across the population. 
Furthermore, by developing a prophylactic method that did not involve the 
transfer of disease material or otherwise impose risk on individual bodies, 
Hahnemann's approach preserved the possibility of preventing communicable 
diseases without bringing the well-being of the individual in tension with the 
protection of the community, a possibility that is often precluded in the 
controversy surrounding the decision to vaccinate. 
His work in the area of prophylaxis garnered considerable attention 
and, at the prompting of the prominent physician Christoph Wilhelm Hufeland 
(1762-1836), the efficacy of his method of preventing scarlet fever 
homeopathically was verified by numerous physicians throughout the German 
territories.10 Though wary of Hahnemann's efforts to undermine existing 
10 As historian Wilhelm Ameke points out, the “judgment of the impartial Hufeland is in sharp contrast 
with the utterances of the majority of allopathic authors, who, on innumerable occasions, did not 
hesitate to speak of homeopathy as a 'delusion' and 'a system of deception'” (x). It also distinguishes 
itself from the hagiographical accounts of Hahnemann and the uncritical reviews of homeopathy 
produced by his devoted followers. According to Kuzniar, “the fact that [Hahnemann] forged his 
own persona as a scientific genius and medical prophet encouraged hagiographic deference, as can 
be seen even to this day” (Birth of Homeopathy, Introduction, location 162, par. 13). Hufeland is 
15
medical practice by promoting the foundation of a new remedial system, 
Hufeland celebrated Hahnemann's developments and was hopeful about 
homeopathy's potential to effectively prevent epidemics without risking the 
lives of those in need of protection. Despite its documented success during 
times of epidemics and the promising precedent it established for the politics 
of public health interventions, Hufeland's reservations were later confirmed 
and homeopathy never rose to prominence as Hahnemann had hoped. By 
extension, the political implications of the homeopathic prevention of infectious 
disease remain, in many respects, an untold story. 
Yet, in view of the enduring controversies that continue to plague the 
project of immunizing communities, it is a story worth telling. It represents an 
alternative trajectory to modern developments in immunology and risk 
analysis, which have come to define our relations with others—indeed our 
very existence—as an inevitable negotiation of risk. Uniquely positioned to 
illuminate the historical contingency of our modern understanding of immunity, 
this is a story that gestures towards alternative ways of living in and fostering 
healthy community. Indeed, more than suggest an alternative method of 
prophylaxis, a politico-historical reading of Hahnemann's medical innovations 
offers insight into a different approach to understanding and interacting with 
life – both individual and collective – than that operative in the modern practice 
rightfully recognized for his relatively fair and balanced accounts of new medical innovations, 
including, for example, the introduction of vaccination in Germany (See Pfeifer, “Der Weg zur 
Pockenschutzimpfung” in Medizin der Goethezeit, 192-99). His assessment of Hahnemann's 
contributions to preventative medicine is accordingly valuable reading for all those interested in the 
history of homeopathy, whether they be critical, sympathetic, or neutral in their orientation. 
16
of vaccination. That is, the divergent political implications of inoculation and 
homeopathy are indicative of an underlying incompatibility between the 
epistemological and ontological assumptions that, respectively, inform and are 
informed by these medical techniques. Stated otherwise, the differences 
between these two preventative strategies signal nothing less than a 
fundamental difference in our understanding of how we, as living organisms, 
live in and interact with the world and, no less radically, of how we should best 
navigate our limited capacity to understand these complex interactions.11  
From this perspective, the differences between vaccination and 
homeopathy can also be said to reflect the different epistemes in which they 
were developed.12 According to Michel Foucault, an episteme refers to “the 
total set of relations that unite, at a given period, the discursive practices that 
give rise to epistemological figures, sciences, and possibly formalized 
systems” (Archeology 191). In other words, it refers to the fundamental 
epistemological assumptions that govern a particular movement in the history 
of ideas, assumptions that are often so basic so as to be invisible to those 
employing them, but that can be discovered when one analyzes them at the 
level of discursive regularities that occur across the sciences. In view of the 
11 Rather than acknowledge the philosophical discrepancies between these two prophylactic 
procedures, most “comparisons” of vaccination and homeopathy simply impose the epistemological 
and ontological assumptions operative in modern understandings of immunity onto the practice of 
homeopathy. See, for example, CBC's “Shot of Confusion” and “Vaccine Alternatives Offered by 
Homeopaths 'Irresponsible.'” 
12 Though homeopathy can not easily be classified under the epistemes of Classicism, the Renaissance, 
or Modernity that Michel Foucault describes, but rather under one that I will designate as distinctly 
romantic. 
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different epistemological assumptions operative in each prophylactic method, I 
will demonstrate that, although they were developed in the same year and 
both were advanced with a similar political interest in containing the spread of 
infectious disease, vaccination and homeopathy are nevertheless worlds 
apart. Informed by a distinctly romantic episteme, Hahnemann’s nuanced 
understanding of disease etiology and, even more fundamentally, of an 
organism's relation to the world in which it lives, initiated a trajectory of 
disease prevention that diverges radically from the modern development of 
vaccination and its political implications. 
Homeopathy and the Episteme of German Romanticism
Although he issued harsh criticisms against their speculative tendencies, 
Hahnemann's therapeutics were nevertheless strongly influenced by early 
German romantic philosophy and Naturphilosophie, both of which prompted 
alternatives to the reductionism characteristic of modern science. Critical of 
the ways in which modernity had estranged humans from the natural world 
and had disenchanted nature with the imposition of narrowly analytic 
structures, the early German Romantics13 sought to re-enchant nature by 
insisting that its mysterious forces could never be exhaustively comprehended 
by analytic reason (Stone, “Schlegel,” 4). According to Frederick Beiser, the 
primary aim of early German Romanticism was social and political: “to 
13 Among the early German Romantics, Beiser includes Friedrich Schlegel, Friedrich von Hardenberg 
(Novalis), Friedrich Schleiermacher, and Friedrich Schelling. 
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overcome the alienation and disenchantment created by modernity, and to 
restore unity with oneself, others, and nature.” He accordingly contextualizes 
all aspects of this movement – including its preference for community over 
antagonistic egoism and its commitment to an organic concept of nature over 
a mechanistic worldview –  in terms of its overall goal “to cure humanity of 
homesickness and to make people feel at home in the world again.” Similarly, 
in their critique of mechanistic, materialistic, and deterministic science and its 
betrayal of nature's complexity, Naturphilosophen demanded “not merely a 
theoretical or epistemological shift, but a reformulation of the relation between 
human beings and nature, often entailing novel political or ethical 
commitments” (Peterson xi). In line with this trajectory, although consisting of a 
plurality of diverging responses to the insufficiency of inorganic sciences to 
illuminate living processes, one of the recurring themes that characterizes the 
romantic movement in the history of German medicine (ca.1795-1840) is its 
recognition of the inherent interconnectedness of life. 
Indicative of his place within this tradition (De Almeida 3; Handley 36; 
55; Kuzniar, “Romantic Vitalism,” 165-66),14 like his contemporary romantic 
philosophers and physicians, Hahnemann understood the natural world as 
dynamic, organic, and interconnected, and focused on integrating human 
beings into, rather than severing them from it, an approach that directly 
informed his response to disease. As Alice Kuzniar observes of Hahnemann's 
14 Most notably, see Kuzniar's recent monograph, The Birth of Homeopathy out of the Spirit of 
Romanticism.
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romantic influences, although homeopathy may, at first glance, seem to 
resemble inoculation, a differentiated understanding of how health and 
disease affect living organisms renders these two prophylactic procedures 
vastly different: “homeopathy relies on opening oneself up to the slightest 
modification offered by the dynamized medicine, while inoculation permits one 
to seal off and protect oneself from susceptibility to toxic influence” (“Romantic 
Vitalism” 163-64). To state the difference concisely: “inoculation means 
developing a resistance, a hardening, or habituation, precisely in order to 
avoid susceptibility that is the precondition for homeopathy's effectiveness” 
(“Romantic Vitalism” 179). Focusing his treatment on the unique susceptibility 
of an organism, Hahnemann observed that when a person is predisposed to a 
particular disease, even the slightest exposure will be infective. More 
importantly, it was in view of the heightened sensitivity of people who fall ill to 
infectious diseases that he understood the efficacy of both preventative and 
remedial treatment: it is precisely those who are most vulnerable to a 
particular disease, he observed, who are also most responsive to a well-
indicated remedy, that is, a remedy selected for inducing symptoms similar to 
those produced by the disease it is designed to prevent or treat. In this way, 
Hahnemann found a way to address susceptibility to disease by working with 
an organism's unique receptivity to its external environment rather than 
providing a form of protection that sealed it off from it. In Kuzniar's words: “if 
homeopathy presumes and enhances the integrity of the body, at the same 
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time this body is a permeable membrane” (Birth of Homeopathy, Ch. 3, 
location 2762, par. 68).
In developing his prophylactic method in view of the irreducible 
singularity of an organism's responsiveness to its environment, Hahnemann 
renounced the need to unnecessarily impose risk on individual bodies. As 
Kuzniar notes, “Homeopathy avoids any poisoning that allopathic medicine 
might generate; it also steers clear of the spectre of contamination by a 
nonhuman substance (actually, from the instruments used) attributable to 
vaccination” (Birth of Homeopathy, Ch. 3, location 2762, par. 68). Applying this 
observation to the political implications of Hahnemann's prevention of 
infectious disease, I will argue that he also renounced the possibility that such 
an allocation of risk could possibly benefit the community. Informed by 
German Romantics' appreciation for the inherent interconnectivity of nature, 
Hahnemann was predisposed to approach community health in view of an 
organism's relations with its external environment and to thereby promote a 
more fluid and porous exchange between the parts and the whole. In short: 
his integrative ontology of nature supported a radically different politics than 
that operative in the controversy surrounding vaccination and its insulating 
treatment of individual and community life.
Insofar as Hahnemann's attention to an organism's unique 
responsiveness to its external environment is inherently at odds with the 
calculation of risk used by proponents of variolation and vaccination – which 
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attempted to generalize the effects of medical intervention across the 
population – his method also implies a different epistemology than that 
operative in the distribution of inoculation. Promulgated on the basis of risk 
analysis and the calculation of possibilities, variolation and vaccination were 
implicated in the development of a narrowly analytic form of rationality that 
arose, generally, to demystify the secret workings of nature and, in particular, 
to address the corresponding problem of medical uncertainty. As such, the 
effort to more effectively prevent infectious diseases with ever more 
sophisticated mathematical calculations – however noble – was involved in 
the “disenchantment of nature,” a designation that Max Weber would later use 
to describe a world in which “we are no longer ruled by mysterious, 
unpredictable forces, but that, on the contrary, we can in principle control 
everything by means of calculation” (13).15 In contrast, Hahnemann, who was 
informed by a distinctly romantic response to the problem of medical 
uncertainty, sought to achieve greater precision in medical practice not 
through an analytic assessment of competing risks, but, rather, by cultivating 
the power to observe living organisms as integrated identities, a faculty that 
German Romantics referred to as intellectual intuition. 
In concrete terms, rather than mathematically distribute the variables 
affecting health and its prevention across the population, a level at which they 
could be better comprehended by analytic rationality, Hahnemann sought to 
15 To read more about the early German Romantics' commitment to the re-enchantment of nature and 
how their work anticipates Weber's account of disenchantment, see Stone's essay, “Friedrich 
Schlegel, Romanticism, and the Re-enchantment of Nature.” 
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improve his capacity to recognize the unique susceptibility of an organism to 
its external environment. And, as we will see, during epidemics, he extended 
this method of observing individual organisms to the community as a whole. 
That is, his method of selecting an appropriate remedy for all those infected by 
a circulating disease required the capacity to recognize across the differences 
of each and every unique symptom picture an underlying unity. In this way, his 
method reflected what Dalia Nassar identifies as the romantic conviction “that 
nature as an integrated nexus is a unity that emerges only in and through 
difference” (Romantic Absolute 3). Opposed to the standardization of medical 
practice that was occurring during his lifetime (Kuzniar, Birth of Homeopathy, 
Ch. 2, location 1195, par. 4), Hahnemann's response to community health 
provides a striking example of the Romantics' sophisticated understanding of 
unity, that is, a unity that “is not abstract or general, but concrete and internally 
differentiated” (Nassar, Romantic Absolute, 4).
Hahnemann's method of observing organisms – both singular and 
social – as differentiated unities is essential to understanding not only the 
political significance of his romantic influences, but also the coherence of his 
work. Otherwise it is difficult to reconcile, on the one hand, Hahnemann's 
unprecedented attention to the individual organism with, on the other hand, his 
relatively uniform method of preventing infectious disease. As Kuzniar 
observes in The Birth of Homeopathy Out of the Spirit of Romanticism, 
Hahnemann “believed in the specificity of each individual” (Ch. 2, location 
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1279, par. 10), a conviction that she identifies with the ideals of romanticism, 
which “defended uniqueness, celebrated individuality, and admired irreducible 
integrity” (Ch. 2, location 1333, par. 13). From this perspective, she 
emphasizes Hahnemann's criticism of allopathic medicine “for attempting to 
reduce separate manifestations of an illness to one cause, whereas he saw 
each discrete case as distinctive. He swore that it was always the person with 
the disease who must be treated, not the disease itself” (Ch. 2, location 1350, 
par. 15).16 Recognizing the way in which Hahnemann's insistence on the 
individuality of each ailment directly relates to his call for physicians to be as 
sympathizing and attentive as possible (Ch. 2, location 1364, par. 16), Kuzniar 
argues that its emphasis on the personalization of the symptom explains both 
homeopathy's historical and continued success. Its move away from an earlier 
mechanized view of the body to focus on communicated self-attentiveness 
was especially appealing to Hahnemann's patients, who experienced their 
symptoms to be absolutely exceptional (Ch. 2, location 1517, par. 29), and its 
emphasis on individuality remains favourable to many “even today in a health-
16 While Kuzniar remains nuanced in her position, Wischner rightly observes that the biggest mistake 
in the reception of homeopathy is the belief that in homeopathy there are no diseases, only diseased 
people (104). Wischner insists that Hahnemann never formulated such a statement and that in view 
of Hahnemann's understanding of fixed diseases (“festständigen Krankheiten”) there is no doubt 
that he had an understanding of real, existing, diseases (105). Hahnemann provides a concise 
summary of his nuanced understanding of disease in his “Essay on a New Principle for Ascertaining 
the Curative Powers of Drugs”: “Now, when I entirely deny that there are absolute specifics for 
individual diseases, in their full extent, as they are described in ordinary works on pathology, I am, 
on the other hand, convinced that there are as many specifics as there are different states of 
individual diseases, i.e., that there are peculiar specifics for the pure disease, and others for its 
varieties, and for other abnormal states of the system” (260-61). For a helpful summary of 
Hahnemann's understanding of the dual nature of disease, see Decker and Verspoor, “Chapter 7: 
Two Approaches to and Two Types of Specific Remedies for Disease” in The Dynamic Legacy.
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care environment where the allopathic practitioner rarely spends over ten 
minutes with a client” (Ch. 2, location 1444, par. 22).
Yet, during his lifetime, Hahnemann enjoyed the greatest gains in 
popularity following his documented success with epidemic diseases, which 
decidedly did not emphasize the irreducible singularity of each and every 
individual's unique manifestation of symptoms. Following his treatment of 
epidemic typhus in 1813, for example, Hahnemann's consultations grew 
fivefold within four months (Jütte 57). He similarly received increased 
recognition, including from government officials, in 1831 for his 
recommendations on how to prevent and treat cholera, so much so that his 
pupil Karl Julius Aegidi celebrated the disease for its role in “increasing the 
love of homeopathy” (qtd. in Jütte 90). According to Ameke, “[a]ll the evidence 
points to the fact that the spread of homeopathy increased rapidly during and 
after the cholera; the self-reliance and confidence of the homeopaths grew, 
and the irritation of their opponents reached the highest pitch” (249).
In contrast with his attention to the way in which chronic diseases find 
unique expression in each and every individual and so require an 
individualized approach to remediation, in his treatment of epidemic diseases, 
Hahnemann selected a remedy based on its similarity to the disease itself, 
recognizing its underlying unity despite the various ways in which it expressed 
itself in different people.17 As he notes in “The Medicine of Experience”:
17 Acknowledging that there are a few exceptions to Hahnemann's insistence that all diseases are 
dissimilar and innumerable, Kuzniar turns to his later views on the inherited chronic diseases, which 
he considered to be generalizable diseases, as a possible counter-example. Yet even here, Kuzniar 
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We observe a few diseases that always arise from one 
and the same cause, e.g., the miasmatic maladies; 
hydrophobia, venereal disease, the plague of the Levant, 
yellow fever, small-pox, cow-pox, the measles and some 
others, which bears upon them the distinctive mark of 
always remaining diseases of a peculiar character; and, 
because they arise from a contagious principle that always 
remains the same, they also retain the same character 
and pursue the same course, excepting regards some 
accidental concomitant circumstances, which however do 
not alter their essential character (440).
Based on this insight, Hahnemann generally prescribed a single remedy, or a 
limited set of possible remedies, whether prophylactically or curatively, for all 
those affected by a particular epidemic disease.18 Yet, as I will later detail, his 
transition from the individual to the community involved neither a 
generalization of risks nor a standardization of demographics, but rather a 
notes, “he believed in the poly-etiology and individuality of illness,” concluding that “[c]learly, 
Hahnemann's entire system of homeopathy is founded on [the] personalization of the symptom” 
(Birth of Homeopathy, Ch. 2, location 1444, par. 22). It is, however, not immediately clear how she 
would fit Hahnemann's treatment of epidemic diseases into this system, where remedies are not 
based on the personalization of the symptom, but rather selected in light of their similarity to the 
disease itself. This aspect of homeopathy may prove illuminating in view of the “marked 
discrepancy” that Kuzniar identifies when she compares Hahnemann's theory to individualize each 
patient's case with his case notes (Krankenjournale), in particular with instances in which he 
prescribed a single remedy to all visiting patients. According to Kuzniar, the high rate of occurrence 
with which the same remedy was given simultaneously to several patients raises the question of 
“whether Hahnemann's praxis was truly tailored to the individual” (Birth of Homeopathy, Ch. 2, 
location 1538, par. 22).
18 For a detailed overview of Hahnemann's distinction between fixed and transient diseases, see 
Wischner, “Die Lehre von der Krankheiten,” Fortschritt oder Sackgasse, 75-147.
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method of observing symptoms concurrently at the levels of the individual and 
the community. In this way, his attention to the health of the population 
remained inextricably bound to the lived experiences among the multiplicity of 
individuals that populated it, a feature that bodes well for the affirmative 
potential of romantic biopolitics. 
Overlooking the political significance of an approach to community 
health that implements the Romantics' differentiated understanding of unity 
and the relation of the part to the whole, traditional historiography has 
generally treated the German romantic movement “like a pariah among the 
medical-historical episodes” (Galdston 346), a warning of the violence that 
occurs when medicine is divorced from empiricism and is lost in a 
philosophical play of empty phrases. More recently, however, a more nuanced 
understanding of the important role that observation played for the Romantics, 
along with a greater appreciation of the ways in which more empirically-
oriented physicians, such as Hahnemann, were influenced by the romantic 
ideals of their contemporaries, has problematized such dismissive readings of 
this unique chapter in the history of medicine.19 Moreover, a sobering 
recognition of the limitations of modern medicine, especially in the fields of 
psychiatry and immunology, has revived interest in romantic medicine 
(Tsouyopoulos, “German Philosophy” 345). As Iago Galdston affirms, “the 
recognition which the Romantics shared in common, of the linkage of man to 
19 See, for example, Nassar, “From Philosophy of Self to a Philosophy of Nature” and Tsouyopoulos 
“Schellings Konzeption der Medizin als Wissenschaft.”
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the universe and of the universe to man” (361), has promising implications for 
the practice of medicine. By extension, a deeper understanding of the inherent 
interconnectedness of living organisms and the natural world stands to 
provide a necessary corrective to our modern isolation in a risk-laden world. 
A Romantic Remedy for a Biopolitical Problem   
Inspired by this revived interest in German romantic medicine, I turn to a 
medical practice brought forth by this tradition – homeopathy – in response to 
an enduring problem in the contemporary study of biopolitics, a problem 
brought to the fore in the question of vaccination but certainly not confined to 
it: is it possible to protect life without inadvertently endangering it? More 
affirmatively, I outline an alternative politics of life that emerges from the 
German romantic tradition of medicine – operative in the homeopathic 
prevention of epidemics – in order to challenge the seeming inevitability of 
biopolitics' reversal into an instrument that indirectly puts the life it is designed 
to protect in peril and that thereby problematizes the relationship between the 
singular and the social. 
Biopolitics, the political management of life at the level of the 
population, is beset by a tragic paradox: the ability to regulate the vitality of a 
population has been historically linked to an increasingly sophisticated 
administration of death. This seemingly insoluble problem has haunted 
thinkers since Foucault introduced it in his analysis of the emergence of 
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biopower, that is, the rise of the modern state's hold on life, its “acquisition of 
man insofar as man is a living being” (Society 239). Foucault's analyses 
highlight the myriad ways in which the state's ability to regulate and enhance 
the vitality of a population are inextricably related to its capacity for 
increasingly all-encompassing administrations of life to the point of control 
over its death. As he presents it, biopower acquires its capacity for violence by 
isolating bodies, both individual and collective. More specifically, biopower 
gains control over life both by segregating a multiplicity of individuals into 
distinct bodies that, through various processes of normalization, can be 
monitored and controlled, and by massifying that multiplicity into a population 
that can be surveilled and influenced. While this process of subsuming the 
biological under state control enables a more efficient management and, in 
many cases, enhancement of life, Foucault warns that it also results in a 
potentially violent disconnect between the 'population' as an object of analysis 
and intervention and the multiplicity of individuals. When the 'population' is 
divorced from the multiplicity that populates it, he observes, it becomes 
possible to legitimize the sacrifice of certain lives in order to safeguard the life 
of the population as a whole. In this way, by seizing life, in both its singular 
and social forms, and severing it from its living context, biopower engages not 
only in the protection of life, but also in its demise. 
In view of the simultaneously protective and destructive capacities of 
enclosing life from its (at times threatening, at other times nurturing) 
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surroundings, a number of contemporary thinkers interested in developing 
approaches to life that offer protection without sacrifice resist the isolation and 
insulation of living organisms by emphasizing their inherent interconnectivity 
and mutual vulnerability.20 Others attempt to rescue the multiplicity of 
individuals from the stifling homogeneity of “the population” by emphasizing 
the diversity of community and the irreducible singularity of its members.21 In 
this way, several recent contributions in the field of biopolitics resonate with 
the project of German Romanticism: they respond to the potential for 
biopolitical violence by supporting approaches to life that promote more open 
and fluid exchange across nevertheless protective and differentiating 
boundaries. 
And yet, despite these important points of convergence, “[r]omanticism 
occupies an ambivalent position in the most influential contemporary 
theoretical accounts of biopolitics.” As Alastair Hunt and Matthias Rudolf 
observe, although romanticism appears at a pivotal moment in the history of 
biopolitics, especially in the British and German traditions, biopolitical theorists 
have consistently overlooked romantic contributions. Tracing this tendency 
within biopolitical thought back to its founder, they note that, “while Foucault 
locates the emergence of biopower at the 'threshold of modernity'—the very 
historical moment punctuated by the emergence of romanticism—his historical 
20 This list includes, among others, Roberto Esposito, Donna Haraway and Judith Butler, and is 
exemplified by the 'posthumanism' turn in the contemporary study of biopolitics. See Cary Wolfe, 
“The Biopolitics of Posthumanism.”
21 This approach is epitomized by the work of Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, in particular their 
notion of “the multitude” as “a set of singularities” (Commonwealth xiii).
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analyses circumvent romanticism.” Faced with “symmetrical views of the same 
terrain – the view of biopolitics without romanticism, and the view of 
romanticism without biopolitics” – they encourage scholarship that explores 
“the implications of the biopolitical problematic for romanticism.” Without 
denying the importance of this pursuit, in the following work I reverse this 
emphasis and instead consider the equally important implications of 
romanticism for the biopolitical problematic. While the former approach is 
admittedly more compatible with the critical orientation of biopolitical study, I 
find the latter to be more resonant with the effort to trace the contours of an 
affirmative politics of life. I maintain that the endeavor to establish a life-giving 
basis for biopolitics requires more than a critical problematization of 
contemporary and historical interventions into life; it also demands of us the 
courage to posit – however tentatively – an alternative method of engaging 
with life.
While I find many aspects of German Romanticism – in particular its 
ethics, aesthetics, ontology, and epistemology – relevant for addressing the 
challenges at the heart of biopolitics, in the attempt to most directly respond to 
the concerns raised by Foucault's analyses of biopower, I hone in on how 
these philosophical contributions are operative in a historically-situated 
medical technique that arose out of this movement. As Maren Klawiter 
observes, in Foucault's account of biopower, medicine is “a particularly dense 
point of transfer within the modern circularity of power” (23). More specifically, 
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Foucault's interest in how biopower functions to both subjugate bodies and 
control populations leads him to interrogate how the isolating mechanisms of 
modern medicine are operative in both its clinical and public health 
applications. The genealogy of biopower's grip on the body can be traced 
back to the rise of scientific medicine or what Foucault termed the “clinical 
gaze” and its control over the population back to the modern apparatus of 
public health, or what might be called the “epidemiological gaze” (Klawiter 23).
To this end, his work focuses on dominant trends in the history of clinical and 
public medicine that highlight power's tendency to isolate and control life, 
sometimes even to the point of death. But there is a rich plurality of other 
developments in the history of medicine that remain unmentioned in his 
historical-political analysis, developments – such as those emerging from the 
romantic tradition that he consistently overlooked – that designate life without 
divorcing it from its living context and that postulate community without 
eroding the unique singularity of its members. Such developments, by 
extension, suggest alternative outcomes to his reading of the rise of modern 
biopower. As Foucault himself observes, “among the cultural inventions of 
mankind there is a treasury of devices, techniques, ideas, procedures, and so 
on, that cannot exactly be reactivated, but [that] at least constitute, or help 
constitute, a certain point of view which can be very useful as a tool for 
analyzing what's going on now—and how to change it” (“Afterword” 236). In 
other words, “understanding the immense array of possible historic and 
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present alternatives provides the only way of making an informed choice 
about the technologies and techniques in which one can participate” (Gerrie).
In view of the extensive range of medical interventions available in the 
history of medicine, the biopolitical question guiding this study – namely, how 
does the relationship between the multiplicity of individuals and the collectivity 
of the population either enable biopower's potential for violence or provide a 
safeguard against it? – prompts me to focus on the prevention of epidemics. 
Highlighting the political nature of infectious disease prevention, Ed Cohen 
notes that the very word 'epidemic' (meaning “among the people”) derives 
from the Greek word demos, a term that, in contrast with 'epizootic' (derived 
from zoon, meaning “nonpolitical animal life”), denotes a geopolitical district. 
He reasons that “if 'epidemics' presuppose that illness carries significance as 
a political form of life, then defining immunity as exemption from such 
epidemic illnesses concomitantly frames it within the same biologic” (176). 
When political leaders assume the task of immunizing individuals, especially 
when the immunity in question is against endemic life-threatening diseases, 
they act precisely as a political sovereign does, defining those whom it 
exempts from otherwise binding laws. Cohen argues that “if we remember that 
Foucault characterizes the political sovereign as the one who bears the ‘right 
to take life or let live,’ then immunity in both its political and medical valences 
evinces such a power” (176). In other words, prophylactic interventions 
against infectious diseases are, by definition, political interventions. They “go 
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to the heart of the social contract, requiring a determination of where the line 
runs between the interests of the individual and those of the community” 
(Baldwin 563). 
Reinforcing the foundational role that the prevention of epidemics 
played in the modern rise of biopower and the formation of the nation state, in 
his comparative reading of various European states' responses to infectious 
disease between 1830 and 1930, medical historical Peter Baldwin remarks 
that it is not immediately clear whether “prophylaxis is a continuation of politics 
with other means” or whether “politics were shaped by the imperatives of 
prevention” (2).22 What is clear, however, is that the precise ways in which the 
lines of distinction are drawn between the singular and the social organism 
vary among different prophylactic methods. Not all preventative health 
strategies position the individual and community in antagonistic relation to 
each other – such that the survival of the one threatens the well-being of the 
other – and, by extension, not all methods of protecting life run the risk of 
inadvertently endangering it. 
According to Baldwin, “over the longue dureé of western thinking about 
diseases and their causes” (9), it is possible to distinguish between “a focus 
on the environmental background of epidemic disease [miasm theory] and its 
transmissibility among humans; prophylactically, between attempts to 
22 For his part, Baldwin convincingly concludes that:
It was not British liberalism or German interventionism (to take again the outliers) that, by 
themselves, determined prophylactic strategies, but the imperatives of geoepidemiology, and 
the associated factors identified here, that helped shape not only the preventive precautions 
they encouraged, but indeed the very political traditions of these nations (563).
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ameliorate toxic surroundings and limiting contagious spread” (9). 
Acknowledging that a strictly binary view of either disease etiology or 
prophylaxis would be a distortion (7) – in fact strategies to prevent or contain 
the spread of infectious disease were multiple and mutually permeable – he 
nevertheless finds it helpful to maintain the distinction in view of the respective 
political implications of each prophylactic approach. At its broadest, Baldwin 
summarizes:
this etiological distinction separates, on the one hand, a view of 
disease as an imbalance between humans and the environment 
whose prevention requires a reequilibriation from an understanding, 
on the other, of illness as the outcome of a specific external attack 
on the autonomous integrity of the body, which, if not preventable 
(by vaccination) or curable through various targeted medical 
manipulations, can at least be rendered innocuous, from the 
community’s point of view, by ensuring that the victim does not 
infect others (16-7).
He observes that, generally, an environmental understanding of disease 
etiology and a corresponding emphasis on sanitary reforms were considered 
liberal, allowing for freedom of movement (and trade!) and freedom from 
invasive medical intervention. Those who emphasized the importance of 
separating sewage from clean drinking water, for example, and providing more 
spacious housing and nutrient-dense food, often prided themselves on 
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demanding “no costly tradeoffs between the respective interests of the 
individual and community” (14). In contrast, prophylactic methods designed to 
interrupt the transmission of diseases, whether through inoculation or 
quarantine, were often thought to involve “violations of the freedom and bodily 
integrity of those feared as infectious, subordinating the (afflicted) individual to 
the interests of the community” (18). 
As we will see, although Hahnemann emphasized the importance of 
environmental and lifestyle considerations in the prevention of epidemics and 
insisted on the immateriality of disease, it is obvious that he was nevertheless 
partial to the transmission theory of contagious disease (Jütte 89).23 
Acknowledging that some instances of acute diseases (or acute flare ups of 
chronic diseases) are the result of individual predisposition or external 
influences, in the Organon he also identifies others that are 'epidemic,' that is, 
contagious diseases that seize many people and illicit similar symptoms in 
each and every one of them (§73).24 His commitment to the transmission 
theory of disease is especially evident in his writings on cholera, in particular, 
in his “Appeal to Thinking Philanthropists Respecting the Mode of Propagation 
of the Asiatic Cholera.”25 Here Hahnemann explicitly denounces the theory 
23 See also Wischner, “Die Lehre von der Krankheiten,” Fortschritt oder Sackgasse. 75-147.
24 Unless indicated otherwise, all references to Hahnemann's Organon refer to the sixth and final 
edition. 
25 Providing an earlier example of Hahnemann's preference for the transmission theory of disease, 
Robert Jütte notes that although other eighteenth-century physicians thought that scabies was caused 
by “small living insects or mites,” this did not immediately impact their choice of treatment: “The 
traditional doctrine of the four humours as well as a number of ineffective home remedies continued 
to prevail, while Hahnemann was the only one to recommend, as early as 1792, the use of sulphur 
solutions to destroy the mites” (84). Kuzniar emphasizes that “Even in an era before Rudolf Carl 
Virchow’s (1821-1902) germ theory of disease and the ensuing drills of quarantine, disinfection, and 
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that the disease is spread through an “atmospheric-telluric nature” in favour of 
the conviction that it is “communicable by contagion only, and propagated from 
one individual to another” (756). 
Presenting a relatively nuanced understanding of disease transmission 
that some consider to be prototypical of modern germ theory and immunology 
(Scheible 54-9), Hahnemann criticizes the faulty conclusion that, since some 
individuals do not fall ill to the disease, that it is therefore not contagious. He 
considers it a “wonderfully benevolent arrangement of God” that it is “possible 
for man to fortify himself against, and render himself unsusceptable to, the 
most deadly distempers” that is, “if he gradually approaches it” and “has an 
undebilitated body” (759). But he chastises physicians and nurses who boast, 
in light of their capacity to treat sick patients without themselves falling ill, that 
the disease is therefore not contagious. He considers this assertion to be 
“presumptuous, inconsiderate, and perfectly untrue,” and, more critically, one 
that has “cost thousands of lives” (760). After all, he argues, when such 
physicians and nurses, themselves fortified against the disease, leave the 
patient:
they take away with them in their clothes, in their skin, in their hair, 
probably also in their breath, the invisible (probably animated 
[wahrscheinlich lebendigen]) and perpetually reproductive 
sterilization, he counseled against kissing others, handshaking, drinking from their glass, and using 
their toilet” (Birth of Homeopathy, location 317, par. 27). See also Hahnemann's writings on “The 
Visitor of the Sick” and “Protection Against Infection in Epidemic Diseases” in “Friends of Health” 
(1792). 
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contagious matter surrounding the cholera patient . . . and this 
contagious matter they unconsciously and unsuspectingly carry 
along with them throughout the town and to their acquaintances, 
whom it unexpectedly and infallibly infects, without the slightest 
suspicion on their part of its source (760).
From this perspective, he considers physicians and nurses to be “the most 
certain and frequent propagators and communicators of contagion far and 
wide” (760). He accordingly pleads to all “thinking philanthropists” to accept 
the transmission theory of contagious disease and, by extension, to adopt 
methods that interrupt the circulation of disease.
As indicated by his harsh condemnation of those whose ignorance 
exposes others to infection, Hahnemann recognized the responsibility that 
individuals – especially physicians26 – have to others in their personal 
management of contagious disease. In other words, his approach to 
communicable diseases was not one that heralded the rights and freedoms of 
individuals over the security of the community. And yet, I will argue, although 
he aligned himself with the transmission theory of disease, his approach to 
prophylaxis also did not subordinate the health of the singular organism to that 
of the social. His distinctly romantic method of observing organisms enabled 
him to recognize the inherent inextricability between the multiplicity of 
individuals and the community. From this perspective, what is most 
26 Hahnemann also describes a similar pattern in sailors who, after building resistance to cholera 
onboard, expose susceptible individuals to the disease when they return to land.
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illuminating about Hahnemann's development of homeoprophylaxis is the way 
in which it develops so closely alongside the modern prevention of epidemics 
– most notably vaccination – and yet consistently diverges on precisely those 
points that impact its implications for community relations. 
Insofar as I trace the seemingly insoluble controversies in the vaccine 
debate over the interests of the individual versus those of the community back 
to the statistical distribution of risks, I am interested in the potential corrective 
provided by Hahnemann's commitment to developing a method of prophylactic 
intervention that follows the medical maxim to first do no harm, Primum non 
nocere.27 While it is impossible to predict all possible side effects of a medical 
intervention, this mandate challenges physicians to refrain from any procedure 
that has demonstrated its capacity for harm, whether imminent or long-term, 
inadvertent or intended, even if it is to avert a potentially greater, future harm. 
It was cited as one of the main medical objections that arose in response to 
variolation, and later, vaccination, that could not be addressed by the 
calculation of risks that ultimately justified the admission of inoculation into 
27 Though this maxim is often attributed to Hippocrates, more recent studies suggest that the author 
was neither Hippocrates nor Galen. One of its first uses in English has been traced back to a book 
by Thomas Inman, Foundation of a New Theory and Practice of Medicine, published in 1860. 
Inman attributes the aphorism to the famous English physician, Thomas Sydenham (1624-1689): 
“Lest it should be objected that our opinions are new-fangled, and therefore unworthy of credence, 
we crouch under the cloak of Sydenham, and say, that our motto is none other that [sic] a translation 
of his Latin aphorism respecting a physician's duties, viz.: – “Primum est ut non nocere” (qtd. in 
Smith 372). Inman, however, does not provide an explicit citation or reference and the aphorism has 
not yet been located in Sydenham's works or biographies. Others trace the expression back to 
Worthington Hooker, who introduces the concept in 1847, attributing it to the oral teaching of a 
Parisian pathologist, François Chomel: “The golden axiom of Chomel, that it is only the second law 
of therapeutics to do good, its first law being this – not to do harm – is gradually finding its way into 
the medical mind, preventing an incalculable amount of positive ill” (qtd. in Smith 374). For a 
detailed discussion on the history of this concept, see Smith. 
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mainstream practice; it could only be overridden. It accordingly provides a 
baseline against which to consider the particular problems that surround the 
decision to vaccinate. It also provides a strategy for opting out of the logic of 
risk analysis employed to legitimize the practice of vaccination, preserving the 
possibility that medicine can effectively prevent disease without actively 
introducing harm to the organisms that it serves to protect. In this way, it 
denies the foreclosure of alternative strategies that is implied in the risk 
analysis of vaccination, which suggests that there are no options outside of 
the risks of infectious disease and prophylaxis: one risks either the side effects 
of vaccination or the complications associated with the diseases they are 
designed to prevent. 
Thomas Osborne identifies the rise of modern public health policy – the 
penultimate expression of modern biopolitics –  with the opening of a gap 
between the two terms of 'health' and 'policy,' that is, “when the relation 
between them was implicitly acknowledged to be dogged by a certain 
indeterminacy” (“Health and Statecraft” 178). One response to the problem of 
medical uncertainty, a response that Foucault emphasizes, lead to the 
calculation of probabilities and the rationalization of risk that helped usher 
inoculation into mainstream practice. It also gave rise to the problematic 
disconnect between the population and the multiplicity of individuals that we 
have come to associate with the violent inclinations of modern biopolitics. But 
this was not the only response. Heavily influenced by Immanuel Kant (1724-
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1804), the romantic movement in German medicine developed radically 
different ways of addressing the problem of medical uncertainty than those 
representative of the English Enlightenment. Reluctant to accept the limits of 
finite rationality, they denied the supremacy of discursive thought and 
developed other, more intuitive, approaches to grasping organisms as they 
are engaged in living processes. The Romantics' responses generated an 
understanding of our relationship with the organic world – including the world 
of infectious disease – that was defined, not by risk, which spurs the erection 
of impermeable boundaries and the annihilation of the other, but by fluid and 
open interchange. I accordingly turn to a historically-situated public health 
practice ushered forth by this tradition to consider the alternative strategies it 
developed to reconcile the needs of the individual with the demands of the 
community in the prevention of communicable diseases. 
In response to the many current theses that attempt to identify the origins 
of modern biopolitics, I emphasize that there are multiple medical technologies 
that take life as their object. More specifically, I recognize, in the German 
Romantics' treatment of life an overlooked alternative to the 'biopolitics' that 
Foucault identifies with modernity. I contend that the problems at the heart of 
modern biopolitics must be approached in view of the latter’s complex origins: 
instead of affirming the inextricable relationship between a politics of life and a 
politics of death, I challenge it by presenting a historical alternative. 
41
The Politics of Risk  
By approaching the politics of prevention in view of the risk factors that a 
particular prophylactic method may or may not introduce, I hope to find a more 
accurate indication of the relationship between the individual and the 
community than is evident in the political or state ideology used to promote it. I 
contend that the competing ideologies used to legitimize a prophylactic 
strategy do not change that strategy’s political implications unless they also 
address the risk factors involved. In other words, the divisive ways in which 
the allocation of risk organizes social relations cannot be resolved by 
presenting it in a more compelling way. In the case of immunization, a 
mercantilist concern for the interests of the late absolute regime was used 
early on to promote variolation and vaccination; proponents argued that this 
procedure promised to increase the population and thus the wealth of the 
state. Later, enlightenment philanthropy and considerations of the common 
good played a major role in legitimizing this medical intervention (Baldwin 246; 
Huerkamp 620; Maehle, “Conflicting Attitudes,” 205; and Wolff, 
Einschneidende,12). More recently, the assumption of risk assumed by those 
who elect to undergo vaccination is promoted by an ethics of altruism (Biss 
21-2). But how do these various ways of legitimizing the burden of risk resolve 
the fundamental way in which the insertion of risk into the public health 
enterprise problematizes the relationship between the individual and the 
community? Were we to confine our criticisms to the mercantilist argument in 
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favour of immunization because of its explicit compromise of the multiplicity of 
individuals for the sake of the whole, we would miss the ways in which the 
same problem continues to plague the decision to vaccinate even when it has 
been reframed in the more socially acceptable language of altruism.
By focusing on the risks associated with vaccination rather than on the 
political legitimization of these risks, I also distinguish my historical account 
from those that deem the most pertinent political issue that arises in the 
practice of immunization to be whether or not its administration is mandatory 
or compulsory. I contend that such readings fail to address the subtler ways in 
which power operates. They nevertheless abound. According to Baldwin: “For 
smallpox, the extremes varied between the compulsory system of universal 
vaccination and revaccination imposed in Germany . . . and the British 
government's inability to maintain similarly strict measures in the face of 
widespread protest, its adoption of a purely voluntary approach” (11). 
Mandatory vaccination is typically associated with the readiness to sacrifice 
individual liberties to the communal good, a position epitomized by the 
German medical police; whereas England's preference for voluntary 
vaccination is considered liberal in its concern for the civil rights of even the 
infectious (529). Reinforcing the traditional dichotomy between liberal England 
and police-minded Germany, analyses that focus exclusively on legislation fail 
to address the critical fact that non-compulsory —that is, voluntary—
vaccination often proved to be just as effective, if not more so, than mandates 
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enforced by law. After all, insofar as Britain's interventionist policies differed 
from those pursued on the continent, they were certainly not developed with 
the hope of doing nothing. They were, rather, selected with the promise of 
being “equally, if not more, effective than the drastic alternatives” (531). That 
is, prominent policy makers in Britain believed that, in the long run, voluntary 
preventative measures would achieve more than harsh compulsion. And, as 
Baldwin observes, seen from a longer historical perspective, this prediction 
turned out to be quite accurate. Indeed, the British prophylactic response to 
contagious diseases “has proven to be the one eventually adopted by most 
other nations, however different their starting points” (531).28 
Finally, by assessing the divergent political implications of vaccination 
and homeopathy in terms of risk rather than in terms of the discourse used to 
navigate between individual rights and the collective good, I am also holding 
out the possibility that a medical intervention need not bring singular and 
social organisms into conflictual relations. From this perspective, I believe 
both pro-individual and pro-community arguments concede too much. I 
accordingly hope to problematize the tendency for both sides of the 
vaccination debate to deepen the severance between the interests of the 
28 This pattern can also be found in the United States. As James Colgrove notes, one of the most 
counterintuitive aspects of the history of vaccination in the United States, “given the early use of 
legal enforcement to protect against smallpox and the extensive network of laws currently in place, 
is that throughout the middle of the twentieth century, health officials relied very little on coercion. 
The preference for persuasion was rooted partly in respect for the principles of liberty and autonomy 
that have occupied such a central position in American civic and political life. Equally important 
were pragmatic reasons. Laws enforced through schools would distract from efforts to protect 
infants, health officials believed, while attempts to force adults would provoke potentially violent 
resistance. Above all, persuasion was felt to be a surer source of behavior change” (5-6).
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community and those of the individual. As Foucault astutely observes, it is as 
futile to pit the rights of the individual against the state as it is to subordinate 
the individual to the needs of the population (“Omnes” 254), since both 
responses reinforce the units of life that biopower controls, or perhaps more 
precisely, the bodies through which power gains access to life. Indeed, 
throughout the long and polarizing conflict between the “pro-” and “anti-” 
vaccine positions, the boundaries between the individual and collective body 
have been reinforced, with both sides reifying a monolithic body while 
remaining quick to point out the contradictions that emerge when their 
opponents do the same. 
As some early anti-vaccine protestors observed, by identifying and 
targeting individual bodies as the locus of disease, the use of vaccination as a 
public health strategy breaks with a long medical tradition that approached 
disease as an imbalance with the environment rather than a specific external 
attack on the body. In contrast with public hygiene methods that focus, for 
example, on providing clean drinking water, effective sewage clearance, and 
spacious housing, vaccination promises to “localize its protocols around the 
individual body to produce aggregate results within the population as a whole” 
(Cohen 87). In this way, although those in favour of vaccination often tend to 
emphasize the common good, denying that a decision that affects public 
health should be left to individual conscience, the efficacy of this medical 
procedure relies on the cooperation or coercion of individual bodies insofar as 
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they are identified as vehicles of contagion. More recent critics have also 
pointed out that the early hope that vaccination could provide lifelong immunity 
was based on the false assumption that immunity is a state that can be 
attained after a single clinical event rather than through ongoing exposure to 
pathogens. Overlooking the critical importance of continual exposure to 
“offending agents” in the development of robust disease protection, “immunity” 
was falsely conceived as a state achieved in and by individual bodies rather 
than through an ongoing symbiotic, open exchange between bodies and their 
environments. Similarly, the principle of herd immunity, often used to 
emphasize the porous relations between individual bodies, presupposes the 
existence of a closed community that has to defend itself from external threats 
in the form of reimported pathogens and internal threats in the form of 
susceptible community members. Herd immunity, or community immunity, we 
are told, acts as a protective barrier to shield susceptible bodies from 
infection. 
And yet, despite their reliance on a conception of closed organisms both 
individual and collective, those in favour of vaccination are usually keen to 
point out the inconsistencies that arise when such delineations are drawn by 
their opponents. More specifically, they criticize those who willingly “free-ride” 
on the “herd immunity” established by their community, claiming that this ill-
conceived decision entertains the false belief that individuals are somehow not 
part of the public. By making a special exemption of themselves, they argue, 
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such individuals perpetuate an illusion of independence—as if the health of 
our bodies is not always dependent on choices that other people make (Biss 
127-29). 
On the other hand, while many early anti-vaccine activists typically 
advocated a more environmental and social approach to medicine, one that 
emphasizes the fluidity between individuals and their surroundings, many 
resisted compulsory vaccination by emphasizing the integrity of the human 
body, drawing a firm boundary between where their flesh begins and where 
the realm of legitimate state intervention ends.29 Feeling the need to defend 
themselves against state coercion, many equated the “common good” with 
state interests in order to demonize both without addressing how individual 
interests could possibly coincide with those of the community. A notable 
exception to this line of argument was made by those who decried the 
violence of medical science in general and so did not need to pit the individual 
against the collective—they simply denied that the “cuttings and maimings” 
involved in vaccination could possibly be for the public good. By focusing on 
the damage caused by vaccination, many anti-vaccine voices could also 
gesture to the hypocrisy of a state that maintained the right of “puncturing 
babies” but claimed no responsibility for the outcome (Durbach Ch. 3, location 
1350, par. 10). How can the decision in favour of vaccination be a social good, 
they would ask rhetorically, but its dangerous side effects not be a social 
29 In Bodily Matters, Nadja Durbach argues that this body politics was particularly characteristic of 
working-class resistance to compulsory vaccination, an aspect of the campaign that middle-class 
anti-vaccination leadership failed to fully address (Ch. 3, location 1677, par. 46).  
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burden?
As the areas of overlap between these counterpositions indicate, 
insofar as both pro- and anti-vaccine advocates have defended (and defined) 
their bodies in response to an external threat, whether it be the state's 
invasiveness or a virulent infection’s, neither group has effectively resolved the 
controversy surrounding the question of vaccination or, more generally, the 
paradoxes at the heart of biopolitics. That is, neither offers an approach to 
protecting communities from infectious disease that reconciles the implicit 
conflict posited between the interests of individuals and those of the 
community. Furthermore, neither approach heeds Foucault's observation, in 
view of the double-pronged reach of biopower, that traditional forms of 
resisting against its proclivity for violence are useless. For my part, instead of 
engaging in this conflict, I propose to expose its contingency in view of a 
historical alternative. How did the insertion of risk into the project of public 
health give rise to the competing interests that continue to plague our medical 
decisions? Conversely, how did the homeopathic prevention of epidemics – 
which endeavored to safeguard life without introducing an element of risk – 
promise to mitigate the tension between the individual and the community 
implied in most public health interventions? Considering the seemingly 
irresolvable conflicts surrounding the decision to vaccinate, this genealogy can 
perhaps best be read as counter-history, written in opposition to the dominant 
historical view, which makes the present paradoxes of vaccination seem 
48
inevitable, either by naturalizing the present or by presenting the present as 
the pinnacle of progress. 
The (Critical) Reality of Risk 
Although my analysis highlights the historically contingent ways in which the 
modern project of immunizing bodies designates life by allocating risk, I do not 
thereby adopt a strong but rather a weak social constructionist position, also 
referred to as 'critical realism.'30 That is, I acknowledge both that hazardous 
phenomena exist that may harm people's health or well-being—such as 
infectious disease or the side effects of a prophylactic procedure—and that 
these hazards are either identified and designated as 'risks'—or not—via 
social and cultural assumptions. In fact, it is precisely the possibility that 
harmful phenomena exist whether or not we apprehend them as such that 
motivates my interest in biopolitics. More specifically, it is the possibility that 
technologies designed to protect life can produce unintended but nevertheless
real side effects, oftentimes only ever in the distant future, unbeknownst to the 
key players involved, that prompts me to delve more deeply into the ways in 
which such technologies specifically target certain segments of the population.
In line with governmentality scholars following Foucault, I am interested 
in the ways in which the analysis of risk emerges historically in the context of 
surveillance and the regulation of populations. Accordingly, I pay close 
30 For a helpful summary of various positions vis-a-vis the reality of risk, see Deborah Lupton 36. 
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attention to the ways in which concepts of risk are constructed to encourage 
individuals to self-regulate and engage voluntarily in undergoing medical 
procedures. How does the imminent threat of infection, for example, motivate 
“high-risk” groups to voluntarily line up for an untested vaccine, perhaps even 
more efficiently than more direct forms of coercion? How does the theory of 
herd immunity extend the assumption of risk by discouraging individuals’ 
refusal of vaccines for reasons of personal conscience and promoting instead 
a principled, active acceptance of vaccination’s risks, all in the name of 
altruism?
And yet, while I identify such constructions of risk analysis as a form of 
governance and an exertion of biopower, I maintain that our ethical evaluation 
of medical interventions—whether we consider them to be instances of 
fostering life or of systematically endangering it—rests, at least in part, on our 
capacity to discern the reality of the various hazards at play in various 
analyses of competing risks. Indeed, the act of people readily lining up for a 
medical procedure because they are deemed to be at high risk of infection has 
radically different implications depending on the actual imminence and 
virulence of the infection, their actual susceptibility to infection, and the actual 
safety and efficacy of the prophylactic intervention. Foucault correctly defines 
the capacity to kill in the biopolitical context not simply as “murder as such,” 
but also as “every form of indirect murder: the fact of exposing someone to 
death, increasing the risk of death for some people” (Security 256). From this 
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perspective, in order to address biopower's proclivity for violence, I find it 
imperative that we acknowledge the reality of the hazards that it imposes on 
us. 
That said, although I recognize the existence of a social and natural 
world independent of human perception, I also acknowledge that human 
knowledge of reality is always fallible and incomplete, especially in the face of 
risk, which is inseparable from ideas of probability and uncertainty. As 
Anthony Giddens observes, “[a] person can't be said to be running a risk 
where an outcome is 100 per cent certain” (Runaway World 22). The inherent 
uncertainty of risk is further complicated in the field of medicine where, we 
often try to reduce risks that negatively affect our health as much as we can 
(Runaway World 24).31 In this case, not only is our response to risk informed 
by our perception of it, but our actions actively change its ontological status. 
That is, divergent reactions to the same risk produce multiple, varying results. 
In view of this future-oriented nature of risk, I find it imperative that we always 
consider the ways in which our management of risks is constituted by 
preexisting knowledges and discourses. What we consider to be a risk and 
what is in fact a risk are determined by our arsenal of possible responses, 
which is, by definition, limited. Thus, while it may be meaningful to speak 
about the objective reality of certain risks—for example, whether or not an 
31 In this way, my position closely resembles that advocated by Ulrich Beck, who seeks to integrate 
what he sees as the two major approaches to interpreting risk: “natural-scientific objectivism about 
hazards” and “cultural relativism about hazards,” into what he calls “a sociological perspective.” 
For a summary of this integration and how it fits into other approaches to risk, see Lupton 62-3.
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infectious disease is circulating throughout a susceptible community—I 
contend that insofar as a risk is only ever an unrealized potentiality, one that 
we try to avoid or mitigate, no matter how precise or sophisticated our 
instruments of measurement may be, a single objective assessment of risk is 
always beyond our grasp.  
Reinforcing my observation that various responses to risk give rise to 
myriad possible outcomes, I would like to explicate another philosophical 
conviction guiding this study, namely, that the reality brought into being by 
multiple medical technologies is plural. Following Anne-Marie Mol, I agree that
ontology is not just “given in the order of things, but that, instead ontologies 
are brought into being, sustained, or allowed to wither away in common, day-
to-day, sociomaterial practices. Medical practices among them” (6-7). Stated 
succinctly: “If it is not removed from the practices that sustain it, reality is 
multiple” (6). That is, vaccination and homeopathy are not only designed and 
developed in light of different epistemes; as medical practices, they also enact 
different ontologies and impart different politics. In the words of Cohen: 
“medicine secret(e)s its political import within the tissues, cells, and molecules 
of our flesh, where we would not usually think to look for it,” (Introduction, 
paragraph 77, loc. 677) making it all the more important to explicate the 
realities that they impose on us. From this perspective, the investigation and 
questioning of ontologies are “therefore not old-fashioned philosophical 
pastimes to be relegated to those who write nineteenth-century history,” but 
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rather highly topical, political, matters. After all, “[i]f reality is multiple, it is also 
political” (Mol 7). More concretely, in view of the various possible ways in 
which medical practices can be done, and the various possible realities that 
medical interventions can impart, we can begin to ask how they might be 
done well (Mol 7). Along with Cohen, I approach the biopolitics of modern 
medicine as “a matter worth rethinking” and, more importantly, I too am 
confident “that such a rethinking might actually lead us to imagine new ways 
of living, both singularly and together, which might be more healing than those 
that modern medicine currently offers us” (Introduction, paragraph 77, loc. 
677).
Indeed, my hope is that, by exploring the epistemological assumptions 
governing the homeopathic prevention of epidemics vis-a-vis those operative 
in vaccination and by explicating their respectively implied ontologies of life, 
we might be better poised to trace the contours of an affirmative biopolitics, 
that is, a politics of life that does not inadvertently endanger the very life that it 
endeavors to protect by bringing the survival of the individual and that of the 
community into irreconcilable conflict with one another. Conversely, by 
presenting the rise of vaccination alongside a historical alternative, I intend to 
expose the limitations of the epistemological and ontological assumptions 
operative in the seemingly inevitable controversy surrounding the question of 
vaccination, which has become paradigmatic of the problems that plague 
biopolitics. In contrast with an ethical or legal response to the allocation of 
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risks surrounding vaccination, for example —which takes the various 
competing interests between the individual and the community as given in 
order to prescriptively suggest strategies for negotiating them—I will consider 
their historical conditions of possibility. More specifically, I will demonstrate 
how the risk analyses developed to legitimize variolation and later vaccination 
to the population functioned to sever the relations between the individual and 
the community. I will then highlight how the inevitable level of medical 
uncertainty that remains despite the most rigorous of calculations creates a 
problematic horizon for biopolitics – one in which it becomes impossible to 
discern whether we are effectively protecting life by prioritizing treatment to 
those most in need or systematically exposing certain segments of the 
population to undue risk. In short, I will present the seemingly insoluble 
problems at the heart of biopolitics as a function of a particular set of 
epistemological and ontological commitments. 
In the first chapter of my thesis, I describe how the challenges 
surrounding the decision to vaccinate have become paradigmatic of all efforts 
to preserve life. First, I detail the ways in which the attempt to interrupt the 
circulation of infectious disease by preemptively imposing risk on otherwise 
healthy bodies raises political questions concerning the optimal relationship 
between the individual and the community. Then I draw on Roberto Esposito's 
and Jacques Derrida's reflections on immunity and autoimmunity to highlight 
more generally the potential for protective mechanisms to destructively turn 
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against the very life they are designed to protect, whether a biological or a 
political organism. In view of the incredible pervasiveness of this problem, I 
describe the ways in which biopower's capacity for self-destruction is a 
function of a distinctly modern ontology of life and politics. I hone in on the 
ultimately self-defeating ways in which the defense mechanisms of modernity 
isolate organisms from the otherness that threatens their annihilation. More 
affirmatively, I outline contemporary strategies to escape the self-destructive 
immunitary features characteristic of modernity by opening organisms to 
continuous exchange with the environment, further contextualizing my turn to 
the romantic medical tradition within the broader effort to find fluid and porous 
understandings of life that counter the modern alienation of individuals and its 
divisive impact on community relations.
In the second chapter, in order to consider the general historical and 
political conditions under which both vaccination and the homeopathic 
prevention of disease emerged, I present the rise of biopower as Foucault 
introduces it, situated in the context of modern European states' struggle for 
their position among other states. I outline the rise of the medical police and 
its interest in the health of the population as further developments of the 
state's explicit mandate to preserve and strengthen its power. I then consider 
the responses of Foucault, Esposito, and Hannah Arendt to the potential for 
violence that emerges when public health initiatives address life at the level of 
the population in ways that divorce it from the multiplicity of individuals. Finally, 
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I problematize analyses that attempt to distinguish life-saving public health 
initiatives from violent forms of medical policing by emphasizing the German, 
patriarchic roots of the latter and celebrating the influences that liberal English 
ideals of freedom and individuality had on the development of the former. In 
view of the many anomalies generated by this polarized reading of history, I 
promote a politico-historical analysis that considers the biopolitical implications 
of specific medical interventions in view of the risks that they actively introduce 
to the lives they are designed to protect, regardless of the cultural and 
ideological prejudices used to promote them. 
Pursuing the problematic relation between the individual and the 
community as it developed historically in the practice of immunization, in the 
third chapter I explore the risk analyses that helped usher variolation into 
accepted fields of rationality by relocating risk to the level of the population, 
one of modern man's most effective strategies for confronting the 
bombardment of risks that surrounded him. First, I identify the calculus of 
probabilities as a response to the problem of medical uncertainty that was 
generally accepted in England in light of John Locke's (1632-1704) skepticism 
regarding our capacity to know the world. Then, drawing on Giddens' and 
Ulrich Beck's insights into the paradoxes that inevitably emerge in the 
assessment of competing risks, I expose the limitation of this epistemological 
approach and problematize the risk-laden ontology that it generates. More 
specifically, I identify how the discourse on risk, specifically the calculus of 
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probabilities used to promote variolation, failed to account for, let alone 
predict, the far-reaching implications of this preventative strategy against 
smallpox. In particular, I consider how the persistent yet unpredictable 
phenomena of waning and failed immunity problematized early attempts to 
accurately assess the risks assumed in the decision to acquire immunity. 
In the fourth chapter, I explicate the problematic politics of vaccine 
distribution by highlighting how they preemptively target specific segments of 
the population to undergo preventative treatment and, by extension, to carry 
the burden of risk associated with prophylaxis. In a close reading of Foucault's 
1977-78 lectures at the Collège de France, I show how the logic used to 
legitimize variolation propagated the position that in order to achieve overall 
improvements in health and prosperity at the level of the population, the 
sacrifice of certain individuals should not only be permitted, but actively 
encouraged. I then demonstrate, with reference to the 2009 swine flu 
pandemic, how the discriminating distribution of risks throughout the 
population perpetuates this logic of sacrifice, even if our political ideology no 
longer supports it.
In the fifth chapter, I consider alternative ways of navigating the 
problem of medical uncertainty that developed in early nineteenth-century 
Germany. Contextualizing the Romantic Movement in German medicine in 
terms of the plurality of responses that arose to address Kant's delineation of 
human understanding, I describe how a shared appreciation for the 
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interdependent receptivity between an organism and its environment unified 
these desperate approaches and, more importantly, how this ideal informed 
medical practice. In contrast with many historical readings of romantic 
medicine that emphasize its speculative tendencies, I focus on the important – 
if nuanced – role that observation played in this tradition, epitomized by 
Johann Wolfgang von Goethe's (1749-1832) observation of plant growth, 
which had a significant impact on the Naturphilosophie of Friedrich Schelling 
(1775-1854) which, both independently and by extension, facilitated the 
integration of the romantic ideal of intuiting organisms as integrated identities 
into the life and medical sciences. Finally, I detail the ways in which 
Hahnemann's “romantic” method of observing organisms as they were 
engaged in living processes and responding to external stimuli concretely 
informed his treatment of disease and, by opening organisms up to ongoing 
exchange with the outside world, how his understanding of the power that 
preserves life, Lebenskraft, suggests an alternative to the isolation often 
implied in modern understandings of immunity. 
In the sixth chapter, I return to the political question of immunizing 
communities by considering how Hahnemann's romantic understanding of the 
fluid interaction between organisms and the external world concretely 
informed his attempts to prevent epidemics. I outline Hahnemann's early 
response to infectious disease and identify the philosophical and ethical 
convictions that motivated his ambivalent reception of vaccination and 
58
subsequent effort to develop safer, more discriminating, forms of treatment. I 
then detail his innovations in the effort to prevent contagious disease and the 
affirmative reception that his prophylactic method received. Finally, I consider 
the political implications of homeopathy as a preventative medical technique 
that refrains from actively imposing risk on the lives it intends to protect, a 
possibility precluded by the contemporary reliance on vaccination. 
 Cohen warns that when we conceptualize immunity as modernity has 
presented it to us, that is, as primarily insular and defensive, we occlude the 
multiple non-defensive healing possibilities that an organism may manifest 
(233). By extension, we deprive ourselves of discovering different conditions 
of possibility for approaching the complex relationships between the individual 
and the community. What might we learn when we redefine our understanding 
of health such that it no longer denotes a defensive, risk-laden frontier but 
rather a vulnerable coexistence with and openness to others? How might we 
change “if we imagined that coexistence rather than self-defense provides the 
basis for our well-being” (251)?
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Chapter One: The Biopolitics of Prevention
The idea that “what does not kill us makes us stronger”32 complicates what 
might otherwise be a straightforward goal of medicine: to promote health by 
preventing disease. Indeed, the very distinction between the two states of 
being is nuanced by the suggestion that those who survive a bout of infectious 
disease often enjoy more robust vitality in the form of resistance to 
subsequent reinfection. This form of immunity, at least historically, has been 
the privilege of those who have fallen prey to disease and lived to speak about 
it. A consolation prize for survivors, immunity was quickly recognized, in its 
power to protect, for its potential to transform a previous encounter with illness 
into a measure of future health.
But what happens when we attempt to bypass the risks associated with 
natural immunity by developing techniques to gain acquired immunity, that is, 
when the contraction of disease is no longer “an essentially passive condition 
[but] one that is actively induced” (Esposito, Bios, 7)? Despite (or precisely 
because of) the fact that, in the process of gaining natural immunity, people 
often stood to lose more than they could possibly gain, the end result was so 
valued that early civilizations sought to mimic this process in a more controlled 
setting. 
Primitive practices of deliberately exposing an uninfected person to 
disease have been found in most early civilizations around the world where 
32 “That which does not kill me, makes me stronger” (Nietzsche 38).
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smallpox was endemic; it was considered a rite of passage orchestrated by 
parents whose children had not yet had the disease (Jannetta 10). The 
medicalized attempt to orchestrate a mild case of smallpox in the hopes of 
conveying future immunity was documented as early as 590 AD in China, 
where children were instructed to breathe airborne droplets of the virus 
through their nasal passages and into their lungs (Jannetta 11; Link x). The 
inoculation of non-virulent live variola virus into one or more incisions made in 
the skin reached Constantinople by 1679 (Kitta 8) and was popularized—
albeit controversially—in Europe at the beginning of the eighteenth century. 
While the Royal Society of England worked tirelessly to help sway public and 
professional opinion in favour of variolation, it did not address all of the 
objections concerning the various risks associated with the practice. Such 
resistance persisted even after variolation was replaced in the nineteenth 
century, as we have seen, by Jenner's method of inoculation with cowpox, a 
disease similar to, though much less dangerous than, smallpox. While the 
relative safety of vaccination quieted some of the controversy surrounding 
acquired immunity, many old concerns remained and many new ones arose. 
From ancient techniques of variolation, through Jenner's proposed 
method of vaccination, right up to contemporary practices, the history of 
acquired immunity is a long and complicated one. It is comprised of many 
disputed facts, told by strong proponents and equally fervent resistors. It is, in 
short, a history that raises more questions than it answers. What exactly are 
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the implications—politically, ethically, and socially—of deliberately 
orchestrating an encounter with disease in a way that attempts to favour our 
chances of survival? 
According to the myth of Achilles, the Greek god killed by a strike to his 
one and only point of vulnerability, conferring immunity is a perilous task. It is 
“a myth . . . and no mortal can ever be made invulnerable” (Biss 8). Echoing 
this position of ancient Greek suspicion, Plato expresses his wariness of all 
medical interventions, “even when they are wielded with good intentions, and 
even when they are as such effective” (Derrida, Dissemination, 99). As Derrida 
observes, the very word Plato uses for a 'therapeutic intervention,' 
pharmakon, captures this ambivalence; it can just as easily be translated as 
'poison,' or 'drug,' as it can as 'remedy' (Dissemination 71). There is by 
definition “no such thing as a harmless remedy. The pharmakon can never be 
simply beneficial” (Dissemination 99). Following Greek tradition, or, more 
precisely, the doctors of Cos, Plato maintains that the pharmakon is 
essentially harmful because it is artificial. It it thought to go against natural life 
because disease is comparable to “a living organism, which must be allowed 
to develop according to its own norms and forms, its specific rhythms and 
articulations. In disturbing the normal and natural progress of illness, the 
pharmakon is thus the enemy of the living in general, whether healthy or sick” 
(Dissemination 100). 
As an enemy of the living, the capacity for the pharmakon to both 
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promote health and endanger life also brings the individual and community 
into precarious relationship, even though the one depends on the other for its 
existence. For example, when prescribed to individuals for the benefit of the 
community, as is often the case with vaccination, the pharmakon 
simultaneously strengthens and severs the ties that bind community members 
together: it unites the interests of the individual and the community in the 
quest for protection against disease; but, by actively exposing individual 
bodies to risk, it also brings them into irreconcilable tension. 
At Risk: The Severance of the Singular and the Social 
At the heart of the controversy surrounding immunization is the fact that this 
medical procedure introduces an element of risk—however extreme or 
negligible— in order to avoid a greater, future, risk—however imminent or 
improbable.33 As James Colgrove observes, “[l]ike any medical intervention, 
vaccination carries the small risk of sometimes severe adverse reactions. But 
unlike other procedures, vaccination is performed on healthy people” (2).34 
Unlike the risks associated with lifesaving surgery, for example, the risks of 
33 Centuries later, even among those who are convinced by the efficacy of immunization and take its 
mechanisms for granted, the idea remains philosophically perplexing. Bringing its paradoxical 
nature to the fore, Esposito describes vaccination as a practice that “infects the organism in 
preventative fashion, weakening its primogenital forces: it risks killing what it meant to keep alive” 
(Bios 92). Georges Canguilhem offers a similar, if more ethically laden, description of the logic of 
vaccines, reasoning that modern immunological techniques excite “a curative faction . . . by 
introducing a lesser evil [mal], a benevolent evil, which leads the organism to react more promptly 
than usual so as to outstrip the onset of more serious, imminent harm [mal]” (32).
34 See also Fine and Clarkson: “This observation, coupled with the fact that prophylactic vaccines are 
in general given to 'healthy' individuals, prior to exposure to disease, raises important ethical and 
strategic problems” (1012). 
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vaccination are assumed not in order to treat a diseased condition but to 
prevent one from happening. It is this preemptive—or, more precisely, 
prophylactic—aspect of risk assumption that generates so much resistance, 
especially when states impose the medical procedure on citizens. Previous to 
the development of state-sponsored immunization, regulations such as 
mandatory quarantine, which limited individual liberty in the effort to protect 
the common good, usually required people to refrain from an action or 
behavior such as travel or communal living. In contrast, mandatory vaccination 
policies forced people to submit to a medical procedure, “one that involved 
discomfort and whose safety and efficacy remained uncertain in the minds of 
many” (Colgrove 10). According to Nadja Durbach, compulsory vaccination 
acts “were the only government initiatives to intervene in direct and invasive 
ways with apparently healthy bodies that posed no immediate risk to the social 
body” (Introduction, location 246, par. 17). Accordingly, the unprecedented 
emergence of organized resistance to vaccination can be understood 
historically as a reaction to these dual elements of risk and coercion (Colgrove
11). The first “anti-vaccination” group, for example, which arose in nineteenth-
century England, portrayed the procedure as dangerous and ineffective35 and 
asserted that making it mandatory was a tyrannical violation of individual 
liberty (Colgrove 10-11). Their arguments were part of a growing discourse 
35 In On Immunity: An Inoculation, Biss references an observation made by Cass Sunstein in “The 
Laws of Fear,” and by Paul Slovic in The Perception of Risk, that people tend to believe that risky 
things carry little benefit and that beneficial things carry little risk. Applying this observation to the 
case of vaccination, she speculates that if we believe that vaccines carry a high risk, we may also 
tend to believe that they are ineffective (178). 
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attempting to articulate the optimal relations between the individual and the 
community. More specifically, they often reflected the ideal of individual liberty 
that was beginning to be promoted in liberal societies as a new social value.36
While early opponents of vaccination often emphasized personal 
freedom and the integrity of the human body in their criticism of the state's 
intervention, as a strategy for preventing contagious disease, vaccination was 
always also part of a larger debate regarding the health of the social body 
(Durbach Ch. 6, location 2734, par. 1). Many in favor of mandatory legislation 
argued that as a matter of public health, the decision to vaccinate should not 
be left to individual conscience but rather made in line with the interests of the 
community (Durbach Ch. 7, location 3327, par. 27). It is this appeal to the 
communal good that pushes vaccination beyond the field of bioethics, where 
respect for patient autonomy is paramount and coercion is anathema, into the 
still-developing field of public health ethics, where it is less clear whether or 
when compulsory measures are appropriate (Colgrove 6).37 Insofar as 
vaccination penetrates the individual and social body alike, the balance 
between the interests of the individual and the claims of the collective—one of 
the most fundamental and enduring tensions in the enterprise of public health
—is nowhere more salient than in policies and practices surrounding 
immunization (Colgrove 2). As Baldwin observes, these dilemmas 
36 To read about the complex relationship between anti-vaccination movement and liberalism, see 
Durbach.  
37 For a general discussion on the key differences between medical ethics, which generally applies to 
individual interactions between physicians and patients, and public health ethics, which navigates 
the tension between individual and community interests, see Swain, Burns, Etkind. 
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counterpose the rights of the individual to autonomy 
and freedom and the claims of community to 
protection against the potential calamity threatened 
by its infectious members. They cast up the basic 
problem of reconciling individual and community in 
the most fundamental, pressing and unavoidable of 
terms (2).  
The controversy surrounding immunization has, from its very inception, pitted 
the interests of the individual against those of the community. But in more 
recent years, the paradoxical relationship between the singular and the social 
organism implied in the decision to vaccinate has been brought to the fore 
even more vividly by deliberations concerning herd immunity. First formally 
described in the 1920s, (Colgrove 3; Fine 266) the theory of herd immunity 
accounts for the observation, made at least as far back as the mid-nineteenth 
century, that vaccinating only part of a population against smallpox could 
arrest an epidemic in full (Biss 23; Fine 266). As further evidence of this 
phenomenon, in the era before vaccination, epidemics tended to come in 
waves followed by lulls during which the number of new children who had not 
yet acquired immunity through natural infection approached a critical mass, 
rendering the community vulnerable to outbreak (Biss 23). Although it 
continues to carry a variety of meanings, the most common implication of the 
term 'herd immunity' is “that the risk of infection among susceptible individuals 
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in a population is reduced by the presence and proximity of immune 
individuals” (Fine, Eames, and Heymann 911).The idea is that when a 
sufficiently large segment of the population is immune to a specific, contagious 
disease, they provide indirect protection to those around them who would 
otherwise be susceptible to the infection.38 Stated otherwise, when enough 
members of a community are immune, pathogens have difficulty moving from 
host to host and cease to spread (Biss 22). It is this consideration, made at 
the level of public health, that informs the policy of Mass Childhood 
Immunization (MCI) (Hobson-West 275) and is consistently referenced in 
legislative or persuasive attempts to overrule an individual's decision to refuse 
vaccination.39 In order for public health goals to be met and maintained, we 
are consistently reminded, a high degree of compliance is necessary. 
It is in light of the principle of herd immunity that an individual's decision 
regarding vaccination is thought to have a direct impact not only on her 
personal well-being, but also on that of her community. Insofar as the risks 
associated with vaccination are considered to be non-existent or negligible or 
at the very least outweighed by the benefits, this decision is used to provide a 
38 The indirect “herd effect” of vaccines applies only when infected persons participate in the 
transmission of an agent and when immunization induces at least some protection against infection 
(and not merely against disease). Thus, as John and Samuel reason, “immunisation against tetanus 
or rabies (even if given routinely) will have no herd effect. As BCG inoculation seems to protect 
only against progressive primary tuberculosis and not against secondary type pulmonary 
tuberculosis, it also has no herd effect” (604). 
39 An individual's “right” to make an exception of him- or herself by refusing vaccination is widely 
condemned as a threat to public health. From this perspective, the World Health Organization 
maintains that during a pandemic, it may be necessary to overrule existing legislation or (individual) 
human rights. Examples are the enforcement of quarantine (overruling individual freedom of 
movement), use of privately owned buildings as hospitals, off-license use of drugs, compulsory 
vaccination, or implementation of emergency shifts in essential services (“Checklist” 5).
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strong counterexample to the assumption that “what is good for the body 
politic cannot be good for the body natural—that the interests of these bodies 
must be at odds” (Biss 131). As Biss summarizes in reference to “all sorts of 
risk-benefit analyses and models of herd immunity”: “vaccination benefits the 
individual as well as the public . . . even 'a population of self-interested people 
can defeat an epidemic'” (131). 
However, when the risks (perceived or actual) of vaccination are just high 
enough to sway an individual's risk analysis when the threat of infection 
(perceived or actual) is relatively low, the principle of herd immunity introduces 
an irreconcilable chasm between the interests of the individual and those of 
the community. Assuming that an individual acts out of rational self-interest, he 
will act in a way that minimizes risk for himself or his children. If the perceived 
threat of disease is high, for example, and that of a vaccine is low, vaccination 
will be sought more readily than if the opposite is true. But insofar as 
vaccination offers indirect protection, when others assume the risks of 
vaccination, they are also thought to reduce the chances of infection for those 
around them and, indirectly, to increase others’ willingness to forgo the 
procedure. On this basis, Fine and Clarkson argue that a rational, self-
interested “individual's ideal strategy would be to encourage everyone else to 
be vaccinated, save himself or herself” (1013).40 In other words, by offering an 
40 For a community, the optimal level of vaccine coverage is that level which minimizes the total 
morbidity in the population. But for an individual, the critical level of coverage is whatever 
minimizes his personal risk of disease—below which he should elect to be vaccinated, and above 
which he should elect not to be vaccinated (Fine and Clarkson 1014). 
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indirect benefit, vaccination is thought to generate a free-rider problem, that is, 
the possibility of individuals profiting from, without contributing to, the 
communal good. As with any free-rider problem, only so many can enjoy a 
free ride. Beyond a certain threshold, the social benefit is destroyed. In the 
case of vaccination, public health administrators insist that, while the decision 
of any one individual to refuse vaccination will not affect the group's 
protection, those decisions in the aggregate will undermine herd immunity. 
They accordingly urge all those deemed fit enough to undergo this medical 
procedure to do so, reserving exemptions for those with medical 
contraindications rather than those with conscientious objections. 
In view of the potential for “free-riders” to take advantage of the 
immunity of those around them, Colgrove reasons that in contemporary liberal 
societies, where vaccination is voluntary, a successful vaccination program 
“depends at least in part on individuals making an altruistic decision” (4). But 
when the failure of altruism erodes the common good, considerations of herd 
immunity are often referenced as an ethical foundation for the acceptableness 
of coercive measures to ensure the welfare of the collective. That is, they are 
used to legitimize interventionist measures that liberal-oriented societies have 
historically resisted, namely mandatory vaccination. Previous to the 
emergence of “herd immunity,” opponents of vaccination could more readily 
cite the dictum of John Stuart Mill that the only justification for coercive action 
against an individual is the presence of imminent harm to other members of 
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society or, in the words of Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, that “the right to 
swing my fist ends where the other man's nose begins.” According to this 
libertarian principle, they would insist, the individual who refuses to accept the 
risks associated with vaccination places only himself at risk of natural 
infection, a situation that does not warrant state intervention. But insofar as 
the notion of herd immunity suggests a concrete other-regarding consequence 
to the decision against vaccination, recent liberal and libertarian philosophers 
have been keen to reference Mill's harm principle as the key ethical 
justification for compulsory vaccination (Colgrove 5).41 Since some vaccines 
fail to develop intended immunity in certain individuals (a phenomenon known 
as 'vaccine failure') and some are not recommended for people with certain 
biological susceptibilities, the argument goes, there are always some 
members of the community willing to assume the risks of vaccination but 
unable to benefit from its protective properties who are endangered by 
vaccine refusers (Colgrove 4). 
In view of this enduring conflict, can we ever foster a healthy, vibrant 
community without overriding the individual interests of its members? Can we 
demand social responsibility in medical decision-making without reverting to 
coercive measures that are otherwise at odds with the ideals of a pluralistic, 
democratic society?
41 See, for example, Ronald Bailey: “To borrow Holme's metaphor, people who refuse vaccination are 
asserting that they have a right to 'swing' their microbes at other people. There is no principled 
libertarian case for their free-riding refusal to take responsibility for their own microbes.”  
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A Persistent and Paradigmatic Problem 
When we extend consideration beyond the particularity of the problems 
involved in acquiring immunity, it is striking to consider how the same tensions 
between the individual and the community implied in the act of vaccination are 
at play in myriad other social interactions. According to Esposito, such 
paradoxes are paradigmatic of all encounters of life, individual and collective. 
“Whether we are talking about the outbreak of a new infectious disease, a 
dispute over established legal prerogatives, a sudden intensification of 
migratory flows, or . . . a terrorist attack,” he observes, “all of these events call 
on a protective response in the face of risk,” that is, an immune response 
(Immunitas 1-2).42 More specifically, in all of the above examples, he notes 
that the risk has to do with trespassing or violating borders: “Someone or 
something penetrates a body—individual or collective—and alters it, 
transforms it, corrupts it” (Immunitas 2). In the case of vaccination, several 
types of risks factor into the decision-making process: “the risk of contracting 
the disease a vaccine is designed to prevent; the risk of suffering an adverse 
event caused by the vaccination; and the risk an individual may impose on 
others by remaining without protection” (Colgrove 5). Yet all of these risks 
presuppose a body, either individual or collective, that is being compromised. 
A 'body,' after all, is not only a medical, but also a political entity. It can be 
used to denote individual organisms as well as social organizations. As Mary 
42 In his interview with Timothy Campbell, he provides a general definition of immunity or 
immunization as “a particular situation that protects [mette in salvo] someone from a risk, a risk to 
which an entire community is exposed” (50)
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Douglas writes, “[t]he body is a model which can stand for any bounded 
system. Its boundaries can represent any boundaries which are threatened or 
precarious” (141). Indeed, whether the danger that lies in wait is a disease 
threatening an individual body or a susceptible individual threatening the 
social body by undermining herd immunity, both incite a defensive immune 
reaction, at times biological, at other times political, most of the time 
impossible to distinguish. But when an individual's defense against a 
perceived threat in turn introduces a risk to the community, or vice versa, the 
singular and the social organism are forced to struggle against each other for 
their own survival, even though both depend on each other for their very 
existence. 
In the effort to gain insight into the tension between the collective and the 
individual implied in the logic of immunization, and to better understand the 
underlying mechanisms operative in the various domains in which this relation 
is defined and redefined, Esposito turns to the etymology of 'immunity' to 
excavate its political-juridical meaning. He observes that in its ancient usage, 
immunity denotes an exemption on the part of the subject with regard to 
concrete obligations or responsibilities that under normal circumstances would 
bind one to others. In short, those who are immune owe nothing to anyone 
(Immunitas 5) and, as such, threaten to undermine the legitimacy of the social 
contract. And yet, indicative of the dual nature of immunity both to limit and 
protect, it is precisely by defining lawful exceptions to the law that the law 
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preserves its capacity to be applied universally and without exception. In other 
words, “since the law declares that its exceptions always already derive from 
it, such exceptions do not trouble its jurisdiction” (Cohen Introduction, location 
153, par. 8). On the contrary, the exception confirms the rule in cases not 
excepted. A conscription law, for example, which identifies those who can 
legitimately opt out of service, compels those who do not meet its 
requirements to fight. To reinforce negatively the law that some people must 
fight the war, it allows some people to avoid fighting it. The people exempt 
from the law become a negative example for those who are not exempt 
precisely to uphold the law. 
In the case of vaccination, the legitimate exemption of certain individuals 
from a routine immunization strategy—namely those understood to have 
immature or deficient immune systems—is recognized by health 
administrators as necessary to that strategy’s effective administration. These 
exceptions negatively reinforce the rule: it makes it all the more important for 
able bodies to be vaccinated and suggests that anyone who exempts him- or 
herself for other, non-medical, reasons or for no reason at all undermines the 
whole enterprise. The fear is that when too many people object to the 
procedure on conscientious rather than medical grounds, the threshold that 
guarantees herd immunity will be surpassed and the efficacy of the 
intervention jeopardized. It is similar to the concern that if not enough soldiers 
are enlisted to fight, homeland security will be compromised. The central idea 
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is that if enough people personally seek to avoid risk by making an exception 
of themselves and relying on others to defend the community, then everyone 
will be at increased risk. In this way, the individualistic strategy to minimize risk 
ultimately backfires. A different articulation of the same underlying problem 
found in conscription laws, in the decision to vaccinate we find a vivid medical 
example of the paradoxical nature of political immunity: in the attempt to 
achieve herd immunity, the very mechanism that protects the individual and 
the social organism—the capacity for exceptions—simultaneously threatens to 
undermine this protection.43 
Derrida articulates the capacity for organisms to inadvertently act against 
their own best interests in his discussions on autoimmunity. By 'autoimmune' 
he means “that strange behavior where a living being, in quasi-suicidal 
fashion, 'itself' works to destroy its own protection, to immunize itself against 
its 'own' immunity (“Autoimmunity” 143). Biologically, autoimmunity denotes a 
kind of malfunction in which an organism produces antibodies or lymphocytes 
that work against naturally occurring substances in the body. Extending its 
meaning beyond this usage, Derrida recognizes the perverse effect of 
autoimmunity, more generally, in terms of the capacity for organisms – 
whether social or singular – to produce the very dangers they need to avoid in 
43 In view of its political and biological meanings, Biss notes the convergence of these definitions that 
occurs in the decision against vaccination: “Long before the term immunity was used in the context 
of disease, it was used in the context of law to describe an exemption from service or duty to the 
state. Immunity came to mean freedom from disease as well as freedom from service in the late 
nineteenth century, after states began requiring vaccination. In a peculiar collision of meanings, the 
exemption from immunity made possible by the conscience clause was a kind of immunity in itself. 
And allowing oneself to remain vulnerable to disease remains a legal privilege today” (126).
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order to ensure their own survival. From this perspective, he takes it as a 
given that “repression in both its psychoanalytic sense and its political sense – 
whether it be through the police, the military, or the economy – ends up 
producing, reproducing, and regenerating the very thing it seeks to disarm” 
(“Autoimmunity” 150). 
Elucidating this paradoxical quality of immunity as it is operative in 
democracy, Derrida begs the question of whether a democratic society that 
squashes voices of dissent against democracy undermines or reinforces itself: 
“Is the right to speak without taking sides for democracy, that is, without 
committing oneself to it, more or less democratic? Is democracy that which 
assures the right to think and thus to act without it or against it?” (Rogues 41). 
Indeed, in order to preserve itself, a functional democracy must always risk its 
own demise. That is, in a well-functioning democracy, democracy itself must 
always remain open for discussion; it must always remain possible to 
democratically elect a totalitarian fascist. Otherwise, by squashing anti-
democratic sentiments, democracy inadvertently produces the very 
authoritarianism it seeks to avoid. From this perspective, Derrida claims that 
there is no immunity without autoimmunity – there is no attempt at self-
preservation that does not put the self at risk. 
Similarly, Esposito observes that, in both its political-juridical and 
biomedical applications, immunity preserves the organism, either individual or 
collective, to which it pertains, by subjecting it to a condition that 
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simultaneously negates or reduces its power to expand: just “as the medical 
practice of vaccinating the individual body, so too the immunization of the 
political body functions similarly, introducing within it a fragment of the same 
pathogen from which it wants to protect itself, by blocking and contradicting 
natural development” (Bios 46). Without this immune reaction, Esposito 
insists, both individual and common life would die away. In the words of 
Derrida, “suppressing the immunity that protects me from the other might be 
nothing short of life-threatening” (“Autoimmunity” 194). Providing insight into 
this biopolitical paradox, Esposito acknowledges that, as a defensive form of 
protection, there is always the possibility that the immune apparatus 
inadvertently turns on itself and its constitutive elements destructively, pitting 
the individual and the community against each other even though the one 
cannot survive without the other. As with the pharmakon, the dose, it seems, is 
what makes the poison.44 
In view of its nuanced role in both the protection and negation of life, 
Esposito introduces immunity as a productive paradigm for considering more 
generally the destructive capacity of biopolitical phenomena, that is, the 
tendency for political interventions into living processes to inadvertently disrupt 
the life they intend to preserve. Stated concisely, he turns to (auto)immunitary 
logic in the effort to understand why “a politics of life always risk[s] being 
reversed into a work of death” (Bios 8). As outlined above, this paradox has 
44 To read more about how Esposito compares and contrasts his understanding on the negativity of 
immunitary logic from Derrida's theory of autoimmunity, see his interview with Campbell, 52-4.
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haunted the study of biopolitics since its very inception: Why do mechanisms 
of power that endeavor to protect life, such as vaccinations, sometimes 
endanger it? According to Esposito, there is no phenomenon of international 
importance that escapes the double tendency implicit in all biopolitics: “On the 
one hand, a growing superimposition between the domain of power or of law 
[diritto] and that of life; on the other, an equally close implication that seems to 
have been derived with regard to death” (Bios 7). In view of its incredible 
pervasiveness, he asserts that a philosophy capable of thinking its own 
moment, “cannot avoid engaging with the question of immunization” 
(“Interview” 53). 
But, what, exactly, does the question of immunization tell us about our 
own moment? What does the historically-situated medical practice of 
vaccination, for example, reveal about the potentially problematic ways in 
which we have come to think about 'life' at both the individual and collective 
levels? Is the disconnect between individual interests and the common good 
implied in the decision to vaccinate simply a function of the potentially self-
destructive way in which immunity preserves life? Or does the problem lie in 
the particular, historically-situated ways in which this prophylactic strategy 
approaches life, such that other historical approaches to communicable 
diseases might open up new, life-affirming, ways of engaging with living 
organisms in both their singularity and their sociality?  
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Immunization and the Modern Enclosure of the Self  
Acknowledging that the biomedical definition of immunity—the refractoriness 
of an organism to the danger of contracting a contagious disease—is ancient, 
Esposito maintains that the modern approach to and understanding of 
conferring immunity is absolutely distinct from older prophylactic methods.45 
He identifies the transformation of the concept of immunity between the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, inspired by Jenner's development of 
vaccines, the experiments of Pasteur and Koch, and the birth of medical 
bacteriology as a critical development in immunological thinking (Immunitas 
7). In fact, before 1883, the pivotal year when Élie Metchnikoff (1845-1916) 
ushered in a modern concept of immunity by defining it as the host's capacity 
to defend itself, neither 'immunity' nor 'defense' referred to physiological 
functions (Cohen 175). When 'immunity' was used in the pre-modern medical 
context, it was not thought of as a response against, but rather as a freedom 
from something (Zumbusch 9). As such, it borrowed from its juridico-political 
inheritance (Cohen 176) and was used primarily in a way that closely 
resembles the original, ancient Roman meaning, which denotes the exemption 
of certain individuals from universally-binding laws (Cohen 13). 
From a medical-historical perspective, the answer provided by the field of 
immunology is simply one of several possibilities for explaining why, given 
45 According to Esposito, “What distinguishes the Egyptian agrarian politics or the politics of hygiene 
and health in Rome from protective procedures and the development of life set in motion by modern 
biopower . . . [is] the intrinsic immunitarian connotations of the latter, which were absent in the 
ancient world” (Bios 53). 
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uniform exposure to sources of illness, morbidity varies (Baldwin 3) – a 
distinctly modern one. As Cohen observes, “modern presumptions about 
personhood and collectivity saturate both immunity and defense,” the two 
cornerstones of modern immunology. Each concept “offers a different strategy 
for accommodating the frictions and tensions (if not outright contradictions) 
between the singular and the multiple, the one and the many, that characterize 
modern political formations” (Introduction, location 115, par. 3). Cohen argues 
that the immunological idea that survival requires a constant struggle against 
the world, now a central tenet of biomedical dogma, is at odds with biological 
thinking about how organisms coexist in shared ecologies, which includes 
myriad non-defensive possibilities for interaction available to organisms, such 
as symbiotic, neutral, and indifferent relations. Accounting for this obvious 
discrepancy, he argues that the life science's investment in a defensive 
organism exposes its (mis)appropriation of modern philosophies of 
personhood. That is, our understanding of biological 
immunity incarnates ideas about human being culled 
from modern politics, economics, law, philosophy, and 
science, which then belatedly achieve scientific status 
when immunity inoculates them into the living organism 
and thereby validates them as essentially 'natural' 
(Introduction, location 217, par. 17). 
And yet, however seemingly 'natural' and self-evident the modern notion of 
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immunity has become,46 Cohen's genealogy of its history reminds us that it 
does not provide the only way of imagining illness and healing (236) and, by 
extension, the only way of constituting relations between the individual and the 
community, self and other. 
Gesturing towards one such overlooked alternative, Kuzniar notes that 
studies examining the cultural implications of vaccination around 1800 – in 
particular the understanding of immunity as a kind of defensive hardening – do 
not mention homeopathy and understandably so: after all, “homeopathy offers 
a different model of human communication and understanding of individuality” 
(Birth of Homeopathy, Ch. 3, location 2782, par. 69). In other words, the 
romantic understanding of an organism’s receptivity to disease that informed 
Hahnemann’s development of homeopathy stands to provide an illuminating 
alternative to the modern rise of germ theory and immunology. It bears 
repeating: the range of preventative techniques that the modern immunitary 
apparatus supports—as well as the distinctly defensive way in which it 
configures the complex relationship between individuals and communities—is 
not exhaustive. Other historical approaches to preventing disease suggest 
other conditions of possibility for engaging with living organisms and for 
navigating the full breadth of their potential for interaction. 
Esposito's search for an approach to life that does not import the 
46 Cohen remarks that the more he delves into the subject, the less he understands why “it seems 
obvious to us to use a complex legal and political concept to describe how we coexist as organisms. 
Taken at face value, immunity has little to recommend it as an organismic possibility; indeed, once 
called to our attention, it seems hard not to notice that the trope only works as catachresis” 
(Introduction, location 328, par. 28).
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contradictions we have come to associate with the immunitary response 
prompts him to problematize the specific immunitary logic adopted by 
modernism. As he explains in an interview with Timothy Campbell, it is 
precisely this “exasperated immunitary conception of biopolitics that became a 
form of paroxysmic thanatopolitics, that is, a politics of death” (52). Esposito 
identifies modernity with the historical and cultural period in which the project 
of preserving life takes the center of political theory and praxis. With the 
increasing secularization of religious meaning, he explains, modern subjects 
became increasingly exposed to the outside world and, in response to this 
new vulnerability and increased sense of risk, developed a series of 
immunitary apparatuses intended to safeguard life. 
According to Giddens, its ongoing relationship with risk has become a 
fundamental feature of modern society. Reinforcing Esposito's reading of 
modernity, he argues that risk “is the dynamic of a society bent on change, 
that wants to determine its own future rather than leaving it to religion, tradition 
or the vagaries of nature” (“Taking Risk” 31). Where traditional cultures may 
well have been more hazardous than contemporary modern society, he 
explains, they had no concept of risk because they did not need one. They 
simply relied on ideas of fate or the will of the gods, whereas modern societies 
tend to substitute such supernatural concepts with the idea of risk (Runaway 
World 22-3). Through myriad processes that ultimately resulted in the 
disenchantment of nature, the unfathomable aspects of the natural world – 
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previously revered as an incomprehensible animating force – were replaced 
with calculable risks. In a modern society, for example, whether or not an 
individual fell ill to a contagious disease, was more likely to be explained in 
terms of quantifiable risk factors than in view of whether or not he was being 
punished for his sins or being struck down by the wrath of nature. In this way, 
the rise of variolation, and later vaccination, coincides with the secular and 
rationalistic ideals of the Enlightenment. Indeed, the general acceptance of 
acquired immunity signaled a decisive break away from fatalism: it 
represented modern man's eagerness to positively embrace risk by making 
the calculated decision to undergo the potential side-effects of a prophylactic 
medical procedure in order to protect himself from the scourges of a 
communicable disease. 
As this example illustrates, another distinctive feature of the modern 
effort to defend life in the face of countless risks, is that it always requires a 
sacrifice. The religious sacrifice was simply replaced by a calculated one. 
From this perspective, Esposito identifies Thomas Hobbes as “the symbolic 
point of departure for the process of modern immunization” (“Interview” 54). 
Providing a paradigmatic example of the negative dialectic of immunization, 
Hobbes asserts that subjects must sacrifice all of their natural rights to the 
sovereign in order to protect their lives from the risk of death that is implicit in 
the community. As Cohen emphasizes, Hobbes characterizes the “state of 
nature” as one of “Warre of every one against every one” (qtd. in Introduction, 
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location 434, par. 37). Esposito finds this simultaneously defensive and self-
sacrificing approach to individual and collective life in all of the political 
categories employed by Hobbes and his followers, including sovereignty, 
property, and liberty. He attributes the contemporary inability to protect life 
without inadvertently negating it to modernity's all-pervasive legacy. 
After all, the modern quest to preserve life by minimizing the risks that 
threaten it, ultimately backfires. As Giddens observes, the attempt to mitigate 
existing risks simply gives rise to new, “manufactured risks,” that is, risks 
“created by the very impact of our developing knowledge upon the world” 
(Runaway World 26).47 Furthermore, insofar as such manufactured risks have 
no historical precedent, the potential danger that they pose is impossible to 
calculate. Ironically, while the rise of the idea of risk was closely tied to the 
possibility of calculation, the risks that were inadvertently produced in the 
attempt to preserve life exceed our predictive capacities: “We simply don't 
know what the level of risk is, and in many cases we won't know for sure until 
it is too late” (Runaway World 28). 
In view of the inherently negative way in which modernity attempts to 
preserve life, Esposito's search for an affirmative biopolitics is grounded first 
and foremost in the effort to “break the modern relation between biopolitics 
and immunization” (52), which, he argues, centers on the idea of a body that 
is closed on itself destructively.48 Cohen argues that when medical science 
47 Giddens accordingly distinguishes between 'external risk,' that is “risk experienced as coming from 
the outside, from the fixities of nature,” and 'manufactured risk' (Runaway World 26). 
48 This is, for example, “how the Nazi biocracy conceived of the German people” (Esposito, 
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transformed the concept of immunity in the late nineteenth century by 
equating it with its defensive capacities, it radically changed how we imagine 
our bodies and how we understand what it means to live as an organism 
among other organisms (Introduction, location 115, par. 6). And when 
immunity as a mechanism of defense was employed in the 1880s to account 
for the success of Pasteur's vaccination experiments, it retroactively conferred 
the status of natural law on germ theory, solidifying the twin pillars of modern 
medicine: immunity and germ theory (18). According to Cohen: “Until immunity 
legalizes the microbe as the causal agent of disease from which immunity 
exempts an organism (thus negatively anointing it as the hostile entity against 
which an organism must defend itself), germ theory contended with a number 
of competing theories of disease causality” (18). The profundity of this 
development in both the history of medicine and modern political thought 
cannot be overstated. For although the modern notion of biological immunity 
appears somewhat late in a political context that had long since propagated 
defensive modes of embodiment, this particular incarnation of it “naturalizes 
such defensive presumptions by repurposing these juridico-political concepts 
as intrinsic to the human organism” (36).49 The result was not only that the 
defensive activity previously reserved for the political realm was now also fully 
“Interview,” 52), and it was often with reference to the organic integrity of the German folk that the 
extermination of Jews was not only justified but deemed necessary. “Nazism treated the German 
people as an organic body that needed a radical cure, which consisted in the violent removal of a 
part that was already considered spiritually dead” (Esposito, Bios, 10).
49 As Cohen astutely points out, it is anything but coincidental “that at the same moment when 
bioscientists affirm the metaphor of immunity’s credibility as a biological truth, Nietzsche depicts 
all such truth as the forgetting of metaphor” (6). 
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operative on the biological plane. More critically, by achieving the status of a 
biological fact, such defensive activity, in all of its various instantiations, could 
now be valorized as a fact of life. 
Instead of evoking the organism's essential connection to the world in 
which it lives, Cohen tells us, this quintessentially modern conception of 
immunity refigures medicine “as a powerful weapon in the body's necessary 
struggle to defend itself from its life-threatening context” (Introduction, location 
169, par. 10). As Melinda Cooper observes, since the late 19th century, 
“modern biology imagined humans and microbes to be engaged in a merciless 
war; a struggle for survival from which only one of us would emerge victorious” 
(114). By defining the organism as a defensible interior which endlessly needs 
to protect itself from a hostile exterior, the modern concept of “immunity-as-
defense” effectively naturalized the precepts of an earlier political 
modernization, one that appoints the individual body as the natural social unit 
(Cohen Introduction, location 341, par. 29). In Cohen's words: “Until the end of 
the nineteenth century the modern individual's atomized body did not accord 
with prevailing scientific theories that apprehend living organisms as 
contiguous with, rather than fundamentally distinct from, their lifeworlds” 
(Introduction, location 207, par. 16). Stated otherwise, with the rise of 
biological immunity, “a monadic modern body fully achieved its scientific 
apotheosis” (Introduction, location 207, par. 16): the insular body that Esposito 
identifies as the locus of biopolitical violence—a violence he seeks to 
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interrogate. 
But how, exactly, should we respond to the closure of the modern body—
both individual and collective—so that it can better escape power's grasp? 
Can we refigure the relationship between the singular and the social organism 
such that they no longer enter into defensive and ultimately self-defeating 
conflict with one another?50 Can we preserve the protective features of the 
immune apparatus without inciting an autoimmune response? 
Opening the Organism to Continuous Exchange  
As described above, in the effort to preserve life without endangering it, many 
contemporary responses to the paradoxes at the heart of biopolitics reinforce 
the efforts of the early German Romantics to expose the organism to the 
outside world and thereby to soften the distinction between self and other. 
Applying this strategy to the concept of immunity, we might ask: If the 
autoimmune response signals a confusion between self and non-self, what 
happens if we altogether do away with this false dichotomy? The challenge, as 
the German Romantics were well aware, is to preserve the otherness of the 
other, that is, to not simply incorporate what is other into the self, but to 
positively embrace rather than ostracize what is alien to us.51 For his part, 
Esposito finds inspiration in Maurice Merleau-Ponty's deconstruction of the 
50 Indicative of how pertinent this issue has become in contemporary discussions of biopolitics, 
Giorgio Agamben considers it more urgent to work on these divisions “than it is to take positions on 
the great issues, on so-called human rights and values” (Open 29).
51 For more on this important nuance, see Stone, “Alienation from Nature and Early German 
Romanticism.”
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compacted notion of the body and subsequent turn to the notion of flesh, 
which effectively opens the body both to its outside and its internal difference. 
That is, he turns to an understanding of immunity that takes as its starting 
point a conception of individual identity that distinguishes itself from the 
closed, monolithic one described in modern concepts of immunity: “Rather 
than an immutable and definitive given, the body is understood as a 
functioning construct that is open to continuous exchange with its surrounding 
environment” (Immunitas 17). Esposito insists that “a positive conception of 
biopolitics can only emerge . . . if one simultaneously develops a conception of 
life that is aporetically exposed to others in such a way that the individual 
escapes an immunization of the self (and hence is no longer an individual 
proper)” (Campbell, “Introduction,” xxix). He finds in the example of the 
implant, whether an artificial prosthesis or a natural implant like fertilized eggs 
in the mother’s womb, the most striking case in point: 
The fact that the genetic heterogeneity of the fetus rather than its 
genetic similarity is what encourages the mother’s immune system to 
accept it means that the immune system cannot be reduced to the 
simple function of rejecting all things foreign. If anything, the immune 
system must be interpreted as an internal resonance chamber, like 
the diaphragm through which difference, as such, engages and 
traverses us (Esposito, Immunitas, 18).
From this perspective, Esposito notes, the capacity for the immune system to 
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turn in on itself and its constituent parts is displaced precisely because it 
resists an insulation of the self. Stated otherwise, in the case of pregnancy, 
immunity is no longer the enemy of the common. In fact, it never effectively 
closes itself off from the common. Furthermore, he notes that the productive 
immunitary features of pregnancy offer a suggestive metaphor for an immunity 
in which “the diversity of the other does not lead to an all-out immunitary 
struggle against it. The traditional immunitary paradigm that reinforces this 
reality is only one possibility” (Campbell, “Introduction,” xxxii). In view of the 
ongoing interplay between the biomedical understanding of immunity and its 
legal and political counterparts, Esposito maintains that the full significance of 
this more expansive understanding of the immune system still eludes us. The 
task of translating a non-negating, hospitable notion of immunity operative in 
the biomedical example of the transplant into political or ethical terms is, after 
all, not an easy one. It is not even clear that such a translation is possible. But, 
Esposito insists that it is “precisely on such a possibility that we have to 
gamble” (“Interview” 54). 
Insofar as they subvert modern understandings of self and otherness, 
singularity and collectivity, I think that the alternative understandings of 
immunity that Esposito and other contemporary thinkers elucidate help 
establish the basis for an affirmative biopolitics. But the question remains: how 
do more fluid and porous conceptions of immunity address the problematic 
relations between the individual and the community implied in modern acts of 
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immunization? In other words, how does an organism in constant exchange 
with its environment live in relation with others? And so, in the attempt to more 
concretely understand how the biopolitical perplexities at the heart of the 
immunitary apparatus inform the relations between social and singular 
organisms, I turn to a prophylactic method that Hahnemann developed in view 
of his understanding that the preservation of life requires a dynamic 
interchange between an organism and its environment. As Kuzniar 
summarizes:
Hahnemann sees the human body as an open system in a 
continuous change of energies. The body responds to the 
vitality of the natural remedy rather than build, as one might 
explain today, antibodies against an entity. Whereas 
immunological identity, as inherited from the late eighteenth 
century, sets life against life, Hahnemann engages life on behalf 
of life. In this he resembles newer concepts of immunity that 
speak of auto-reactivity in terms of interaction and homeostasis 
as constant regulation of the body's balance (Birth of 
Homeopathy, Ch. 3, location 2804, par. 68).
Informed by the integrative ontology and epistemology of German 
Romanticism, Hahnemann's understanding of disease and its prevention is 
uniquely well-poised to expose the limitations of modernity's risk-laden and 
divisive understanding of immunity. 
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Although certain aspects of the counter-Enlightenment have been 
dismissed as a regression from modern scientific achievements, one of the 
distinguishing features of early German Romanticism is its endorsement of the 
enlightened values of secularism, humanism, and the primacy of reason. 
Stated succinctly, the Romantics “sought to create a culture that would 
reconceive nature as enchanted, but in a distinctly modern way” (Stone, 
“Schlegel” 4). Alison Stone accordingly finds this area of study relevant for any 
contemporary philosophy that attempts to reconceive nature as animated 
without completely jettisoning the values of modernity that we continue to 
uphold, values such as those prompting us to prevent disease rather than 
succumb to it fatalistically. Indeed, what is most illuminating about 
Hahnemann's response to epidemics is that it corresponded with the 
enlightened dream to rid the world of the scourges of disease. He was simply 
not prepared to engage in an endless negotiation of risk or, more precisely, to 
actively impose risk on living organisms, in order to accomplish this goal. His 
integrative ontology prevented him from drawing the lines of distinction 
necessary to justify the imposed burden on a single individual in order to 
benefit the whole. As a result, his distinctly romantic approach to disease 
prevention provides an important historical alternative to the modern trajectory 
of immunization. 
If the self-defeating aspects of immunology and, more generally, 
biopolitics can be traced back to modern man's defensive reaction to his 
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threatening environment, what new possibilities become available to us when 
we consider alternative responses to this perceived risk? While modern 
immunology functions to naturalize our modern orientation to risk, I maintain 
that alternative immunological understandings of embodiment cannot alter our 
relation to others and our environment unless we also reconfigure our relation 
to risks, such as, for example, those involved in disease prevention. How do 
the risk assessments that inform our decisions regarding vaccination delineate 
a kind of life deserving of protection? How do they antagonize the relationship 
between the individual and the community? Finally, how might a 
problematization of this relation to risk help resolve the paradoxes at the heart 
of vaccination and, more generally, biopolitics? In short, in order to better 
understand how a less defensive understanding of immunity might bring the 
individual and community into more harmonious relations, I reformulate the 
quest for an affirmative biopolitics in terms of the politics of disease 
prevention: Is it possible to protect a multiplicity of individuals from 
communicable diseases without endangering the very lives we seek to 
protect? If so, how would such a non-negating form of protection resolve the 
seemingly irreconcilable tension between the individual and the community 
operative in the modern immunitary apparatus?
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Chapter Two: Politics of the Body and the Body Politic
Before considering the ways in which the homeopathic prevention of 
epidemics suggests an alternative approach to life than that operative in the 
proliferation of risk analyses used to promote inoculation, it is important to first 
consider the general historical and political conditions under which both 
methods were developed. As public health initiatives that developed alongside 
the rise of the modern state, both inoculation and homeopathy were of interest 
to state leaders urgently trying to improve the health of the population. Yet, as 
we will see, state initiatives to interrupt the spread of infectious disease and to 
thereby increase the life expectancy of the population – however enlightened 
– were never exclusively motivated by humanitarian ideals. Economic and 
militaristic interests were also at play in efforts to foster the vitality of the 
population. And, as Foucault presents it, this instrumentalist investment in life 
introduced a problematic gap between the 'population,' a life force that is 
valued for its contribution to the wealth of the modern state, and the 
'multiplicity of individuals' – the aggregate of living bodies – which is thereby 
stripped of its inherent value. 
In view of the problematic divide between the population and the 
multiplicity of individuals that it generates, one of the biggest challenges 
emerging from Foucault's account of biopower is how to distinguish life-giving 
public health initiatives from the biopolitical apparatus that generated them. 
While many have been eager to salvage social medicine from the grips of the 
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medical police by emphasizing the individual rights and freedoms won by the 
rise of liberalism and its critique of state power, the insidious nature of 
biopower prompts us to more carefully examine how various medical 
interventions continue to reinforce its originary divisiveness despite radical 
transformations in political ideology. 
Raison d'État: The State's Raison d'Être
As Foucault's historico-political analyses detail, Western mechanisms of 
power have undergone a profound transformation since the classical age: the 
tactics of battle have retained the same underlying principle—“that one has to 
be capable of killing in order to go on living” (History 136-37)—but 
mechanisms of power invariably change shape when employed to secure 
states rather than to protect the sovereignty of monarchs. For modern society, 
he observes, “the existence in question is no longer the juridical existence of 
sovereignty; at stake is the biological existence of a population” (History 137). 
That is, power is no longer exercised to ensure the safety of the prince and his 
territory, but rather the security of the population and, by extension, of those 
who govern it (Security 93). 
Foucault situates the historical rise of biopower in the aftermath of the 
Thirty Years' War (1618-48), an enduring period of political and religious 
conflict that destroyed countless lives and devastated economic growth 
throughout many parts of Europe (Cohen Introduction, location 368, par. 32). 
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When the ambassadors who negotiated the treaty of Westphalia sought to end 
the persistent wars by establishing a state of balance between European 
states, he argues, the nation state developed a new interest in the life of its 
population, recognizing it as the most valuable resource for maintaining a 
state of war preparedness (Foucault, Security, 384). After all, the new 
equilibrium in Europe did not actually end the state of war, but rather changed 
its terms. According to Gustav Schmoller, during this formative period, the 
whole history of European foreign relations can be “summed up in the 
opposition to one another of the separate interests of the newly rising states, 
each of which sought to obtain and retain its place in the circle of European 
nations” (50). 
In the interest of its own survival, each state strove to rely as much as 
possible on domestic resources to support its military, political, and economic 
initiatives, which were numerous. It was necessary not only to repair the 
ravages of war, but also to meet the new military demand to establish 
permanent armies, all the while addressing the population's growing 
consumption. Together, these circumstances led states to develop strategies 
both to promote and protect their productive potential. The result was a set of 
mercantilist policies and interventions designed to accumulate financial 
resources and achieve self-sufficiency through state subsidy, control, and 
protection (Cohen 59; Raeff 1224). In its various forms (including the distinctly 
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German form, cameralism),52 mercantilism can most coherently be understood 
as “the instinctive national policy of states in the process of evolution, while at 
the same time in miscellaneous struggle with other states” (Small 25). More 
specifically, in the attempt to maintain always an advantageous position in the 
balance of trade, the importation of manufactured goods was discouraged in 
favour of their production and exportation; the exportation of raw materials 
was prohibited; and domestic shipping and coasting trade were encouraged 
by restricting or forbidding foreign competition (Schmoller 58). Although a 
country's unique geopolitical position informed the specific ways it adopted 
these general guidelines, the consistent thought pursued everywhere was this: 
“as competition with other countries fluctuated up and down, to cast the weight 
of the power of the state into the scales of the balance in the way demanded 
in each case by national interests” (Schmoller 59). In short, raison d'État was 
each state’s raison d'être.  
The perilous balance established in Europe was meant primarily to 
prevent any state from becoming strong enough to enforce its law on any 
other state. But, as Foucault notes, “war is the first instrument of this 
precarious, fragile, and provisional universal peace” (Security 387). More 
specifically, after “peace” was established in Westphalia, it was deemed not 
only justified, but also necessary, to wage war in order to preserve this 
52 Cameralism is often referred to as the more politically-oriented, specifically German, form of, or 
continental translation of, mercantilism (Cohen 266; Rosen, “Cameralism,” 23). For a description of 
the important differences between cameralism and mercantilism and the distinct geopolitical 
circumstances that gave rise to each form of statecraft, see Wagner.     
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balance (Security 387). The existence of a large, expensive, permanent 
military apparatus within this system of “peace” was one of the indispensable 
instruments for the constitution of European balance (Security 392; Cohen 
65). And so, while the treaties that ended the Thirty Years’ War allowed state 
leaders to empty the battlefields and rebuild the economy, they also prompted 
them to make massive investments in permanent armies to carry out military 
operations. The continuity of life that could be trained for such purposes—the 
endurance of the life of the population—became an object of unprecedented 
political and economic importance. As George Rosen observes: “[a]dmiration 
for the virtues of a growing population and intense desire to increase the 
number of people within a country mark the political and economic views of 
the later seventeenth century and of most of the eighteenth century” 
(“Cameralism” 21).
Since the preservation of the state requires not only a living population 
but also a thriving one, it follows that the role of modern government is not just 
to govern, but also to improve the condition of the population, to increase its 
wealth, its longevity, and its health (Foucault, Security, 141). In a mercantilist 
system, the prosperity and happiness of the population was considered the 
wealth of the state, a basic principle expressed nowhere better than by the 
young Prince Friedrich of Prussia: The might of a state, he recognized, 
does not at all consist in the extent of its lands, nor in the 
possession of vast wastes or immense deserts, but in 
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the wealth of its inhabitants and in their number. The 
interest of a prince is thus to populate a country, to make 
it flourish, not to devastate and destroy it (qtd. in Broman 
46).
This view, held by many throughout Europe, functioned to legitimize the state's 
interest in organizing and intervening in societal affairs. With the rise of the 
modern state, the traditional role of government shifted from the duty to 
preserve justice to the active task of fostering society's productive energy. 
Foucault identifies this transition with the rise of a police force that could 
effectively enforce and regulate matters of national interest through various 
methods of inspection and surveillance, information and intelligence gathering, 
and direct intervention (sometimes to the point of deadly force) in private, 
familial, and commercial matters (Security 465).53 Installed to make raison 
d'État function by intervening in the lives of citizens (Security 358), the police 
force continued to demonstrate the exertion of power in ever new domains of 
life (Security 440). In concrete terms, managing the population required, 
among other things, reducing infant mortality rates, preventing epidemics, and 
lowering morbidity and mortality rates of endemic diseases (Security 474). In 
crude terms, it required fostering the life body that populated the permanent 
armies that had been erected to defend newly delineated nation states (Cohen 
Introduction, location 434, par. 36). And it is in this context that Foucault traces 
53 Reinforcing this transition, Foucault emphasizes: “Police is not justice. Whether written by those 
who support and justify the need for a police, or by jurists or parliamentarians who display a certain 
mistrust of police, all the texts agree on this: police is seen as not being justice” (Security 439-40). 
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from “beneath the dramatic and somber absolute power that was the power of 
the sovereign, and which consisted in the power to take life,” the emergence 
of biopower: “the power to make live” (Society 247). 
Medical Policing and its Valuation of Life  
Insofar as the preservation of the state was correlated generally with the 
prosperity of its members, the domain of the police in modern states was 
immense, extending, as Foucault succinctly summarizes in Security, Territory, 
Population, from “living to more than just living” (421), its heterogeneity a 
testament to its totalizing aspirations. In its modern usage, 'police' refers to 
“the set of interventions and means that ensure that living, better than just 
living, [and] coexisting will be effectively useful in the constitution and 
development of the state's forces” (421). Stated otherwise, “the objective of 
police is everything from being to well-being, everything that may produce this 
well-being beyond being, and in such a way that the well-being of individuals 
is the state's strength” (422). Despite differences in the various ways it was 
worked out in practice, the basic idea behind the emergence of the police 
apparatus—that is, the imperative to use and increase the state's forces in a 
way that reinforces rather than compromises the order of the state (414)—
showed remarkable resilience over time and across Europe (Carroll 464). 
As one of the regions most devastated by the enduring years of religious 
and political war, in the years following the treaties of Westminster, German 
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states engaged in some of the most intense theoretical and practical 
development of “state-making” and police control in Europe. Following the 
Thirty Years' War, while other state systems were expanding to meet the new 
needs of the time, the German territories had to struggle for their very 
existence (Small 48). It was not only the immense loss in men and capital 
compared with other regions that pushed German states into retrogression, 
but also, more critically, its lack of politico-economic organization and 
consolidation of its forces (Small 48). It was, in short, not without reason that 
German statesmen came to attribute their struggles to want of a good “Polizei” 
(Small 45). Foucault appropriately refers to the German states that were 
constituted and reorganized at the time of the treaty of Westphalia as 
privileged spaces for innovation of policing strategies. Occupying an 
intermediate position between feudal structures and the big European states, 
he observes, they became small, microstate laboratories that could serve both 
as models and sites of experiment (Security 412-13).54 
During these formative years, German territories became paradigmatic 
examples of a modern police state trying to cultivate internal resources in 
order to achieve external security. In the attempt of these small, war-torn 
territories to secure their place in the newly established European equilibrium, 
a new form of statecraft was developed, called cameralism (Cohen 60). While 
cameralism is often presented as the continental version of mercantilism, the 
54 As Neocleous observes, it was in large part the collapse of the feudal world that demanded new 
practices of order and new concepts with which to understand those practices and, in turn, that 
linked police to the doctrine of raison d'État and the emergence of the modern state (436). 
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critical difference is that the latter emphasized the prosperity of the state 
through economic regulation while the former sought to govern people's lives 
(Cohen 266). More specifically, the project of cameralism encompassed the 
inhabitants of the state, not in their singularity, but “as an aggregate whose 
collective life activities it channels, directs, augments, enhances, organizes, 
and dedicates to the 'happiness' of the state” (Cohen 61). It used methods 
which were clearly out of the question for democratic societies: its most salient 
feature was the subordination of the interests of the individual to the interests 
of the community” (Small 29), or, more accurately, to the interests of the state. 
In the effort to consolidate and centralize administrative and economic policies 
for the absolute monarch, the primary task of cameralists was to provide the 
heads of state with the aggregate knowledge necessary for state action 
(Rosen, “Cameralism,” 24). To this end, they made extensive use of a strong 
police force; Polizeiwissenschaft was taught in German universities as a 
subfield of Kameralwissenschaft, with practically no equivalent until the end of 
the eighteenth century, when it would exert a critical influence throughout 
Europe (Foucault, Security 412-13). 
Alongside the development of administrative systems to centralize all 
activities in the German territories for the welfare of the state, medical men 
developed an increasing interest in the relation of health problems to the state 
(Rosen, “Cameralism,” 35). In the eighteenth century, German academic 
physicians struggled for recognition in a society bombarded with a plethora of 
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“health providers,” including surgeons, barbers, and midwifes, as well as 
miracle healers, charlatans, and drug peddlers. Their predominantly academic 
training and proficiency in Latin was unimpressive to the large majority of the 
population and, without a recognized standing in society, most physicians had 
only a few patients on whose fees their income depended. Indeed, many 
medical practitioners complained that their wealthy patients viewed them as a 
kind of servant (Broman 19-20; Huerkamp 621). In an effort to gain a more 
authoritative and financially secure position in the health field, in the 1770s, 
numerous physicians began publishing works in the area of public health, with 
the hope of gaining recognition from state administrators. More specifically, 
they started to present medical policy in terms of the new cameralist discourse 
and proved themselves quite adept at so doing (Broman 49-51). Their efforts 
to establish themselves as important contributors to the administration of 
governance were largely successful, and over time, questions of health and 
disease were deemed so critical as to warrant a new domain of political 
interest, namely 'medical police.' While the population's well-being already fell 
generally under the scope of modern police, the explicit emphasis on medicine 
as a form of governance effectively refocused the policing project. 
The rise of medical policing effectively functioned to align the police force 
with medical experts rather than the cameralist administrators who had 
previously dominated the scene (Cohen 66). Medical policing came to be 
recognized as a particularly important branch of general policing, since its 
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reach was not confined to those who came under its influence through specific 
circumstances, but applied to the whole population (Rosen, “Fate,” 56). 
Indeed, this new jurisdiction expanded the purview of medicine from the 
individual body to the body politic and, with it, its governing concerns to 
include social, political, and economic factors that inform the population's 
vitality (Cohen 67). In this capacity, although medical policing did not normally 
deploy deadly force, it was otherwise configured within the general ideas and 
practices of policing and included methods of investigation, regulation, 
prosecution, information gathering and intervention (Carroll 465). Like other 
jurisdictions of state power, the medical police authorized itself by declaring its 
interest as the state's interest. Although it continued, as medical practice, to 
exhibit a deep interest in life, as an extension of the police force, this 
investment did “not accrue interest simply because human life—or more 
specifically, the life that citizens embody—represents an intrinsic good” 
(Cohen 73). Rather, medical police valued the life of the population “as a fund 
on which the state can draw” (Cohen 73). In other words, medical police 
based their recommendations on one of the central principles of eighteenth-
century cameralism, namely that the size and productivity of a state's 
population is the cornerstone of its economic and political power (Broman 51). 
As Cohen perceptively observes, this advantage-value calculus is what 
frames the entire discourse of medical police or, more specifically, the way in 
which it “explicitly defines human 'value' as not only calculable per se but 
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calculable precisely with respect to the 'advantage of [the] population'” (69). 
Providing a coherent framework for optimizing the state's primary asset, 
that is, the vitality of its population, the medical police had a lasting impact not 
only on European political and medical thought, but also on public health 
practice. The six-volume System of Complete Medical Police (System einer 
vollständigen medicinische Policey), for example, written by Johann Peter 
Frank (1745-1821), had a direct influence on medical pedagogy and 
encouraged others to translate the principles of medical policing into official 
legislation (Cohen 67). While the effect of his work was felt most strongly 
within German-speaking regions, and in areas such as Italy, which were in 
close political and cultural contact with the German states, there is little doubt 
that Frank helped spread his notion of medical police beyond German 
borders: by the later eighteenth century and well into the nineteenth century, 
his ideas appeared not only in Germany, Austria, and Italy, but also in France, 
Great Britain, and the United States (Rosen, “Fate,” 46). 
The Rise of the Population and the Fall of Men 
Though it undoubtedly improved the health and longevity of countless lives, 
the fact that the modern state's investment in public health was originally for 
the explicit purpose of building a robust military and a strong economy gives 
us reason to question the ways in which its various strategies configure the 
multiplicity of individuals in relation to the population. As Foucault warns, 
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although the well-being of the population appears, at first glance, to be the 
final end of government, when raison d'État is the predominant political 
rationality, the well-being of a population is valuable only insofar as it 
preserves the state. In other words, there is “an absolutely fundamental 
caesura” between the population, a level that is pertinent for the government's 
economic-political action, and the multiplicity of individuals that is no longer 
pertinent, or more precisely, “pertinent to the extent that, properly managed, 
maintained, and encouraged, it will make possible what one wants to achieve 
at the level that is pertinent” (Security 64). More specifically, through the use of 
forecasts, statistical estimates, and overall measures, biopower engages with 
the population as the primary life body and relates to the multiplicity of 
individuals that comprise the population as merely that. With the most 
sophisticated of techniques, he observes, it achieves a kind of “bestialization 
of man” (qtd. in Agamben, Homo Sacer, 10). In the words of Foucault: “[F]or 
the first time in history, the possibilities of the social sciences are made known, 
and at once it becomes possible both to protect life and to authorize a 
holocaust” (qtd. in Agamben, Homo Sacer, 10). 
Although he distinguishes biopower from sovereign power in its capacity 
to normalize, modify, and regulate rather than annihilate life, Foucault insists 
that biopower’s rise to prominence did not thereby coincide with a decrease in 
bloodshed. Moreover, he provides insight into the apparent paradox that the 
power to make live could be capable of hitherto unthinkable violence. More 
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specifically, Foucault highlights the ways in which biopower takes on a new 
capacity for destruction when it operates at the level of the population: “If 
genocide is indeed the dream of modern powers, this is not because of a 
recent return of the ancient right to kill; it is because power is situated and 
exercised at the level of life, the species, the race, and the large-scale 
phenomena of population” (History 137). 
In her account of the rise of the modern state, Arendt similarly 
problematizes the development of public health, which, she argues, targets 
the life-body of the population in such a way that dissolves the freedom and 
spontaneity of its individuals. In The Human Condition, Arendt identifies the 
state’s preoccupation with the “life process itself,” that is, with “all activities 
serving the subsistence of the individual and the survival of the species,” as a 
distinctly modern phenomenon (72). In contrast, she notes that in the ancient 
Greek polis, laborers who ministered to the bodily needs of life, and women 
who guaranteed the physical survival of the species, were always hidden 
away in the private sphere, well beyond the scope of public life (72). Matters 
of survival were, according to ancient Greek understanding, driven by 
necessity and thereby justified the use of violence. As such, they were 
categorically excluded from the polis, where “everything was decided through 
words and persuasion and not through force and violence” (26). The violence 
necessitated by the struggle for survival was characteristic of life beyond the 
polis. Such violence was the distinctly pre-political act of liberating oneself 
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from the necessity of life for the freedom of the world (31). But, Arendt 
observes, it was never a matter of politics proper. And for good reason.
According to Arendt, the movement of the life processes from the 
privacy of households to the light of public consciousness did not bring with it 
an end to the brutality characteristic of bare necessity. She insists that the 
violence previously characteristic of family life, “where the household head 
ruled with uncontested, despotic powers” (27), has since become “the 
monopoly of government” (31). She argues that the relations among citizens 
in modern society resemble the equality of household members before the 
despotic power of the household leader. The one critical difference is that in 
society, “where the natural strength of one common interest and one 
unanimous opinion is tremendously enforced by sheer number, actual rule 
exerted by one man, representing the common interest and the right opinion, 
could eventually be dispensed with” (40). Arendt refers to this modern 
phenomenon as “a kind of no-man rule” and insists that “this nobody, the 
assumed interest of a society as a whole . . . does not cease to rule for having 
lost its personality” (40). On the contrary, on every level of society this “rule by 
nobody” “expects from each of its members a certain kind of behavior, 
imposing innumerable and various rules, all of which tend to normalize its 
members, to make them behave, to exclude spontaneous action or 
outstanding achievement” (40). Stated otherwise, this “rule by nobody” erodes 
the mechanisms that protect singularity and shelter community from its own 
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excess. Arendt warns that under certain circumstances, “rule by nobody” may 
turn out to be one of the cruelest and most tyrannical versions of rulership 
and, for this reason, maintains that “statistical uniformity is by no means a 
harmless scientific ideal; it is the no longer secret political ideal of a society 
which, entirely submerged in the routine of everyday living, is at peace with 
the scientific outlook inherent in its very existence” (43).55
In view of the particular violence that both Foucault and Arendt 
associate with the administration of life at the level of the population, it is 
instructive to consider the ways in which this expression of biopower differs 
from methods that target individual members of society. According to 
Foucault’s historico-political reading, biopower first emerged in the late 
seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries through practices that centered on 
55 In Homo Sacer, Agamben views the fact that Foucault could begin his study of biopolitics with no 
reference to Arendt's work as a testament to the “difficulties and resistances that thinking had to 
encounter in this area” (10). He thinks that it is most likely these same difficulties “that account for 
the curious fact that Arendt establishes no connection between her research in The Human 
Condition and the penetrating analyses she had previously devoted to totalitarian power (in which a 
biopolitical perspective is altogether lacking), and that Foucault, in just as striking a fashion, never 
dwelt on the exemplary places of modern biopolitics: the concentration camp and the structure of 
the great totalitarian states of the twentieth century” (10). Without disputing Agamben on this point 
(and, more affirmatively, agreeing with its raison d'être), I find it important to highlight the passages
—albeit few and far between—in which Foucault does explicitly address the Holocaust (see above) 
as well as the continuity between Arendt's study of biopolitics and her observations of the Eichmann 
trial. While she deliberately confines her observations of Eichmann in Jerusalem to the trial of a 
single man and explicitly denies that her book could possibly provide an account of totalitarianism, 
Arendt does take care to explicate her observation that it is “the essence of totalitarian government, 
and perhaps the nature of every bureaucracy…to make functionaries and mere cogs in the 
administrative machinery out of men, and thus to dehumanize them” (135). While she then only 
acknowledges that “one can debate long and profitably on the rule of Nobody, which is what the 
political form known as bureau-cracy truly is” (135), without proceeding to do so, I think that this 
suggestion, alongside her penetrating account of Eichmann—his incredible normalcy, his absurd use 
of clichés—as well as her more general observations on the “banality of evil,” is apt. More 
specifically, it provides an instructive biopolitical context for considering her insights in The Human 
Condition alongside her work on totalitarianism in a way that appropriately refuses to deny the utter 
singularity of either the Holocaust or the Eichmann trial. 
107
the human body (Society 241-42). This “anatomo-politics” is exercised by 
procedures of power that characterize the “disciplines” (History 139), that is, 
technologies that aim to forge a “docile [body] that may be subjected, used, 
transformed and improved” (Discipline 136). Foucault contrasts this form of 
biopower with one that emerges later, in the second half of the eighteenth 
century, as “a unique, non-disciplinary, technology of power, that applies to 
man-as-living being” (Society 242), namely biopolitics.56 In contrast with the 
disciplines of anatomo-politics, biopolitical technologies correspond with “the 
species body” and address biological processes such as propagations, births, 
mortality, life expectancy, and longevity, along with all the conditions that can 
cause these to vary (History 139). 
Although Foucault distinguishes anatamo-politics from biopolitics 
insofar as the former is exercised on the bodies of individuals, while the latter 
relates to populations, he is careful to qualify that the individual is not the 
primary datum on which disciplines are exercised. Rather, disciplines exist 
only insofar as there is a multiplicity and, more importantly, a goal or objective 
that can be obtained on the basis of this multiplicity (Security 26). He points 
out that the task of governing an entire population made the need to develop 
56 By focusing primarily on the normative management of populations, my study of biopolitics falls 
into the 'stream' identified by Hardt and Negri that focuses on the “administration of life that 
generally requires viewing individuals from a statistical perspective, classifying them into large 
normative sets, which become more coherent the more the microsystems that compose them are de-
subjectivized and made homogeneous” (57-8). Recognizing that this interpretation has the merit of 
“philological fidelity,” they criticize it insofar as it “poses against this threatening, all-encompassing 
power over life no alternative power or effective resistance but only a vague sense of critique and 
moral indignation” (58). I contend that the merit of this approach extends far beyond “philological 
fidelity” insofar as it provides us with methods of recognizing the most lethal aspects of biopower 
and of seeking more life-giving alternatives. 
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disciplines—that is, methods of controlling human bodies—even more acute. 
As such, he insists that we refrain from understanding the analytics of power 
as the replacement of a society of sovereignty by a society of discipline, and 
then of a society of discipline by a society of government. “In fact we have a 
triangle: sovereignty, discipline, and governmental management, which has 
population as its main target and apparatuses of security as its essential 
mechanism” (Security 143). While the anatomo-political axis of biopower 
segregates a multiplicity of men into individual bodies that can be monitored, 
trained, employed, and, if need be, punished, the biopolitical axis massifies it 
into a population that can be influenced by overall processes characteristic of 
life (Society 242). In short, anatomo-politics disciplines the multiplicity of 
individuals into a population that biopolitical mechanisms can then monitor 
and control. Together, both axes of biopower work to produce a life that takes 
priority—the population—and by extension, a life that is subsumed to the 
population—the multiplicity of individuals. In this way, these two levels of the 
individual and the collective are mutually implicated in producing a life that is 
no longer inherently valuable but only instrumentally so.
Foucault explains that it was precisely this “taking charge of life, more 
than the threat of death, that gave power its access even to the body” (History
143). This in turn accounts for the apparent paradox of biopower’s capacity to 
both foster and endanger life. In short, power needs animate bodies in order 
to exercise its dominion over life. As Esposito observes:
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The body is the most immediate terrain of the relations 
between politics and life, because only in the body does life 
seem protected from what threatens to harm it and from its 
own tendency to go beyond itself, to become other than itself. 
It is as if life, to preserve itself as such, must be compressed 
and kept within the confines of the body (Immunitas 14). 
In the absence of living bodies, biopower would cease to exist. It is precisely 
for this reason that Foucault identifies death as “power's limit, the moment that 
escapes it” (History 138). And yet, in view of the tactics of power—that one 
has to be capable of killing in order for a population to go on living—it is clear 
that the state's project of fostering life does not thereby render it philanthropic. 
As Foucault reasons, as soon as power gave itself the function of 
administering life, “its reason for being and the logic of its exercise—and not 
the awakening of humanitarian feelings—made it more and more difficult to 
apply the death penalty” (History 138). 
How, then, “could power exercise its highest prerogatives by putting 
people to death, when its main role was to ensure, sustain, and multiply life, to 
put this life in order?” (History 138). Simply stated, when this question is 
considered exclusively at the level of individual bodies, it cannot: “For such a 
power, execution was at the same time a limit, a scandal, and a contradiction” 
(History 138). Without a biopolitical apparatus with which to prioritize the life of 
the population, acts of murder undermine biopower’s grip on life. That is, the 
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state wastes a valuable resource when it cannot exploit a life. Nevertheless, 
the seeming contradiction of biopower’s administration of death begins to 
dissolve when we shift our perspective to the level of the population. In order 
to maintain capital punishment, biopower need only invoke the criminal’s 
incorrigibility and the need to safeguard society (History 138). In a biopolitical 
state, the interests of the population are paramount. And, according to this 
logic, when a dangerous criminal is considered beyond reform, then execution 
may well have its place. That said, if he is still responsive to “rehabilitation,” 
then biopower undermines itself by annihilating a life rather than using the 
animate body to populate its army. After all, the “life” that is taken up by 
biopower “appears 'ordered' within 'the body' as a resource for, a condition of, 
war preparedness” (Cohen Introduction, location 445, par. 38). It is, I think, 
from a distinctly biopolitical perspective that we can best understand 
Foucault’s observation that “those who died on the scaffold became fewer and 
fewer, in contrast to those who died in war. But it was for the same reasons 
that the latter became more numerous and the former more and more rare” 
(History 138, my emphasis). Indeed, when the raison d’etre of biopower is to 
secure the life of the population and, by extension, of those who govern it, 
there is no longer a discrepancy between the power that administers life and 
the power that administers death to docile bodies. As Foucault notes, within 
the system of biopower, “killing or the imperative to kill is acceptable only if it 
results not in a victory over political adversaries, but in the elimination of the 
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biological threat to and the improvement of the species or race” (Security 
256). Reinforcing this observation, Esposito observes: “Where the health of 
the political body as a whole is at stake, a life that doesn’t conform to those 
interests must be available for termination” (Bios 133). He notes that, by 
preoccupying themselves with the health of the German body, medical and 
political men in the Nazi state “turned themselves into the executioners of 
those they considered either nonessential or harmful to improving public 
health” (Bios 115). From this point of view, Esposito prompts us to consider 
genocide as the result, not of an absence, but of a presence, of a medical 
ethics perverted into its opposite (Bios 115). He goes as far as to argue 
that at least some Nazi doctors actually believed that 
they were respecting the substance, if not the form, of 
the Hippocratic oath that they had taken, namely, not to 
harm in any way the patient. It's only that they identified 
the patient as the German people as a whole, rather 
than as a single individual. Caring for that body was 
precisely what required the death of all of those whose 
existence threatened its health (Bios 115-16).
And so, insofar as it targets the collective body rather than the individual, 
biopower bestows upon itself the power to kill without undermining its power 
over life. In this way, it gains a grip even on death. As Foucault observes in 
Society Must be Defended, power can influence death only at the level of the 
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population, that is, only “in general, overall, or statistical terms” (248). Stated 
succinctly: “Power has no control over death, but it can control mortality” 
(248). While biopower can reinforce its anatomo-political axis only through the 
administration, rather than the annihilation, of life, along the biopolitical axis, 
biopower’s dominion over life knows no limit.57 And yet, by explicating 
biopower’s lethal capacities, enabled by its abstraction of “life” from the 
population, we should not by extension consider its anatomo-political 
apparatus to be benign. It is, after all, only ever by disciplining docile bodies 
that biopower establishes contact with life, manipulates bodies, and populates 
a life force with which to execute its economic-political agendas. Without a 
multiplicity of individuals, there is no population. But without a population, 
biopower can sustain itself only by administering life, not annihilating it. And 
so, in view of the nuanced relationship between biopower’s control over living 
bodies and its stronghold on the population, how can we most strategically 
respond to its lethal articulations while retaining its life-saving potential? How 
can we extricate effective public health initiatives from the biopolitical machine 
that generated them?  
57 I find in this reading of the biopolitical paradox a possible rebuttal to Esposito's contention that 
Foucault fails to account for biopolitics' propensity for violence because he continually oscillates on 
the question of whether or not biopower's interest in protecting the vitality of a population 
represents a clean break from the sovereign right to kill (Bios 42). Foucault explicitly states that 
genocide is not a vestige of the ancient right to kill and offers another, distinctly biopolitical, 
explanation to account for such violence. 
113
Is it Social Medicine or Medizinische Polizei?  
In the effort to salvage life-saving public health initiatives from modern 
biopolitics' proclivity for violence, I explicitly distance my analysis from 
attempts to distinguish social medicine from medical policing by reducing the 
latter to an extension of eighteenth-century German leadership that attempted 
to govern life for the explicit purpose of strengthening state power. Rosen, 
who argues that the German approach to public health was wholly 
incompatible with the individual freedom that the British were already starting 
to take for granted at the end of the eighteenth century, was instrumental in 
popularizing this interpretation; he observes that insofar as the concept of 
medical police was adopted outside of Germany, it tended to be limited to 
areas of community life where governmental intervention was generally 
accepted, most notably disease prevention (“Fate” 47). I contend that this 
polarized reading of the history of public health fails to acknowledge the more 
insidious, though no less interventionist, forms of biopower operative in certain 
“liberal” forms of medical rationality, such as the analysis of risks used to 
promote immunization to the population. It also reduces the rich plurality of 
German medical innovations to its most totalitarian expression and overlooks 
important contributions, such as the homeopathic prevention of epidemics, 
that explicitly counter such calculating and divisive approaches to life. 
Even on the question of communicable diseases, comparative readings 
of the history of public health tend to polarize, on the one hand, the tendency 
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of the German monarch to give more consideration to the needs of the 
community than to the claims of the individual and thereby legitimize 
mandatory quarantines and vaccinations; and on the other hand, Britain's 
consistent use of tactics, such as broad sanitary measures and voluntary 
vaccination, that would impinge less obviously and immediately on the rights 
of individuals (Baldwin 556). The British spirit of individual liberty, such 
readings suggest, was resistant to any restrictions on personal freedom: the 
working class would not tolerate drastic statutory intervention; trading interests 
resisted quarantinism's interference in commercial liberty; and compulsory 
smallpox vaccination was regarded as a violation of personal liberty (Baldwin 
28). 
Following Rosen's lead, in his essay “Security and Vitality: Drains, 
Liberalism, and Power in the Nineteenth Century,” Osborne goes as far as 
saying that Britain was “a country without a tradition of police, but with a 
strong tradition of liberalism” (105), invoking this “more or less straightforward 
historical fact” (105) to discredit readings of the history of medicine that 
emphasize the continuity between an absolutistic police science and later 
developments within the regulation of health. Presenting the eighteenth-
century science of police as the prototype of a more or less totalizing form of 
biopolitics in which nothing was to be impervious to the gaze of knowledge, 
Osborne’s quest for a non-totalizing biopolitics turns him to the distinctly liberal 
art of regulating the vital sphere that was developed in Britain. After all, he 
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argues, in its purest form, liberalism signals a critique of state reason coupled 
with attention to the technological means of bringing about forms of 
government detached from totalizing forms of sovereignty. Whereas police 
represented a political technology that was happy to intervene as much as 
possible, liberalism demands continual suspicion of the means and ends of 
government (100-02).58
This liberal challenge to totalitarianism is, according to Osborne, what 
distinguishes public health policy from state-sponsored espionage, the latter of 
which instituted the kind of universal healthcare epitomized by the medical 
police. In his essay on “Health and Statecraft,” he presents the liberal 
recognition of the indeterminacy of the concept of health in relation to policy 
as the critical factor that enabled the transition away from the interventionist 
approach of medical policing. He argues that a liberal approach to health 
tends to direct health policy at a certain distance precisely because it 
embraces the unavoidable indeterminacy of administrating health.59 It 
58 It should be emphasized that liberalism in this sense does not represent a substantive doctrine or 
practice of government as much as a recurring critique of state reason and politics (Barry, Osborne, 
and Rose 8). From this perspective, the emergence of liberalism coincides with the realization that 
excessive governing could ultimately thwart the ends of government (Barry, Osborne, and Rose 8). 
For early liberal thinkers, it became increasingly clear that state intervention distorted the object to 
be governed (Osborne, “Health and Statecraft,” 183). By extension, liberalism effectively 
undermines raison d'État; it challenges the assumption that the State is able to have sufficient 
knowledge of what has to be governed—that is, an adequate knowledge of itself, the state—on the 
basis of which it can act in accordance with its own interests, in order to, for instance, increase its 
wealth vis-a-vis other states (Burchell 22). In critical response to mercantilism, for example, 
economic thinkers such as Adam Smith and the physiocrats epitomized this liberal problematization 
insofar as they demonstrated that attempts to direct individuals' actions on the basis of the collective 
good are harmful since the collective good is in principle incalculable. As this turn to a more 
laissez-faire economic policy illustrates, liberalism doubts the rationality of the state and the 
possibility of it, or anyone, being able to know perfectly and in all of its details the reality to be 
governed (Burchell 22). 
59 Osborne’s search for a distinctly liberal approach to medicine leads him to the British nineteenth-
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emphasizes the provision of infrastructural conditions for healthy living—such 
as effective sewage clearance and a clean water-supply—rather than 
intervening directly in the lives of individuals and families. Using these 
examples to demonstrate that the respect for indeterminacy at the heart of 
liberalism does not, as some might argue, necessarily entail retrenchment in 
the field of health policy, Osborne upholds such indeterminacy as something 
that “we have to live with—even defend” (180). He is confident that 
one has only to consider the political consequences of attempts 
to absolutize—to make determinate—the concept of health, to 
see the pertinence of this. It often seems as if such initiatives 
tend in the direction—putting it contentiously—of a 
polizeiwissenschaft of health; policy reverts to its root, police. 
And if, indeed, one thinks of those kinds of regime that have 
attempted to make health a goal of political ideals, it is difficult to 
century revolution in urban sanitation, in part, because, following Foucault, he recognizes the focus 
of a liberal government to be not the territory of the body, but rather the ensemble of a population. 
Accordingly, he recognizes the role of this form of governance to employ ‘mechanisms of security’ 
that will assure the integrity of the natural processes of the population, (“Security and Vitality” 102) 
an approach that he considers to be epitomized by the Victorian sanitary reforms that sought to 
provide the conditions of health without intervening directly in the life body of the population. But, 
unlike broad sanitary measures, which were attempts to govern health from a distance, the practice 
of variolation that gained prominence in England in the mid-eighteenth century did intervene 
directly in the territory of the body. Pointing to the individuating nature of vaccination, Cohen 
provides a succinct schema to consider Frank and Jenner as personifying two distinct medical 
rationales: “If Frank champions a medical project that simultaneously encompasses the individual 
citizen’s entire life as well as the lives of all citizens as a whole, Jenner offers a singularizing 
protocol that endeavours to alter a specific disease’s effects on particular individuals. . . He attends 
solely to the singular context from which a specific infection arises and within which he hopes to 
modulate its effects — even if he ultimately aspires to propagate such modulations throughout the 
“whole world” (86). Through the calculus of probabilities, modern immunization strategies brought 
the body to the fore of public health interventions, reinforcing Foucault's observation that the task of 
governing life at the level of the population made methods of controlling human bodies all the more 
necessary (Security 143).  
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resist a certain pressure to shudder inwardly (180). 
Happy to leave the legacy of medical policing behind as a vestige of 
mercantilism and cameralism, a warning against absolutistic approaches to 
health, Osborne is hopeful that the liberal development of public healthcare in 
nineteenth-century England effectively rescued the administration of health 
from the state's agenda to advance its most valuable resource: the population. 
“Nineteenth-century public health,” he argues, “points to a domain that is not 
simply that of the maximization of a population by a State, but the regulation of 
something positive in its own right—‘public health’—via infrastructural 
techniques that were designed to monitor it as a kind of dependent variable” 
(“Security and Vitality” 106). Informed by a political rationality that explicitly 
denounces raison d'État, he suggests, the health of the population under 
liberalism could be respected for its own intrinsic value. It was no longer 
merely the means of achieving the state's military and political agendas.
While I share Osborne's predilection for broad sanitary reforms—such as 
providing clean drinking water and effective sewage clearance—I contend that 
such an approach to health is life-affirming only insofar as it provides the 
conditions of health without imposing risk on the lives it endeavors to protect. 
That is, I do not attribute the life-affirming potential of sanitation to the liberal 
recognition of the indeterminacy between health and policy. After all, the 
modest attempt to govern health from a distance by providing its conditions of 
possibility is only one of the ways in which England's response to this 
118
indeterminacy continues to inform contemporary public health initiatives. As 
we will see, another strategy, developed as early as the mid-eighteenth 
century in England to legitimize variolation, is to address the inevitable 
uncertainties that surround the question of immunization with the calculus of 
probabilities. In direct contrast with the Victorian promise to govern health from 
a distance, the response to indeterminacy that folded immunization into the 
rationality of probabilities used the many uncertainties that surround health not 
to abstain from direct intervention, but to legitimize it. By subjecting risk to 
rational calculation, the problem of indeterminacy was transformed into an 
even more effective form of governing and regulating the population. The 
identification of certain groups as “at risk”’ or “high risk,” for example, allowed 
governing powers not only to develop strategies to intervene more 
discriminately, but also preemptively. And so, while the liberal 
acknowledgment of the indeterminacy between health and policy ostensibly 
challenged the authority of state power and promised to reign in its reach, risk 
analysis and the calculation of probabilities provided a rationality to justify 
intervention in the face of this uncertainty. 
Further disrupting the caricature of liberal England protecting the integrity 
of individual citizens against Germany's absolutistic interventions, more recent 
historical studies of policing have discredited the long-held thesis that the 
notion of 'police,' so central to modern European political thought, lacked a 
119
comparable concept or system in England.60 Such counterevidence suggests 
that the relative absence of discourse pertaining to the medical police in 
England, and the gradual acceptance throughout Europe of the idiom of public 
health, shows us more about the political tactics used to represent the 
enforcement of public health than it does about any actual changes in the way 
such intervention developed. That is, rather than “public health” emerging as a 
new government strategy to reflect a new, liberal political reality, in view of this 
evidence it seems more likely that a new idiom emerged to portray the 
medical police in a way more palatable to those who resisted the police force 
as the antithesis of liberty (Carroll 464). By denying that the decline of 
mercantilism and the rise of political economy led to a decline in policing and a 
corresponding rise of persuasion and education, such historical accounts help 
resolve important discrepancies that inevitably emerge in attempts to polarize 
the absolutist German medical police and liberal English public health 
strategies. As Baldwin insists, in view of his extensive reading of the history of 
public health in modern Europe, the assumption that the decentralized laissez-
faire approach supposedly characteristic of the British permitted only few and, 
at best, liberal public health interventions, is completely dubious, as is the 
corresponding belief that the centralized continental administrations reinforced 
by the ideology of medical police were ready and able to act more broadly and 
effectively (530). He notes that even contemporaries recognized the failure of 
60 For comprehensive literature reviews, see Dodsworth and Carroll. 
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such caricatures: “The French especially were chagrined at the extent to 
which the British, proud of their individual liberties and decentralized 
government, could nonetheless impose precautions of a stringency only 
dreamt of by Gallic reformers (527). 
The dichotomization of modern England and Germany in the literature 
has also been challenged from another perspective, namely the body of 
predominantly German historiography that responds favorably to the 
absolutistic policies of German territories. Rather than approach the historical 
roots of public health as a past from which we need to extricate contemporary 
medical practices, such readings celebrate medical policing and enlightened 
absolutism as major protagonists in the development of modernity. For 
example, focusing specifically on the value of the medical police, Henry 
Sigerist identifies its exemplar, Johann Peter Frank, as “one of the most 
outstanding figures in the great public health movement that took place in the 
second half of the 18th century” (Introduction 81), explicitly challenging the idea 
that “Germans enforced health through brute force while the English humanely 
educated their citizens” (Civilization and Disease 92). For his part, Frank was 
confident that each and every citizen benefited from the state's involvement in 
their health and prosperity:
How lucky is a society, whose leaders do not merely 
depend upon the sympathy of the better citizens and 
doctors, but who allot some aid to the needy father who 
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has taken ill, [and] to all truly indigent down-at-the-heel 
people; and who testify thereby to the influence that the 
well-being of the last link has on the great chain, through 
which citizen is linked to citizen and in which no part can 
suffer without a corrosive rust affecting the others! (qtd. 
in Broman 62).
Furthermore, insofar as Frank recognized the limitations of medicine to 
address the primary cause of disease—namely, poverty—he emphasized the 
importance of promoting the social conditions of health rather than 
retroactively treating disease. As outlined above, the environmentalist 
approach that Victorian England favoured has a long history in Western 
medicine, one that has certainly not been restricted to liberal forms of 
government. In view of this glaring oversight, it seems as though the concern 
that the state's recognition of the population as its most valuable resource 
necessarily exposes citizens to potential violence might stem from an 
imposition of certain liberal biases. More specifically, such a concern tends to 
arise when the distinct concepts of state and civil society inform our 
interpretations of medical policing despite the fact that such concepts had not 
yet been conceptually parsed apart as independent spheres in the mercantilist 
and cameralist societies in which medical policing emerged. And in view of the 
attempts made in early-nineteenth-century Germany to develop prophylactic 
strategies that shield a community from infectious disease without imposing 
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risk on individuals, we can better appreciate how the good of the community 
could have been synonymous with that of its members. 
As a corrective to the more polarizing reading of national differences in 
public health intervention, I follow Baldwin's suggestion that the pertinent 
distinctions to be drawn are not between interventionism and laissez-faire, 
action and inaction, authoritarianism and liberalism, but rather between 
“different forms of intervention, some more drastic and apparent, others more 
subtle, but nonetheless effective for that” (Baldwin 535). Reinforcing this 
perspective in view of historical evidence, Patrick Carroll also finds it more 
illuminating to account for differences between various instantiations of 
medical police “less in terms of intervention versus no intervention, and more 
in terms of what kind of intervention” (468). More relevant than state 
legislation, political ideology, or the priority given to the individual vis-a-vis the 
community, I contend that the most pertinent question that emerges when we 
attempt to disentangle certain public health initiatives from biopolitics’ capacity 
to endanger the life it intends to protect is whether or not a particular medical 
intervention legitimizes the active introduction of harm. It is from this 
perspective that I consider the extent to which specific preventative medical 
interventions perpetuate the logic that certain segments of the population can 
be exposed to potential harm for the greater good. I contend that if certain 
aspects of medizinische Polizei make us shudder, it is first and foremost 
because we are concerned that its calculation of the value of its citizens 
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implies that life is instrumentally rather than intrinsically valuable, a claim that 
can be used to legitimize the sacrifice of certain members for the good of the 
whole. And, as I will demonstrate, this logic is also operative in medical 
procedures that reduce the morbidity and mortality of communicable diseases 
by discriminately distributing the risks of prophylaxis throughout a population.
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Chapter Three: The Rationalization of Risk and its Break with Rationality 
Foucault identifies the modern approach to immunization as an 
unprecedented development in the history of medicine, notable for the specific 
methods its proponents designed to calculate the variable risks surrounding 
infectious disease and its prevention. In contrast with legal and disciplinary 
approaches that address individual bodies, Foucault distinguishes modern 
mechanisms of security that consider the population as a whole and in the 
context of a series of probable events (Security 20). Applied to the question of 
inoculation, the problem was hardly a new one: Do the risks associated with 
infectious disease justify assuming the risks of deliberately conferring 
immunity? Yet those confronted with the decision to intentionally acquire 
immunity were no longer left to their own limited discretion; for better or worse, 
unlike premodern methods of conferring immunity, modern methods were 
supported by a calculus of possibilities according to which risk was not only 
something to be considered at the level of the individual, but something that 
could be rationalized in view of the population as a whole. More specifically, to 
determine inoculation's value, its exponents regularized smallpox's “lottery-like 
nature by statistically normalizing its individual occurrences across a 
population” (Cohen 97). 
Like Foucault, Beck identifies an emphasis on the calculability of risks 
with the rise of modernity and industrialization. In World Risk Society, he 
observes that, in contrast with the threats characteristic of premodern 
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societies—such as plagues, famines, and natural catastrophes—threats that 
were deemed incalculable because they were attributed to external, 
supernatural causes—modernity transformed these hazards into calculable 
risks. According to Beck, the fundamental difference between the human 
dramas of the past and contemporary “risks” is that the latter are based on 
decisions, or, “more specifically, decisions that focus on techno-economic 
advantages and opportunities and accept hazards as simply the dark side of 
progress” (50). In short, contemporary risks “presume industrial, that is, 
techno-economic, decisions and considerations of utility” (50). Beck considers 
the consequence of this transition to be fundamental: no matter how 
devastating, preindustrial disasters were experienced as “strokes of fate” such 
that the countless accusations that they invoked were “religiously motivated” 
and not—like industrial risks—politically charged. Providing insight into the 
interminable controversy surrounding the question of vaccination, Beck 
reasons that since contemporary risks have their origins in decision-making, 
“the problem of social accountability and responsibility irrevocably arises, even 
in those areas where the prevailing rules of science and law permit 
accountability only in exceptional cases” (50). Indeed, as Beck presents it, one 
of the greatest paradoxes of a society governed by the navigation of risk, a 
risk society, is that despite its emphasis on decision-making and, by extension, 
accountability, the non-localized nature of contemporary risks and their 
potential long-term effects renders them as incalculable as premodern 
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catastrophes.61 The emergence of antibiotic-resistant superbugs, for example, 
points to the paradoxical way in which the attempt to diminish risks, in this 
case the risks associated with certain infectious diseases, can give rise to 
even greater risks that are even more challenging to address. The attempt to 
mitigate risks, in short, creates the conditions for new, hitherto unimaginable, 
risks. 
Medical Verification in the Face of Uncertainty 
In the attempt to influence the life of the population despite the inevitable 
indeterminacy between intervention and outcome, statistical analysis proved 
to be an indispensable tool. As Foucault observes, more important than 
knowledge of the corpus laws or skill in applying them, at the level of the state, 
governance requires knowledge of the things that comprise the reality of the 
state: statistics (Security 354). While the term was first coined in the mid-
eighteenth century in Germany to denote qualitative descriptions of the state, 
in the late seventeenth century, England had already developed political 
61 In the case of epidemics, even though infectious diseases are still widely thought to have “natural” 
(if no longer supernatural) origins, they nevertheless fall under the domain of human action insofar 
as we attempt to control their spread. Indeed, as soon as an effective preventative technique 
becomes available, it becomes increasingly difficult to accept disease as a natural occurrence. The 
news headlines are telling: “Unvaccinated child contracts measles,” for example, and “Vaccinated 
child contracts measles, outbreak has some parents concerned.” Whether we fault someone for not 
taking preventative measures or technology for not providing full protection, it is difficult to find an 
instance of infectious disease that is not in some way, either positively or negatively, attributed to 
human action. In short, the potential for human intervention frames the entire field of communicable 
disease, culminating with the emergence of human-generated diseases. Whether through deliberate 
acts of bioterrorism or the unintended “side-effect” of certain medical technologies to give rise to 
particularly virulent pathogens, in the field of epidemiology we find the tendency, that Beck 
highlights elsewhere, for technology to generate more problems than it can resolve. 
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arithmetic to quantitatively assess the wealth and power of the state, and in 
the eighteenth century, mathematicians created the calculus of probabilities, a 
new field of study that treated chance mathematically (Rusnock, “Medical 
Statistics,” 351). The introduction of statistics to the field of medicine is usually 
traced back to early nineteenth-century Paris hospital medicine, but statistics 
also has significant roots in eighteenth-century Britain. In fact, the numerical 
arguments that proponents of inoculation used in support of prophylactic 
practice are arguably the first use of numerical evidence to evaluate a medical 
practice (Rusnock, “Weight of Evidence,” 289).
The medical acceptance of the calculus of probabilities in England was, 
in large part, influenced by Locke's epistemological investigations, which, 
according to Nelly Tsouyopoulos, had the first decisive philosophical influence 
on modern medicine (Röschlaub 192).62 Often considered the first of the great 
English empiricists, Locke's Essay Concerning Human Understanding 
grapples with the limitations of our capacity to know the world. Apart from the 
few things that we can know for certain, such as our own existence and the 
nature of mathematics, Locke maintains that we are otherwise left to act 
without certain knowledge. He found probability to be a suitable basis for 
action, convinced that our intellectual task is not to know everything, but only 
those things that pertain to our behaviour.63 
62 See Tsouyopoulous 192-95 for a summary of the various ways in which Locke's philosophy 
influenced medicine, including the dynamic relationship between the organism and environment 
that would later find warm reception by the German Romantics. 
63 In this account of Locke, I do not address the philosophical question of how best to interpret Locke's 
epistemology, but rather the historical question of the impact that his work had on the medical 
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Following Locke's assertion that the weakness of our faculties makes it 
impossible to have positive knowledge of the external world, many English 
thinkers accepted that experience and history can only ever grant us probable 
knowledge. From this perspective, the primary task of rationality was to 
determine the probable truth of phenomena in the external world by examining 
all grounds of probability. Indicating the need for credible testimony, the 
highest degree of probability was deemed to be calculable in the context of 
general consent, that is, when all witnesses report the same experiences with 
regard to certain matters of fact. Though one can never be certain that 
generalizations from specific data are true, the calculus of probabilities was 
generally accepted as the most rational method of decision-making in the face 
of uncertainty. It was in keeping with this standard that proponents of 
inoculation submitted to mathematical analysis the variables informing related 
decision-making processes (Miller 113). 
Pointing out the congruity between vaccination and variolation and the 
calculus of probabilities, Foucault identifies four characteristics about them 
that did not typically describe other medical practices of the time. Both 
techniques “can be generalized, are certain, preventative, and absolutely 
inconceivable in the terms of medical theory” (Security 86). Honing in on the 
generally applicable character of inoculation, Foucault argues that these 
features made it possible to approach the question of acquired immunity in 
tradition, in particular on the use of medical statistics to support the practice of inoculation. 
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probabilistic terms. The convergence with statistical analysis of variolation, 
and later, vaccination, he continues, was essential to their integration into an 
accepted field of rationality, since both methods were completely 
heterogeneous with respect to medical theory at the time (Security 86).64 
Historically, medical professionals have often derived their authority from an 
explicit, discursive linkage between theory and practice, and from the high 
valuation that their society placed on that linkage (Broman 10). The 
justification for using variolation as a medical procedure was based on the 
observation that survivors of smallpox did not usually succumb to the disease 
a second time. But this knowledge was common knowledge and, as such, 
could grant inoculators expertise neither on the subject of smallpox nor on its 
prevention. The justification of variolation practices by the realm of medical 
arithmetic thus raises important questions about whether statistics have been 
deployed in medicine wherever contemporaneous medical theory has been 
incapable of providing an authoritative theoretical account of why a particular 
practice might or might not work (Rusnock, “Weight of Evidence,” 305-06). 
At the time that statistical analysis was first extended to the field of 
medicine, it was generally accepted that smallpox posed one of the greatest 
threats to the vitality of a population. So prevalent and dreaded was the 
64 See also Rusnock's “The Weight of Evidence and the Burden of Authority”: “The correspondence 
and publications addressing inoculation in eighteenth-century Britain indicate that numerical and 
probabilistic arguments were enthusiastically embraced, at least by some members of the public, 
thus confirming observations made by historians such as Patricia Cline Cohen, James Cassedy and 
John Money, that numeracy in all its many facets was on the rise in the eighteenth century” (305-
306).
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disease, that parents did not count their children until their children had 
survived it (Miller 31). The first statistical records of causes of death, compiled 
during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, indicate that smallpox was 
high on the list of the great “killers,” with roughly six to ten 
percent of all deaths resulting from it. Children under five 
years were the most frequent victims of smallpox. . . 
Contemporaries estimated that about 80-85 per cent of 
the population contracted smallpox at some point during 
their lifetime. Estimates of the mortality rate vary, but 
overall between one in six and one in ten smallpox 
victims died. Sometimes it was as many as one in three, 
depending on the severity of the epidemic (Huerkamp 
618).
While smallpox was usually endemic in urban centers, where it was almost 
exclusively a childhood disease (Blower 275), there were, in less densely 
populated areas, usually a few years of relief before another epidemic would 
strike again. Here too the disease would discriminately infect young children, 
in particular those born after the previous epidemic, since they had not yet 
become immune through having had smallpox before (Huerkamp 618). Many 
people did not even try to prevent their children from becoming infected, but 
instead sought an ideal time for their children to contract the disease, usually 
during a relatively mild epidemic (Huerkamp 618-19). In rural communities 
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throughout Europe, “buying the smallpox” or Pockenkaufen became a 
common custom according to which children were sent to the home of a 
patient recovering from a mild case of the disease in order to buy crusts for a 
penny or two (Miller 43; Huerkamp 619). After all, it was generally recognized 
that when someone contracted smallpox and survived, they were usually 
immune from the disease for the rest of their lives. 
From this perspective, there was only a small shift from the lay practice 
of deliberately exposing children to smallpox, to the medicalization of 
variolation (Huerkamp 619), and indeed, some accepted the medical 
procedure as part of the “vibrant self-health culture of healing that 
characterized the first half of the nineteenth century” (Durbach Ch. 1, location 
421, par. 14). Yet the rationalizations developed to justify the inoculation of 
smallpox were worlds apart from the local forms of knowledge that prompted 
parents to expose their children to the circulating disease. As Cohen notes, 
the numerical analyses developed in support of inoculation not only endorsed 
the procedure itself but also, as a means of endorsement, provided a way to 
recognize and evaluate the procedure's consequences. In other words, 
inoculation “involves two distinct and yet deeply entangled innovations: as a 
preventative medical technique, it also spurs an important new mode of 
medical verification” (91). 
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The Royal Society and its Rational Reduction of Risk   
In view of smallpox's dual promise to both devastate bodies and offer them 
future protection, at the beginning of the eighteenth century, the method of 
inoculation practiced in Constantinople started to gain attention in Europe, and 
by the second decade, an ever widening circle was familiarizing itself with a 
new means of rendering smallpox less hazardous (Miller 48-55). Widely 
recognized as the hub of scientific and medical communications from all parts 
of the world, the Royal Society of London was often the center and facilitator 
of such exchanges and in this influential position played a significant role in 
the general acceptance of variolation in England. Indeed, although Lady Mary 
Wortley Montagu's (1689-1762) arrangement to have her three-year-old 
daughter inoculated in April 1721—after having witnessed the procedure in 
Constantinople—is widely recognized for its role in popularizing the technique, 
it is clear that her enthusiasm “would not have sufficed to propel the practice, 
just as the isolated inoculations in Germany and Hungary during the same 
year, and in France even two years earlier, did not initiate the practice there” 
(Miller 24). Not even the public Newgate medical trial, initiated five months 
later by the royal family—in which six prisoners were inoculated and, after all 
fully recovered, were released—was enough to sway public opinion. And 
when the Prince and Princess of Wales arranged to have two of their 
daughters inoculated the following year, the potential for this public procedure 
to convince at least some skeptics was foiled by reports of the death of the 
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Earl of Sunderland's two-year-old son, allegedly from the inoculation he had 
received two weeks prior. Rather than enlighten the public about the safety 
and efficacy of variolation, these highly publicized events “precipitated a 
decade of pen warfare which brought the whole issue before the literate 
public” (Miller 102).65  
While some embraced inoculation as a reasonable response to the 
inevitable reality of a virulent disease, the prophylactic practice was also the 
subject of significant criticism, much of which arose from within the medical 
community. The “artificial” smallpox infection induced by variolation was 
generally considered milder than the “natural” smallpox that one otherwise 
contracted. But some argued that it could also take a bad, at times deadly, 
turn. Many accordingly found that the procedure contradicted the medical 
maxim to “first do no harm.” Conversely, others voiced the concern that, owing 
to its relative mildness, the protection resulting from inoculation was not 
always permanent and, in some cases, someone who had been inoculated in 
childhood could contract smallpox as an adult, when the disease was 
considered even more dangerous. Finally, in the argument that proved to be 
the most compelling, some insisted that the process of inoculation was itself 
known to start an acute smallpox epidemic, putting other members of the 
community at risk (Huerkamp 619).66 And so, even when variolation was 
65 Compare with Rusnock, Vital Accounts, 45 and Maehle, “Conflicting Attitudes,” 198.
66 See also Maehle, “Conflicting Attitudes,” 203-05 and Maehle, “Ethics of Prevention,” 93-4. Other 
non-medical arguments against variolation included the religious argument that inoculation 
interfered with divine providence and the nationalistic argument that because of its non-European 
origins, this foreign practice could not be trusted (Rusnock, “Weight of Evidence,” 291). 
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regarded as the only effective available method of preventing smallpox, and 
there were no known effective forms of treatment, controversy continued to 
rage over its efficacy and over its potential danger both to the individual and to 
the community (Bradley 7). 
In the attempt to introduce clarity to the ongoing pamphlet war 
circulating around the issue of inoculation, in 1722, London-based physician 
and Fellow of the Royal Society John Arbuthnot (1665-1735) was among the 
first to use numerical evidence to evaluate a medical practice, a move that 
proved to be decisive in subsequent debates over inoculation (Rusnock, Vital 
Accounts, 44). In response to his opponents' complaint that the outcomes of 
inoculation were uncertain, Arbuthnot argued that certainty was impossible to 
find in any human affair, especially any medical or surgical intervention. But 
he insisted that this was not reason to avoid such interventions. On the 
contrary, people should allow themselves to be guided by the strongest 
probabilities and, in the case of smallpox, inoculation had a clear numerical 
advantage over death by natural smallpox (Miller 111). As Genevive Miller 
notes, it was not accidental that the statistical method was first applied to 
medicine in England at a time when Isaac Newtown occupied the chair of the 
Royal Society. In this intellectual climate, all kinds of phenomena, including 
the biological, were believed to be suitable subjects of analysis via 
mathematical abstraction and manipulation (24). Reliance on numerical 
analysis provided a new metaphor for rationality as well as an element of 
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rational decision-making, and coincided with an “epistemological investment in 
the notion that material processes, both natural and social, operate according 
to fixed natural laws determining recognizable if not predictable regularities” 
(Cohen 92). For his part, Arbuthnot was well practiced in bringing 
mathematics to bear on topics not typically treated quantitatively. He was 
convinced that knowledge of a subject could only ever be small and confused 
unless it was reduced to mathematical reasoning (Rusnock, Vital Accounts, 
46). Eager to subject the controversial uncertainties surrounding inoculation to 
numerical analysis, Arbuthnot combed through the London bills of mortality 
and created a table with columns, respectively for total burials and burials 
attributed to smallpox for the years 1707 to 1718, inclusive. Based on the 
estimate that 1 in 10 deaths over the age of one were due to smallpox, he 
argued that because all inhabitants in London encountered smallpox at some 
point in their lives, 1 out of 10 people who contracted the disease would die. 
He then compared this rate to the 1 out of 100 chances of dying from 
inoculation (a ratio presented without evidence). In view of this comparison, 
he argued that a practice that reduces the mortality of small pox from 1 in 10 
to 1 in 100 would, if practiced universally, save the city of London at least 1 
500 people yearly, and that the same odds would also appeal to any rational 
private person (Rusnock, Vital Accounts, 48-9). While Arbuthnot's emphasis 
on the interests of the state was reminiscent of mercantilist arguments for 
increasing the population, his argument also address the interests of the 
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individual (Rusnock, Vital Accounts, 49). He maintained that the numerical 
advantage of inoculated smallpox over the natural disease united the interests 
of the individual and the collective in favour of the prophylactic procedure: 
individuals would reduce their chances of dying and the State would thereby 
increase its population.   
While Arbuthnot's anonymously published pamphlet enjoyed some 
popularity (Rusnock, Vital Accounts, 47), it was the numerical analyses of 
James Jurin (1684-1750), the “chief architect of this numerical approach” 
(Rusnock, “Weight of Evidence, 14), that most significantly altered the 
discourse surrounding the question of inoculation. Highly regarded for his 
vigorous support of Newtonian ideas, Jurin was well placed among the 
intellectual elite of London and was also well known to savants in Europe and 
North America. In short, he “epitomized the enlightened ideals of English 
culture” (Rusnock, “James Jurin,” 8).67 As the secretary to the Royal Society, 
he had access to a wide network of correspondents and, in this capacity, 
could base his figures for inoculated smallpox on empirical reports. Likely 
familiar with Arbuthnot's approach to the question of inoculation (Rusnock, 
“James Jurin,” 23), Jurin was prompted to weigh in on the subject by his 
correspondence with Yorkshire physician Thomas Nettleton (1683-1742). As 
67 As indicated by his concern for the livelihood of his fellow citizens and optimism that medical 
innovation could cure the ills of humanity, Jurin's pioneering efforts to establish smallpox 
inoculation were very much informed by the rationality of the enlightenment and were well received 
as such. Voltaire, for example, who became a passionate advocate of inoculation during his stay in 
the late 1720s (Maehle, “Conflicting Attitudes,” 198), considered himself to be a disciple of Jurin, 
and exclaimed that “Who loves liberty must live in England; who loves truth ought to read your 
good authors and especially Mr. Jurin” (qtd. in Rusnock, “James Jurin,” 8).  
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one of the first physicians to inoculate individuals outside of London, Nettleton 
was met with considerable resistance in his community and suggested to 
Jurin that the only way that inoculation could be established in Britain against 
the prejudices that it faced was to compare the dangers of inoculated and 
natural smallpox (Miller 111; Rusnock, Vital Accounts, 52).68 Actively pursuing 
this line of inquiry, Jurin maintained that he had no intention of becoming 
entangled in the heated controversy surrounding the issue and was 
determined to provide nothing but “matters of fact” (Rusnock, “Weight of 
Evidence,” 292). His first paper on inoculation, presented to the Royal Society 
in 1723, brought together all the statistical evidence available at that date, 
including figures from Boston, the London Bills of Mortality from 1667-1687 
and 1701-1722, as well as information supplied by the few physicians 
practicing inoculation in England at the time (Miller 115; Rusnock, Vital 
Accounts, 51). Based on these numbers, he concluded that the risk of dying 
from smallpox was nearly 2 out of 17 and that the recorded deaths due to 
inoculated smallpox were much lower: in New England, 1 in 60 had died, 
while in England only 1 in 91 cases (Miller 115). In short, he offered “a plain 
proof from Experience and matters of fact that the small pox procured by 
Inoculation (even by the accounts of those that oppose that practise) is far 
less dangerous, than the same Distemper has been for many Years in the 
Natural Way” (qtd. in Miller 115). Unlike Arbuthnot, Jurin based his estimates 
68 See Nettleton 117-20. 
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of deaths caused by inoculated smallpox on empirical sources and they were, 
as such, better received (Rusnock, Vital Accounts, 51). Jurin’s figures were 
widely cited in England and on the continent and—a testament to their 
authority—very few attempts were made to verify his numerical ratios until the 
end of the eighteenth century (Rusnock, “Weight of Evidence,” 290). 
Acknowledging that his numerical analyses did not address the 
question of whether or not any particular individual would contract smallpox 
and, if so, whether that person would die from it, Jurin was nevertheless 
confident that comparing an estimate of the hazard “which all of Mankind, one 
with another, are under of dying of the natural Smallpox,” with the hazard of 
inoculation, “the Publick may be enabled to form a Judgment, whether or no 
[sic] the Practice of Inoculation tends to the Preservation of Mankind, by 
lessing the Danger to which they are otherwise liable” (qtd. in Cohen 90). The 
rationality of this numerical approach prompted people to base their decisions 
on an overview of the population as a whole and not to be swayed by 
occasional reports of inoculation gone badly. It asked them to override their 
limited assessment of the variable factors—for example, the severity of the 
approaching epidemic, the relative health of their child, and the competence of 
the local inoculator—and defer the decision-making process to analysts like 
Jurin who had access to authoritative accounts that gave an accurate 
overview of the whole. In fact, a significant part of Jurin’s campaign was 
devoted to arbitrating controversial cases or, more precisely, undermining 
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claims of death caused by inoculation or incidents of natural infection in 
children despite their having undergone the procedure.69 
Waning Immunity and Waning Authority  
The calculus of probabilities introduced a new area of expertise to the 
question of inoculation. While medical physicians could contribute little to 
explain why survivors of smallpox usually did not succumb a second time to 
the disease, insofar as the former appealed to rational mathematical 
arguments, inoculators could nevertheless continue to practice with authority. 
Foucault accordingly credits the calculus of probabilities with ushering 
immunization into accepted fields of rationality at the time. Yet, as Beck's 
analysis of 'risk society' demonstrates, “the essential and momentous 
consequence” that arises when we approach contemporary phenomena in 
terms of their relative risks lies in the fact that “in definitions of risk the 
sciences’ monopoly on rationality is broken” (Beck, Risk Society, 29). 
Elaborating on this point, Beck notes that when risk analyses are made, 
there are always competing and conflicting claims, interests, and viewpoints. 
In other words, there is no expert on risk: “in matters of hazards, no one is an 
69 See Rusnock: “Despite this widespread acceptance, many difficulties beset Jurin's numerical 
investigations in medicine. To construct mortality ratios, he had first to collect and collate case 
histories, which required extensive correspondence with a group of geographically widespread 
practitioners. . . The creation of standard narratives from the numerous individual case histories 
involved the extraction of consistent, quantifiable information, which then could be tallied and 
tabulated in established categories. Jurin's indisputable ratio of the number of inoculated and natural 
smallpox cases were thus the result of an arduous and at times controversial process of soliciting, 
selecting and sorting varied case histories” (“Weight of Evidence” 290).  
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expert—particularly not the experts” (World Risk Society 58). From this 
perspective, Beck makes the following provocative claim: 
Science's rationality claim to be able to investigate 
objectively the hazardousness of a risk permanently 
refutes itself. It is based, firstly, on a house of cards of 
speculative assumptions, and moves exclusively within a 
framework of probability statements, whose prognoses 
of safety cannot even be refuted, strictly speaking, by 
actual accidents. Secondly, one must assume an ethical 
point of view in order to discuss risks meaningfully at all 
(Risk Society 29).70 
By bringing the rate of death by smallpox into mathematical relation with the 
mortality rate of inoculation, such risk analyses implicitly value above all else 
the preservation of human life and, from this perspective, both causes of 
death—variolation and “natural” smallpox infection—are considered to be 
ethically on par. Jurin’s appeal to lower rates of death by artificially induced 
smallpox as compared to natural smallpox did not address the concerns 
raised by religious and medical men, whose objections were, respectively, that 
variolation interfered with divine providence and that it breached all maxims of 
ethical practice by actively introducing illness (Rusnock, “Weight of Evidence,” 
70 To illuminate the first problem—that statements of probability cannot, in principle, be refuted—it is 
helpful to consider a simple example. The statement “The probability that it will rain tomorrow is 
1/5,” made “with respect to such and such evidence,” can never itself be empirically confirmed. 
Tomorrow we will see either rain or not-rain, but we will never see a rain of probability 1/5 (Carnap 
192).
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291). From these critical perspectives, the options of dying from natural 
causes versus as a result of medical intervention are not ethically neutral, and 
Jurin's attempt to avoid “entanglement in the heated, ongoing disputes and 
[provide] instead only ‘matters of fact’” (Rusnock, “Weight of Evidence,” 292) 
at best only suspends religious and ethical considerations and at worst 
obfuscates them. In either case, it certainly cannot resolve them. In this way, 
the calculus of possibilities permits what Beck refers to as a type of 
“technological moralization” that no longer needs to employ ethical 
imperatives directly. It replaces the categorical imperative by comparing, for 
example, different mortality rates under different conditions. By submitting the 
decision-making process to numerical calculations, the calculus of risk 
exemplifies what Beck calls “a type of ethics without morality, the 
mathematical ethics of the technological age” (World Risk Society 51).  
Ethical objections aside, early risk analysts were also unable to 
address the concern that, by failing to provide lifelong immunity, variolation 
delayed patients’ disease susceptibility to a time of life when the risks of 
complication were greater. As Beck warns us, the primary question generated 
by recourse to risk analysis is, “[h]ow does modern society deal with self-
generated manufactured uncertainties?” (World Risk Society 31). In short, the 
harms generated in the process of techno-industrial development are—by all 
existing institutional yardsticks—neither calculable nor controllable (World 
Risk Society 31). Though observations that immunization did not always 
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provide lifelong immunity were well documented, since they were impossible 
to quantify statistically, occurrences were all but absent from the risk analyses 
that helped usher variolation into the fields of rationality. For his part, Jurin 
acknowledges that whether or not inoculation provides “effectual Security” 
against smallpox is an important factor in the decision to undergo the 
procedure (Rusnock, “Weight of Evidence,” 296), but such consideration does 
not actually factor into his calculations. He simply claims that there was “no 
Instance as far as I have been able to learn, of any one Person, either in 
Turkey, New England, or here at Home, who has received the Small Pox by 
Inoculation, that has afterwards had it the natural Way” (qtd. in Rusnock, 
“Weight of Evidence,” 296). When such instances did emerge—when, for 
example, Jurin enumerated the number of inoculated individuals to determine 
the risk of mortality— he simply “subtracted the number of individuals on 
whom the operation had no effect” (Rusnock, “Weight of Evidence,” 297). In 
his account for the year 1723, for example, Jurin listed 34 inoculators who 
inoculated 483 persons. “Of those 483: 440 had the small pox by inoculation, 
5 had an 'imperfect small pox by inoculation’, for 29 individuals the procedure 
had no effect, and 9 persons were 'suspected to have died of inoculation'” 
(Rusnock, “Weight of Evidence,” 297). After exhibiting this tally, he subtracted 
the number of individuals on whom the operation had no effect, leaving the 
hazard of dying of inoculated smallpox to 9 in 445 or roughly 1 in 49 or 50 
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(Rusnock, “Weight of Evidence,” 297).71 As this reductive move indicates, 
although Jurin was well aware of the complexity of variolation, throughout his 
published writings he sought to downplay these difficulties by reducing the 
complexity of inoculation experiences to a limited number of easily quantifiable 
categories, namely life and death (Rusnock, “Weight of Evidence,” 298).72 
In this binary system, possible indications of failed immunity were not 
only erased from his calculations; so too were those who offered such 
testimony dismissed as unreliable witnesses. Indeed, Jurin devoted 
considerable effort to challenging case histories that undermined inoculation. 
In 1725, for example, when Dr. William Clinch cited a case of an inoculated 
child succumbing to natural smallpox, Jurin immediately contacted the 
offending surgeon as well as the local minister to dispute the veracity of the 
claims by bringing into question the character of the man who made them.  
When we consider Jurin's deliberate suppression of counterevidence 
from an ethical perspective, his behavior is reprehensible; yet when we view it 
in light of the calculus of probabilities, it is totally and utterly banal, a mere 
function of the inherent limitations of calculating probabilities. As Beck 
observes
71 As Rusnock observes, “the category 'imperfect small pox by inoculation' immediately leaps out 
from the above list, raising myriad questions about how individuals identified smallpox, how they 
distinguished an 'imperfect' sort and so on” (Weight of Evidence” 297). 
72 In this binary system, for example, a young girl left deaf and mute after inoculation was recorded by 
Jurin as a success since it had not resulted in death. Jurin justified such a maneuver with the 
argument that “if accidents other than death resulting from inoculation were to be reported, so too 
would conditions emanating from natural smallpox” (Rusnock, “Weight of Evidence,” 298). 
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 risk analyses must restrict themselves to the estimation 
of certain quantifiable risks on the basis of probable 
accidents. The dimensions of the hazard are limited from 
the very beginning to technical manageability. In some 
circles it is said that risks which are not yet technically 
manageable do not exist —at least not in scientific 
calculation or jurisdictional judgment (Risk Society 29). 
From this perspective, Jurin was simply limiting the dimensions of his analysis 
to what was technically manageable. That is, although he acknowledged that 
reported cases of failed inoculation often dissuaded citizens from seeking 
variolation, he could not find an easy way to quantify the related risks. The 
variability of immunological responses to variolation was inherently 
incompatible with the effort to “statistically normaliz[e] its individual 
occurrences across a population” (Cohen 97). Instead of adjusting his method 
of analysis to account for the complexity of his subject, he denied the 
existence of anomalies by adjusting numbers and silencing testimonies. 
The fait accompli of permanent immunity was, as it is now, difficult to 
prove. For one thing, actively testing an inoculated individual's level of 
protection by deliberately re-exposing her to infection with natural smallpox 
was and continues to be technically and ethically questionable. Although Jurin 
never explicitly requested information of this nature, some of his medical 
correspondents nevertheless did perform, and report on, such human 
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experiments. One doctor even urged Jurin to further coordinate such studies, 
concerned that the argument that “the Inoculated are liable to have the Small 
Pox again by Infection in the Natural Way” was often used as a “Strenuous 
Argument against Inoculation” (Rusnock, “Weight of Evidence,” 296). But Jurin 
himself did not solicit such trials, perhaps, as Rusnock speculates, because of 
the questionable ethics of exposing patients to infected individuals (Rusnock, 
“Weight of Evidence,” 296). 
Perhaps Jurin also recognized that such corroborating evidence would 
never be enough to sway the skeptics. After all, whether by accident or 
experiment, even if someone demonstrates himself to be unsusceptible to 
natural infection, this evidence alone provides no indication of how much 
longer his protection will last. It certainly does not guarantee lifelong immunity. 
Jurin was painfully aware of this limitation and lamented the difficulties of 
proving the existence of lasting protection, especially in view of how easy it is 
to disprove it. In his Account for the year 1725, for example, he writes: 
But though the affirmative Side of this Question cannot 
be fully establish’d under a considerable Length of Time, 
and a great Number of Experiments; the Negative may 
indeed admit of an easier Proof: For a Number of 
Instances of Persons receiving the Small-Pox by 
Inoculation, and having them afterwards in the natural 
Way, will be sufficient to convince the Publick, that 
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Inoculation is no Security from the natural Small-Pox 
(qtd. in (qtd. in Rusnock, “Weight of Evidence,” 303). 
And yet, the capacity to predict how long an individual remains protected is 
necessary for evaluating one's relative risks of natural infection and, by 
extension, the protection one provides the community. Were this information 
accessible, its inclusion would certainly provide more accurate results than 
could be obtained by simply comparing the relative risks of dying from natural 
versus inoculated smallpox, as if the decision to vaccinate were necessary but 
once in a lifetime. But in its absence, Jurin was left with little choice but to 
base his calculations on the assumption that variolation offers lifelong 
protection. While the problems of waning and failed immunity are undoubtedly 
important factors in the risk-benefit analysis of immunization, his commitment 
to numerical analysis prompted him to act as though risks that could not be 
quantified simply did not exist. 
Although testimonies of imperfect immunity presented a considerable 
challenge to Jurin's numerical defense of universal immunization, compared 
with the criticisms leveled against vaccination, there was only a small margin 
of objectors who contended that variolation failed to provide lifelong immunity. 
Albeit associated with a relatively high level of risk, since it involved 
inoculation with a natural strain of smallpox, the assumption that successful 
variolation conferred complete subsequent immunity was (and for the most 
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part continues to be) relatively uncontroversial.73 Indeed, even after Jenner 
popularized vaccination, variolation remained popular in England, in part 
because people preferred what they considered the real thing (Durham Ch.1, 
location 435, par. 14). Insofar as vaccination was preferred to variolation, it 
was not because it promised greater protection but rather fewer risks. As 
Peter Razzell summarizes, vaccination, unlike inoculation, was generally 
considered to be a safe injection, “both for the person injected and the 
unprotected population exposed to him, and this was the reason why 
inoculation was replaced by vaccination” (ix).74 
Though the problem of waning immunity persisted when vaccination 
eventually displaced variolation, and, in some cases, became even more 
acute, the tradition of dismissing testimonies of natural infection in those who 
had previously been vaccinated continued. For his part, Jenner was quick to 
acknowledge the body of counterevidence that challenged the results of his 
73 See, for example, Bradley: “[Bernoulli] assumes, justifiably, that successful inoculation confers 
complete subsequent immunity” (10) and “[D'Alembert] has to admit that the danger of inoculation, 
once overcome, is over for ever, whilst the monthly risk of natural smallpox recurs every month of 
life until one catches it” (11). According to Razzell, “no-one has queried the prophylactic power of 
inoculation to protect against attacks of smallpox.” On the contrary, it is generally agreed that 
“being severer in its effects than vaccination, it produced . . . a much longer period of immunity 
(usually for a lifetime)” (ix). See also Rusnock: “Smallpox inoculation referred to the procedure of 
taking matter from a pock on someone infected with smallpox and inserting it in a small incision 
made on the arms or legs of a healthy individual. A mild case of smallpox typically ensued, but not 
always. Inoculation was known to cause death, but in the majority of cases, it provided lifelong 
immunity to natural smallpox” (“Medical Statistics” 337).
74 Razzell then goes on to undermine the polarization of vaccination and inoculation, “with the one 
being viewed as safe and effective, the other as dangerous and demographically damaging,” and in 
turn question “the actual historical contribution of inoculation in reducing smallpox mortality” (ix). 
His primary argument is that “the vaccines used in Jenner's lifetime were in fact derived from 
smallpox virus, and that early vaccination was a form of inoculation” (ix). While interesting in its 
own right, Razzell's thesis does not weigh down much on my own considerations of the efficacy of 
acquired immunity. As I will demonstrate, whether the early vaccines were cowpox or attenuated 
smallpox, the uncertainty surrounding how long they provided protection remained. 
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Inquiry; he was simply reluctant to admit that such findings disproved his 
hypothesis. Instead, he attributed cases in which vaccination apparently failed 
to confer lasting immunity to the difficulty of achieving successful vaccination 
in light of the procedure’s technical sophistication. Jenner was concerned that 
such practical difficulties would undermine the value of his important findings 
and warned that inexperienced vaccinators could give ineffectively vaccinated 
individuals a false sense of security. He imagines a farmer who, having heard 
of cowpox’s protective properties, notifies a local surgeon when something 
resembling cowpox appears on his farm. The surgeon, also eager to tap into 
the prophylactic qualities of cowpox, makes an experiment by taking away 
disease material from the cow to inoculate his patients. If he effectively 
produces a sore and invokes some systemic reaction, Jenner argues, the 
“fallacious idea of security both in the mind of the inoculator and the patient 
may arise” (Further Observations 5). In the effort to prevent this unfortunate, if 
understandable, error, in 1799, Jenner attempted to overcome the deficiencies 
of the Inquiry with his Further Observations on the Variolae Vaccinae, which 
provides a more detailed description of how to discern that a particular ailment 
is in fact cowpox and when to extract disease material from it. Hopeful that 
this supplemental description would help alleviate some of the controversy 
surrounding the efficacy of vaccines, Jenner warned that repeated diagnostic 
errors would likely prevail until cowpox became more generally understood.75 
75 Jenner's dismissive response to counterevidence of his claim to be able to offer perfect protection 
was echoed in subsequent efforts to corroborate his findings. Among the first to review Jenner's 
pamphlet was George Pearson, a chemist well versed in the importance of experiments and trials. 
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More than two hundred years later, it is difficult to evaluate the reasons 
for documented failures of vaccination to protect against smallpox, that is, to 
assess whether such counterevidence was the result of individual 
incompetence or the inherent limitations of the technique, even when it was 
properly administered. What is not controversial, however, is that, regardless 
of the reasons, vaccines failed to provide the lifelong immunity that Jenner 
and other early supporters of this technique had expected. History has shown 
that a large percentage of those who received the vaccine were either not fully 
immunized or, in many instances, definitely needed to be revaccinated. As a 
result, confidence in vaccination was gradually shaken by the realization that 
one vaccination was not sufficient to provide protection. Validating Jenner's 
concerns about the false assurance that people might acquire when 
inoculation proved to be ineffective, the fact that vaccination did not always 
convey lifelong immunity was only ever brought to light when many who 
Pearson expressed concerns about the small number of case histories that Jenner included and, more 
importantly, that only Jenner's experiences had been reported (Rusnock, “Medical Statistics,” 341). 
To address this limitation, Pearson turned to correspondence, as Jurin had done eighty years earlier. 
Similarly, whenever he encountered reports of individuals succumbing to smallpox after having had 
cowpox (whether through natural infection or inoculation), he simply discredited the testimony. He 
cites, for example, “an intelligent and respectable Inoculator in this country” who reported that, of 
several hundred people that the latter had inoculated with smallpox, who had previously had 
cowpox, very few caught the infection. The inoculator reported that he had good reason to believe 
that those who had fallen ill had been deceived about having had cowpox in the first place (8-9). 
And when a surgeon of Buckingham recollects cases of boys having had smallpox after having had 
cowpox, Pearson accounts for this counterexample by concluding that “[t]he disease is not very 
notorious, for I passed some days last week with two intelligent farmers, one of them had kept 70 
milch Cows for many years pass, but knew nothing of the Cow Pox among his servants. The other 
knew as little” (13). Accepting Pearson's incredulous interpretation of these and similar testimonies, 
Jenner concluded that Pearson's report “contains not a single case which I think we can be called an 
exception to the fact I was so firmly impressed with—that the Cow Pox protects the human body 
from the Small Pox” (Further Observations 2). 
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thought they were protected suddenly discovered that they were coming down 
with the disease. The fact that they had assumed the risks of vaccination had 
not protected them from the further risks of infection. As some critics note, in 
some cases, susceptibility was simply delayed to a later stage of life, when the 
risks of complication were greater than they likely would have been in 
childhood. Reinforcing Beck's warnings about the incalculability of technology-
generated risks, the rationalization of risks that helped legitimize prophylactic 
intervention was wholly ill-equipped to integrate the failing of technology into 
its analyses, let alone anticipate its far-reaching consequences. And so, 
although the calculation of risks was first employed in the effort to divest the 
natural world of its uncertainty, it inadvertently introduced new risks, risks of 
hitherto unthinkable magnitude. 
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Chapter Four: The Burden of Risk and the Burden of Proof
The uncertain and incalculable risks surrounding the decision to vaccinate are 
particularly problematic when we consider that the weight of such risks, as of 
the risks of natural infection, is usually primarily borne by certain segments of 
the population: young children in the case of routine vaccinations, and various 
other demographics in the case of epidemics. Early risk analysts were 
confident that calculating the numerical advantages of inoculation had 
revealed the procedure to be favorable for individuals and the population 
alike. But as we will see, insofar as the community’s interest in reducing 
overall disease mortality rates can be in tension with the individual's 
endeavour to withstand his encounter with disease, the attempt to unite 
individual and community interests through rational risk reduction ultimately 
backfires. 
In Security, Territory, Population, Foucault highlights this difficulty with 
inoculation by comparing the logic of the medical procedure to the logic of a 
free-market society, both of which he associates with a laissez-faire approach 
to governance.76 He points out that there are important resemblances 
between the prophylactic treatment of smallpox with injected disease material 
and the economic approach to scarcity that attempts to “find a point of support 
in the processes of scarcity themselves” (87) rather than avoid scarcity 
altogether. In contrast with the former juridical-disciplinary regulations 
76 Throughout this chapter, all citations of Foucault's work are, unless indicated otherwise, from 
Security, Territory, Population. 
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representative of mercantilism, which strove to mitigate scarcity and high 
prices with a series of prohibitions and constraints—no hoarding, no 
exporting, etc.—Foucault traces the historical transition, in the middle of the 
eighteenth century, to a more “liberal” approach to the “natural” fluctuations of 
scarcity and abundance. From the latter perspective, scarcity was no longer 
viewed as an evil to be avoided at all costs, but rather a natural phenomenon 
that should be incorporated into the economic system, allowed and, at certain 
times, even encouraged (59). Scarcity became something that could be 
effectively dealt with via a series of other economic mechanisms that 
gradually corrected, compensated for, checked, and finally nullified it (62). 
Similarly, rather than attempt to contain the spread of communicable diseases 
by treating infected persons and preventing their contact with others—
approaches characteristic of the older, juridical-disciplinary, approach (90)—
inoculation promised to prevent disease by mimicking its circulation in society, 
albeit in an artificial manner. As Foucault observes, what was most
remarkable with variolization,77 and more especially with 
variolization than with vaccination, is that it did not try to 
prevent smallpox so much as provoke it in inoculated 
individuals, but under conditions such that nullification of 
the disease could take place at the same time as this 
[inoculation], which thus did not result in a total and 
77 In Graham Burchell's translation of Security, Territory, Population, he translates the French 'la 
variolisation' into 'variolization.' Both refer to the medical inoculation of smallpox, variolation. 
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complete disease (87-8). 
And so, with quantitative methods of analysis to monitor and adjust as 
appropriate the “natural” ebbs and flows that occur within a living population, 
government leaders were no longer compelled to avoid the “evils” of disease 
and scarcity, but could rather fold them into a well-functioning society. It was 
primarily this feature of immunization, this paradoxical promise of avoidance 
through non-avoidance, Foucault argues, that “made these new techniques [of 
variolation and vaccination] acceptable, if not for medical thought, at least for 
doctors, administrators, those responsible for the medical police, and finally 
for the people themselves” (88).
The concrete way in which the logic of immunization opened up a gap 
between the individual and the population is brought to the fore in Foucault’s 
critical examination of the liberal promise that in a “free market,” there are no 
massive food shortages. When the condition of scarcity is allowed to develop, 
laissez-faire theories of economics assure us, its reality necessitates its self-
regulation. But, Foucault is careful to note, this does not mean that the 
problem of hunger is thereby abolished. On the contrary, scarcity is a 
necessary part of the functioning economic system—a necessary evil. In order 
to prevent widespread scourges, he reasons, there must be “some scarcity, 
some dearness, some difficulty in buying wheat, and consequently some 
hunger, and it may well be that some people die of hunger after all” (64). 
Observing that by letting these people die of hunger it becomes possible to 
154
prevent scarcity from occurring in the massive form of scourge typical of 
previous systems, Foucault reminds us that such a reality is possible only 
insofar as the population, on the one hand, and the multiplicity of individuals, 
on the other, remain at odds. In the case of economics, it is an antagonism 
inherent in the scarcity event: at the level of the population it all but 
disappears, but the scarcity that causes the death of individuals not only does 
not disappear, it must not disappear (64). Herein lies the paradox. Similarly, in 
the case of smallpox, Foucault is clear that the introduction of inoculation did 
not eradicate the reality of disease or death, but rather removed our 
consideration of its seeming inevitability to the level of the population, where it 
could better be normalized and rationalized. The weight of concern, at least 
with regard to variolation—the risks of dying from inoculation versus from 
smallpox (88)—undoubtedly still fell on the individual. But by submitting the 
question to the calculus of probabilities, it became possible to approach the 
decision on an entirely new scale. 
Case, Risk, Danger, and Crisis
The conflict of interests between the individual and the population—a conflict 
seen also in free-market economics—is further complicated, in the case of 
smallpox inoculation, by the systematic distribution of risks across the 
population. In view of smallpox’s preferential infection of certain 
demographics, its prevention was thought to be more effective to the extent 
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that preventative strategies mirrored the patterns of infection. As Foucault 
observes, in contrast with seventeenth- and eighteenth-century medicine's 
description of disease as substantial, “united with a country, a town, a climate, 
a group of people, a region, a way of life” (88), in the quantitative analyses 
made of smallpox, disease begins to appear as a distribution of cases in a 
population circumscribed in time or space. That is, when disease is handled in 
terms of the calculus of possibilities, the notion of a “case” emerges, which “is 
not the individual case, but a way of collectivizing the phenomena, integrating 
individual phenomena within a collective field” (88). In this sense, 
immunization provides a vivid example of biopower's method of dividing up 
the multiplicity of people into manageable parts. As Beck describes it, “risks 
open the opportunity to document statistically the consequences that were at 
first always personalized and shifted onto individuals. In this way risk de-
individualizes. Risks are revealed as systemic events, which are accordingly 
in need of a general regulation” (World Risk Society 51).
When disease becomes accessible in this way, Foucault reasons, it 
becomes possible to identify the “risk” for each and every body: “For each 
individual, given his age and where he lives, and for each age group, town, or 
profession, we will be able to determine the risk of morbidity and the risk of 
mortality” (89). Such calculations, he continues, imply that risks are not the 
same for all individuals, nor for all ages, nor in every condition or place—and 
thereby enable the identification of dangerous elements within a population. 
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Yet rather than consider susceptibility in terms of a unique encounter between 
an organism and its external environment, risk analysis reduces it to a function 
of demographics. Regarding the risk of smallpox, for example, it is considered 
dangerous to be younger than three years old and more dangerous to live in 
the town than in the country (89). Finally, Foucault argues, the notions of case, 
risk, and danger all pertain to the phenomenon of “crisis,” the “sudden, circular 
bolting [of a disease] that can only be checked either by a higher, natural 
mechanism, or by an artificial mechanism” (90). The state of crisis is ultimately 
what gives the calculations of case, risk, and danger an added sense of 
urgency. 
Demonstrating the enduring presence of the power mechanisms 
Foucault identifies with the historical administration of variolation and 
vaccination, during the H1N1 pandemic of 2009, what public health authorities 
deemed to be most concerning was not the actual presence of the disease in 
certain countries or climates, but rather the identification of a probable case—
of who, or rather, which demographic, was considered to be most at risk of 
contracting the virus during a time of crisis. When Dr. Margaret Chan, the 
Director General of the World Health Organization (WHO), raised the level of 
the influenza pandemic alert from Phase 5 to Phase 6, she identified pregnant 
women as being at an increased risk of experiencing complications from the 
virus, stressing that this heightened risk was especially threatening with a 
strain, like H1N1, that infects younger age groups preferentially: “around one 
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third to half of the severe and fatal infections are occurring in previously 
healthy young and middle-aged people.” Chan noted that this pattern of 
infection is significantly different from that seen during epidemics of seasonal 
influenza, when most deaths occur in frail elderly people. For this reason, she 
was especially concerned about how the virus would behave under conditions 
typically found in the developing world, where more than ninety-nine percent 
of maternal deaths occur. When smallpox was present, Foucault writes, it was 
dangerous to be younger than three years old (61). With H1N1, it was 
dangerous to be young and pregnant. In both cases we find that the notion of 
case introduces a break in the domain of life under biopower’s control; it 
stratifies the biological continuum and provides a basis for prioritizing those 
deemed most in need of treatment. Moreover, such demographically-targeted 
medical interventions are often made during times of crisis, which, in the 
words of Chan, “creates a demand for advice and reassurance in the midst of 
limited data and considerable scientific uncertainty.”
As Foucault outlines it, the elements of case, risk, danger, and crisis 
invoked in the widespread use of inoculation defined individuals in a way that 
was completely distinct from the approaches used in previous medical 
practices. In contrast with the disciplinary system applied to endemic diseases 
like leprosy—a system that involved treating the disease in each patient 
insofar as the latter could be cured, and then preventing contagion by isolating 
the sick from the healthy—the apparatus that appears with variolation and 
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vaccination does not impose a division between those who are sick and those 
who are not. Rather, it approaches all who are sick and all who are not sick as 
a whole, that is to say, it approaches the population in its entirety, and 
identifies the coefficient of probable morbidity or probable mortality within this 
population. In the eighteenth century, for example, the rate of mortality from 
smallpox in certain regions was 1 in 7,782. Foucault argues that, after 
establishing the idea of “normal” morbidity or mortality for the entire 
population, a finer analysis could be made to distinguish different normalities 
in relation to each other—that is, the “normal” distribution of cases of and 
deaths due to smallpox for every age, region, town, and type of occupation. 
With this demographic information, public health policies can then attempt to 
minimize the most unfavorable, deviant normalities in relation to the normal, 
general curve—that is, to bring them more into alignment with the overall 
norm. For example, the discovery that children under three years old are 
affected by smallpox much more rapidly, easily, and strongly than other age 
groups would inform the attempt to improve these subgroup morbidity and 
mortality rates to align them better with the average levels of morbidity and 
mortality of the population—averages affected in turn by the now lower 
morbidity and mortality rates of the affected segment (91). 
In the effort to lower the morbidity and mortality rates of infectious 
disease, it certainly makes sense to target special population groups that are 
most “at risk.” It is also clear that this approach is advantageous at the levels 
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of the individual and the population alike. By providing preferential treatment 
to those most in need of it, it is possible to help the greatest number of people 
and have the largest impact on interrupting the spread of infection. And yet, 
this rationalization of probabilities takes on a radically different tenor when we 
bring the associated risks of a prophylactic procedure, known and unknown, to 
the fore, and consider how a particular segment of the population, specifically 
targeted in the hope of slowing and stopping the train of disease transmission, 
must bear the burden of the consequences of such medical intervention. As 
Beck observes, a risk society deals first and foremost not with the distribution 
of 'goods' but with the allocation of 'bads' (World Risk Society, 63).
By “collectivizing the phenomena,” considerations of case, risk, danger, 
and crisis rupture the domain of life that is under power's control, creating 
caesuras within the biological continuum, namely cases. And in the face of 
disease, not all cases are equal. Foucault identifies racism as the mechanism 
that typically fragments the biological continuum in biopolitical societies. That 
is, he introduces the concept of racism to account for how the power of death 
can be exercised in a political system centered on preserving life. Identifying 
biopower with societies that promote life by normalizing their members, in 
Abnormal he argues that, within such a system of power, “racism is the 
indispensable precondition that allows someone to be killed, that allows others 
to be killed. Once the State functions in the biopower mode, racism alone can 
justify the murderous function of the State” (256). Racism, in short, is what 
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introduces the break between what must live and what must die (254-55), 
replacing the old sovereign right over life. But in order to interrupt the 
biological continuum, racism need not target ethnicities deemed to be inferior. 
In fact, Foucault is careful to distinguish this traditional form of ethnic racism 
from the kind of “internal racism” operative in the context of biopolitics, which, 
he argues, “is not so much the prejudice or defense of one group against 
another as the detection of all those within a group who may be the carriers of 
a danger to it. It is an internal racism that permits the screening of every 
individual within a given society” (316-17).78 As Foucault presents it, racism is 
what “allows the biopolitical state to designate certain populations or 
segments of its own population as threatening, and thus to warrant that 
population's endangerment in the name of the protection and management of 
life” (Taylor 753). From this perspective, although targeting groups at 
increased risk of infection does not, in itself, advance a racist agenda, it does 
provide justification for stratifying society in terms of the danger that certain 
groups present to the whole. After all, identifying a special group as being 
more at risk of contracting an infectious disease—and, in turn, more at risk of 
infecting the rest of the population—provides a way of determining not only 
who is most in need of treatment, but also who should assume the burdens of 
prophylactic treatment in order to stop the train of transmission for the benefit 
of the whole. 
78  This “internal racism” dispenses with race by identifying non-racial abnormalities (such as deviant 
sexuality or abnormal cognitive and physical abilities) as a threat to be eliminated insofar as passing 
on deviant genes is considered to undermine the future of the race (Taylor 749). 
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This potential for therapeutic discrimination was highlighted by the 
Swiss mathematician Daniel Bernoulli (1700-82) in 1760, when he applied 
statistical analysis to the question of variolation even more rigorously than 
Jurin did in the latter’s mortality tables. A wholehearted supporter of 
immunization, Bernoulli endeavored to develop a mathematical formula to 
display the numerical advantages that successful, universal inoculation would 
confer both on the individual and the community (Bradley 8)—and to thereby 
influence public health policy (Blower 275).  He was adamant that “in a matter 
which so closely concerns the wellbeing of the human race, no decision shall 
be made without all the knowledge which a little analysis and calculation can 
provide” (277). 
Bernoulli defends his case by finding the numerical gain in life 
expectancy that would be achieved if smallpox no longer existed or, what 
would amount to the same thing, if nobody died of it. In other words, he 
assumed that universal variolation could effectively eradicate the disease, and 
then calculated the numerical advantage that a world free from the scourges 
of smallpox would have over a world in which the disease was still rampant. 
His calculations indicate that, in contrast with only 565 out of 1300 newborns 
who reached the age of 25 in the eighteenth century, when smallpox was 
endemic, 644 would survive if smallpox was eliminated. He is quite confident 
that if variolation brought all the advantages that “accompany the state of 
freedom from smallpox” without any disadvantages, the decision in favour of 
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inoculation would be the obvious one. It is only ever the risks attributed to 
inoculation, he adds, that keep us undecided (284). 
Bernoulli’s reflections prompted him to examine a new question, 
namely, what would be the state of the human race if, at the price of a certain 
number of victims, we could procure for it freedom from natural smallpox? 
Admitting that this problem, at least at first, appears to be difficult, he, I think 
accurately, insists that it in fact “flows quite naturally from our principles and 
our way of treating the subject” (284). Accordingly, after factoring the risks 
associated with inoculation into his calculation, Bernoulli concludes that the 
number of infants lost to inoculation is negligible for the whole population, 
“which alone merits the attention of the Prince when the wellbeing of the State 
or the public as a whole is concerned” (284). From this perspective, he 
considers it a moral certainty that, so long as inoculation administered to 
infants kills no more than 100 out of 943, it would be a benefit to society. Any 
potential losses would solely involve children useless to the State, and gains 
would affect those within an age group that is most precious (284-85). 
A paradigmatic example of the mechanisms of security that functioned 
to integrate immunization into modern society, Bernoulli's report reinforces the 
basic principle inherent in laissez-faire economics, namely that, in order to 
improve the life of the population, the sacrifice of certain individuals is not only 
forgivable, but necessary. Yet, unlike the stratification present in capitalistic 
society, which systematically disadvantages the poor (and all other groups 
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insofar as they are more likely to be poor), the mechanisms of security at play 
in the distribution of acquired immunity have the additional capacity to draw 
other lines of differences in the biological continuum—babies, children, and 
pregnant women, for example, are often singled out in public health 
campaigns regardless of economic status. 
What happens when our efforts to protect the population at large impose 
increased risks on a particular segment of the population? Such a concern, I 
contend, need not assume that contemporary government leaders would 
willingly sacrifice members of the population for the benefit of the whole. While 
the mercantilist ideology that informed Bernoulli's conclusions is no longer in 
vogue, his numerical methods of analysis are still well regarded and, 
irrespective of the political ideology with which they are employed, are bound 
by the same inherent methodological constraints. Indeed, all that is needed for 
the mechanisms of security to take on a more negative tonality is a lack of 
knowledge, an almost inevitable consequence of acting “in the midst of limited 
data and considerable scientific uncertainty” (Chan). When an unknown risk is 
entered into the calculus of probabilities as “no risk”—the otherwise benign 
notions of case, risk, danger, and crisis can transform an altruistic public 
health enterprise into a widespread medical experiment,79 one in which it is 
precisely those identified as being most in need of treatment who absorb the 
79 By extension, when members of the population are targeted with a vaccine that has not been 
(adequately) tested for safety or efficacy, I find it appropriate to invoke the principles of the 
Nuremberg Code, a set of ethical guidelines that forbids experimentation on human subjects without 
free and informed consent.
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greatest risks.
Priority Treatment for Pregnant Women  
This vulnerability was brought to public attention during the swine flu 
pandemic, when pregnant women were isolated as a special population 
group, particularly at risk of complications from infection. On the one hand, 
since they were identified as particularly susceptible to complications 
associated with the swine flu virus, they were especially encouraged to be 
vaccinated; on the other hand, there were concerns expressed that such 
recommendations could not be supported by a risk-benefit analysis: at the 
time the risks of vaccinating pregnant women with adjuvanted vaccines were 
completely unknown. 
Once the swine flu vaccine was introduced at the end of September 
2009, mechanisms of security functioned with rapid precision to distribute the 
vaccine to the populations “most at risk.” In early October, United Nations 
health officials urged rich countries to make more vaccines available to poorer 
nations, who are understood to be at greater risk because of their high rates 
of maternal deaths. The United States, Brazil, and France agreed to make ten 
percent of their national vaccine stockpile available to developing countries, 
and manufacturers donated approximately 150 million doses of vaccines 
(Rabinovitch). On 10 November 2009, GlaxoSmithKline announced its 
agreement with the WHO to donate 50 million doses of its adjuvanted 
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pandemic H1N1 vaccine to the WHO for distribution to developing countries 
most in need (“GSK Signs Agreement”). 
This gesture of global solidarity was made six weeks after the French 
national nurses’ union published a press release stating that sixty-five percent 
of nurses planned to refuse the swine flu vaccine over safety concerns, a 
concern that prompted the Health Minister of France to drop plans to give 
vaccines with adjuvants to pregnant women (“Vaccinations Dont Grippe 
H1N1”). These developments followed less than a week after Prime Minister 
Ewa Kopacz delivered her speech to the Polish Parliament stating that she 
would not authorize any vaccines because they had not yet been adequately 
tested for safety.80
In contrast with these more conservative reactions, in Canada, the 
government made use of Section 30.1 of the Food and Drugs Act, which gives 
the Minister of Health the authority to fast-track a drug “to deal with significant 
risk, direct or indirect, to human health, public safety, or the environment” 
(“Road to Rollout”). As written by GlaxoSmithKline on the product information 
leaflet for Arepanrix H1N1-AS03-Adjuvanted H1N1 Pandemic Influenza 
Vaccine: 
Health Canada has authorized the sale of the 
Arepanrix H1N1 based on limited clinical testing in 
80 Kopacz also considered the conditions offered by the pharmaceutical companies for the purchase of 
the vaccines to be unacceptable. The government was asked to take full responsibility for all 
undesirable side effects and the vaccines were offered at up to two to three times the price of 
vaccines used against seasonal influenza (Flynn 17). 
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humans under the provision of an Interim Order (IO) 
issued on October 13, 2009. The authorization is 
based on the Health Canada review of the available 
data on quality, safety and immunogenicity, and given 
the current pandemic threat and its risk to human 
health, Health Canada considers that the benefit/risk 
profile of the Arepanrix H1N1 vaccine is favourable for 
active immunization against the H1N1 2009 pandemic 
H1N1 influenza strain (25).
The declaration of a pandemic allowed the Health Minister to authorize the 
vaccine on “limited clinical testing.” Pregnant women were especially 
encouraged to receive it even though, in contrast with the limited data of other 
populations, absolutely “no data has been generated in pregnant women with 
Arepanrix H1N1 nor with the prototype AS03 adjuvanted H5N1 vaccine” (8). In 
the absence of information, GlaxoSmithKline advised consumers that 
considerations should be taken of any recommendations made by the Public 
Health Agency of Canada, (5) and “the agency sa[id] the vaccine with the 
adjuvant is safe for pregnant women” (“Road to Rollout”). And so, the risk 
analysis for the pertinent population was made in the absence of any data. 
The decision was made preemptively that, no matter what the risks of 
vaccination may have been, the risks of infection were greater.  
A comparison is instructive: in the absence of a pandemic, when 
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GlaxoSmithKline is held to higher safety standards, it explicitly acknowledges 
that, since the safety and effectiveness of a seasonal flu vaccine with adjuvant 
“have not been established in pregnant women or nursing mothers,” (Flurarix 
20) pregnant women have to be informed accordingly. They stipulate that all 
women who receive the vaccine while pregnant should be registered with 
GlaxoSmithKline’s pregnancy registry. That is, if, and only if, it is considered 
absolutely necessary that the vaccine be administered to them. After all, the 
manufacturers at GlaxoSmithKline reason that since there are “no adequate 
and well-controlled studies in pregnant women,” (Flurarix 12) the vaccine 
should be given to a pregnant woman “only if clearly needed” (Flurarix 12). 
When the world was no longer in a state of alarm, during the 2011 flu season, 
GlaxoSmithKline acknowledged that “although excess morbidity and mortality 
were observed among pregnant women during the pandemic outbreaks in 
1918-19 and 1957-58, further studies are needed to determine whether 
pregnancy per se is a risk factor that warrants routine influenza immunization” 
(Fluviral 5). But in a state of emergency, “pregnant women who don't get the 
H1N1 vaccine are at the highest risk of becoming sick and infecting their 
fetuses” (“Pregnant Women Urged”); the vaccine was considered “the best 
solution because it offers an almost perfect protection” (“Pregnant Women 
Urged”).
As a token precautionary measure, in the early days of the declared 
pandemic, Health Canada ordered just under two million doses of the vaccine 
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without the adjuvant (“Road to Rollout”). Within a few short months, however, 
this concern was considered negligible compared with the danger of being 
infected that pregnant women faced. In December 2009, public health experts 
in Montreal urged pregnant women in particular to get the H1N1 vaccine, 
since they are at the highest risk of becoming sick and infecting their fetuses: 
“It’s the only way to protect your little baby” (“Pregnant Women Urged”). Dr. 
Richard Lessard, from Montreal’s Public Health Agency, acknowledged that 
there was “some confusion in the early days of the vaccine campaign,” but 
assured the public that “it’s now clear that with or without the adjuvant—an 
additive that boosts the immune system’s response to a vaccine—the vaccine 
isn’t dangerous for pregnant women” (“Pregnant Women Urged”). Once again, 
it is not clear on what basis Lessard discerns that with or without the adjuvant 
the vaccine is safe for pregnant women. But it is clear that there is a difference 
between an adjuvanted vaccine and a monovalent vaccine, namely the 
adjuvant, that is, materials such as aluminum, squalene, and Polysorbate 80 
added to the vaccine to accelerate or enhance antigen-specific responses. 
In the months following the swine flu pandemic, the fact that the H1N1 
campaign had targeted pregnant women prompted researcher Carla Herberts 
and her colleagues from the Centre for Biological Medicines and Medical 
Technology in the Netherlands to consider the safety of adjuvanted vaccines 
in this special population. What they found was a startling dearth of 
information. More specifically, after a survey of the literature, they reported 
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that “the safety of adjuvanted vaccines in pregnant women has not been 
tested in clinical trials” (1421) and that “the potential effects on pregnancy of 
interfering with this uniquely adapted immune balance through the induction of 
proinflammatory reactions as those induced by adjuvanted vaccines have only 
been studied rarely” (1411). As Esposito notes in his exploration of the unique 
immune reaction present in the mother during pregnancy, changes in the 
maternal immune system are essential for acceptance of the fetus and for 
development of the placenta, and interference with this immune response may 
interfere with normal pregnancy. For this reason, Herberts and her colleagues 
stress that it is impossible to extrapolate vaccine safety data from 
nonpregnant populations to the pregnant population: proinflammatory stimuli 
that are present in vaccines, in particular in adjuvanted vaccines, may induce 
a stronger immune response in pregnant individuals, since pregnant 
individuals have been shown to be more sensitive to proinflammatory stimuli 
than nonpregnant women. In theory, they explain, a strong activation of the 
maternal immune system during this period, such as that induced by an 
adjuvanted vaccine, could negatively impact the implantation of the embryo 
and acceptance of the fetus (1421). Herberts et al. conclude that a risk-benefit 
evaluation of administering adjuvanted vaccines to pregnant women is 
extremely difficult insofar as the risks remain unestablished. Acknowledging 
that, despite this limitation, several governmental organizations decided to 
administer adjuvanted vaccines to pregnant women, they maintain their 
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position that “immunization with adjuvanted vaccines during pregnancy is best 
avoided” (1421). They insist that more data is needed to determine whether 
the benefits of the use of these vaccines and their adjuvants outweigh the 
risks of developing potentially severe pregnancy complications, such as 
preeclampsia or even abortion (1417).
The Clarity of Hindsight
In the months following the declared pandemic, researchers challenged not 
only the safety of the vaccine but also the necessity of taking such an extreme 
preventative measure, regardless of its specific risk profile for special 
populations. Despite early fears about the virulence of H1N1, the virus failed 
to become the severe global threat that it was predicted to become, opening 
the WHO's response to the threat to vast criticism. In fact, the common focal 
point uniting all arguments presented by critics was the disparity between the 
relatively mild unfolding of the virus when it first appeared in the autumn of 
2009, and the far-reaching prophylactic action taken to prevent its spread 
(Flynn 8). Particularly salient in its criticism, the Council of Europe, who were 
subject to the WHO's management decisions, denounced the WHO's reliance 
on vaccination to deal with the threat of infection. Reinforcing Beck's 
observation that in risk conflicts, “the central question of power is . . . the 
question of who, with what legal and intellectual resources, gets to decide 
what counts as a 'risk'” (“Interview” 100), one of the central points of criticism 
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expressed by the Council was the WHO's definition of “Pandemic Phase 6.” 
While the declaration of this pandemic phase initiated an immediate 
international agenda to implement mass vaccination strategies, critical voices 
noted the glaring omission of the disease's severity as a criterion for 
promoting the influenza pandemic to the highest alert level (Grolle and 
Hackenbroch). In other words, “the pandemic could be declared without the 
need to show that it was likely to be severe in terms of its impact on the 
population (for example regarding severity of illness and death),” (Flynn 9) 
even though establishing the urgent need for vaccination was to be based on 
the expected severity of the disease’s impact on individuals who contracted it, 
as was the legal authority to bypass standard safety procedures for testing 
vaccines before introducing them to the general population. As members of 
the International Health Regulations (IHR) review committee summarized in 
their evaluation of the criticisms leveled against the WHO, “Even if the 
definition of a pandemic depends exclusively on spread, its degree of severity 
affects policy choices, personal decisions and the public interest” (15). 
After the WHO declared the pandemic to be at Level 6 at a time when 
the influenza was presenting relatively mild symptoms, a number of critics 
honed in on the fact that the WHO had changed the definition of pandemic 
levels just before announcing that H1N1 had reached the sixth level. On 26 
January 2010, Dr. Wolfgang Wodarg, German epidemiologist and former 
member of the Parliamentary Assembly, argued that the declaration that the 
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swine flu had reached Pandemic Phase 6 had been possible only because the 
threshold for declaring a pandemic had been lowered. In response, the WHO 
maintained that the basic definition of a pandemic was never changed, and 
that any observed changes were the result of improving the phrasing so as not 
to scaremonger unnecessarily (Flynn 9). The European Council argued that 
regardless of the WHO's intentions in modifying the pandemic definition in a 
way that allowed for an accelerated announcement of such an event, doing so 
in a non-transparent way at a time when a major influenza infection was 
already underway raised doubts concerning undue influence on decision-
makers. Paul Flynn, as rapporteur of the committee, observes that the 
outcomes of declaring a pandemic prematurely were dramatic: 
distortion of priorities of public health services all over 
Europe, waste of huge sums of public money, 
provocation of unjustified fear amongst Europeans, 
creation of health risks through vaccines and 
medications which might not have been sufficiently 
tested before being authorised in fast-track 
procedures, are all examples of these outcomes (17).
In view of the far-reaching consequences of the WHO-organized global 
response to H1N1, Flynn suggests that, going forward, all stakeholders should 
work in-depth to agree on a common definition and description of what an 
influenza pandemic is and that “this should become the central element of 
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clear international guidelines for national pandemic preparedness planning” 
(10). 
While the European Committee's call for increased transparency was 
driven by suspicions that the WHO may have been unduly influenced by 
financial interests, the IHR review committee found “no evidence of 
malfeasance” (11). More specifically, although the committee acknowledged 
that the WHO's lack of transparency was ill-advised81 and understandably 
gave rise to suspicions from certain state members, it “found no evidence of 
attempted or actual influence by commercial interests on advice given to or 
decisions made by WHO” (17). Furthermore, the committee members were 
critical of accusations that invisible commercial interests influenced the WHO's 
actions, condemning it as an affront to the core public-health ethos to prevent 
disease and avert avoidable deaths (17). It was not commercial interests that 
prompted the WHO to take preemptive action, the committee was confident, 
but rather the conviction common to all public health officials that “in the face 
of uncertainty and potentially serious harm, it is better to err on the side of 
safety” (10). The committee unfortunately did not address how this core value 
should be reconciled with the possibility that the prophylactic strategies 
themselves introduced an unknown element of risk. It is, for example, difficult 
to err on the side of safety when the safety profile of certain vaccines in 
certain demographics is entirely unknown.
81 The IHR committee found that the WHO lacked “a sufficiently robust, systematic and open set of 
procedures for disclosing, recognizing and managing conflicts of interest among expert advisers” 
(16).
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 In response to accusations that the WHO vastly overstated the 
seriousness of the pandemic, the committee reminded critics that reasonable 
criticism can be based only on what was known at the time that the decisions 
were made and not on what was learned later. As Giddens observes, “We just 
cannot know beforehand when we are actually 'scaremongering' and when we 
are not” (Conversations 212). And the committee found that the degree of 
severity of the pandemic was very uncertain throughout the middle months of 
2009, when countries would have needed to place orders for the vaccine. 
Dispelling allegations of misconduct, the committee deemed the discrepancy 
between the WHO's intervention and the severity of the pandemic to have 
been the inevitable—if unfortunate—result that arises when you match the 
public health mandate to favor action over inaction with the sobering fact that 
a “lack of certainty is an inescapable reality when it comes to influenza” (10). 
Providing additional insight into the course of action chosen by the 
WHO, Sudeepa Abeysinghe offers a simple, though no less profound, 
explanation: the WHO's heavy reliance on vaccines during the swine flu 
pandemic reflected a well-worn institutional process in disease management 
(382-2). Although the WHO acknowledged other possible responses to the 
influenza pandemic, such as isolation and quarantine, anti-virals, and sanitary 
measures, it allocated such measures as secondary to the vaccines, which 
were emphasized as the best (and only real) strategy (390). Like the external 
committee reviewing the WHO's actions, Abeysinghe is critical of accusations 
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that the WHO's almost exclusive attention to vaccines reflected the economic 
interests of pharmaceutical industries, insisting that the WHO would not have 
benefited from a false scare, since this would have, and indeed has, 
undermined the organization’s long-term credibility. Furthermore, she argues, 
other measures such as anti-virals would have been equally profitable (385). 
She finds that a “path dependency” analysis more convincingly explains the 
WHO's preference for vaccines, that is, the tendency for well-established 
institutional processes to be pivotal in decision-making processes, especially 
in the face of risk and scientific uncertainty. In short, she argues that the WHO 
did what it did in the face of uncertainty, namely manufacture and distribute 
vaccines, because that is what it has always done.
In line with the WHO's own self-assessment, Abeysinghe identifies its 
campaign to eradicate smallpox as the prototypical example of the 
organization's success in controlling infectious disease (387) and argues that 
this precedent has provided the perspective through which it has managed 
subsequent cases. More specifically, she details how following this early 
success story, vaccination became the WHO's dominant strategy in controlling 
infectious disease (387). Although the WHO often references the successes of 
its past mass vaccination campaigns when justifying its continued reliance on 
vaccination to eradicate other infectious agents, Abeysinghe argues that, in 
fact, the prominent failures of these campaigns lies, at least in part, in the 
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WHO's dependency on vaccination as a resource against communicable 
disease.
The European Council also highlighted the WHO's path-dependent 
behaviour in addressing the swine flu threat by criticizing its reliance on 
vaccination over strategies that have a better established record of being 
effective. Inviting Tom Jefferson from the Cochrane Reviews to attend their 
public hearings, the European Council cited his co-authored finding, after 
reviewing more than 40 clinical trials, that “the performance of the vaccines in 
healthy adults is nothing to get excited about” (11). More specifically, Jefferson 
concluded that on average, perhaps 1 adult out of 100 vaccinated will get 
influenza symptoms compared to 2 out of 100 in the unvaccinated group. 
Even more relevant to the H1N1 vaccine campaign, where certain high-risk 
groups, such as pregnant women, were encouraged to be vaccinated 
because they were particularly vulnerable to complications, the review found 
no credible evidence that vaccines have any effect against complications 
associated with influenza, such as pneumonia or death (11).82 Further 
challenging the WHO's heavy emphasis on vaccinations, Jefferson notes that 
in contrast with the inconsistent record of vaccinations to effectively treat the 
flu, “public health interventions such as hygiene measures and barriers have a 
much better evidence than vaccines” (12). In view of the financial and 
infrastructural demands of a mass vaccination strategy, he considers them to 
82 He also reasoned that even if vaccines were one hundred percent effective, they could only affect 
between seven and fifteen percent of the annual flu burden, since this is the proportion of people 
with an influenza-like illness (“flu”) who truly have influenza (2). 
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be a better alternative to vaccination because they are “cheaper and socially 
acceptable, as well as being life savers in poor countries” (12). 
Without suspecting that the WHO had ulterior motives for relying almost 
exclusively on vaccination during the H1N1 “pandemic,” the IHR external 
committee echoed Jefferson's concern that the organization’s emphasis on 
vaccination over hygiene undermines its capacity to meet the threats posed by 
contagious disease. More specifically, its overall conclusion of the WHO's 
performance during the swine flu pandemic was that “the world is ill-prepared 
to respond to a severe influenza pandemic or to any similarly global, sustained 
and threatening public-health emergency” (12) and it attributed this lack of 
preparation above all to the WHO's over-investment in a technology ill 
equipped to handle a severe pandemic, namely vaccines:  
The world's capacity to prevent and limit a severe 
pandemic is constrained by many factors: 
predominant reliance on vaccine production 
technology that is little changed in 60 years; the need 
to match vaccine to particular viral strains; the inability 
to predict which influenza viruses will be dangerous to 
human health; uncertainty about the effectiveness of 
many pharmaceutical and public-health measures; 
the lack of field-based, rapid, affordable, highly 
sensitive and specific diagnostic tests; and limitations 
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of infrastructure, resources and capacities in many 
countries (22).
In view of the inherent limitations of a mass vaccination campaign to 
effectively address a widespread pandemic, like Jefferson, the external 
committee suggested that the WHO invest more in hygienic preventative 
strategies: “Also needed are improved knowledge of and practical strategies 
for implementing public-health and personal protective measures, such as 
handwashing, respiratory etiquette, isolation and social distancing” (22). 
As this case study from 2009 vividly illustrates, while it is arguably 
outdated to think, along with Bernoulli, that government leaders might 
knowingly expose a particular segment of the population to undue risk, in view 
of all of the unknown variables at play in global pandemics, it is perfectly 
reasonable to expect that they might unknowingly do so.83 During the H1N1 
83 It is in view of this very real possibility that Dr. Bernadine Healy, former head of the National 
Institutes of Health, criticizes the public health establishment for being too quick to dismiss vaccine 
concerns as irrational. As David Kirby reports in his article, “Dr. Bernadine Healy: Don't Dismiss 
Vaccine Link,” Healy insists: “The more you delve into it, if you look at the basic science, if you 
look at the research that's been done in animals, if you look at some of these individual cases, and if 
you look at the evidence . . . what you come away with is that the question [of vaccine safety] has 
not been answered.” She accordingly denounces public health officials for dismissing the hypothesis 
that vaccinations might contribute to autism without having studied the population who “got autistic 
symptoms within a period of a few weeks of the vaccines.” She insists that large population studies 
are not enough to disprove a link and that resources are available to design more focused studies to 
help establish “whether or not there are susceptible children . . . [children] more susceptible to 
vaccines, plural, or to one particular vaccine, or to a component of vaccines, like mercury.” Herself 
a proud member of the Institute of Medicine (IOM), she is nevertheless critical of their mandate 
deliberately not to pursue susceptible groups out of fear that “if they found them, however big or 
small they were, that would scare the public away. They don't want to pursue this hypothesis 
because it could be damaging to the public health community at large.” Dr. Healy's critical 
assessment not only exposes the ways in which the mandates governing vaccine “science” continue 
to prioritize the population as a whole over the multiplicity of individuals; it also demonstrates how 
such an approach to risk analysis privileges ignorance. As long as “no known risks” continue to be 
evaluated as “no risks,” the particularly vulnerable members of society will continue to be 
compromised for the benefit of society. See also Solomon. 
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pandemic, when decisions needed to be made at a time of scientific 
uncertainty, pregnant women were especially encouraged to assume the 
unknown risks of vaccination in order to avoid the incalculable risks of the 
swine flu. Insofar as it targeted pregnant women, this episode provides a 
particularly vivid demonstration of the way in which the seemingly banal 
mechanisms of security and path-dependent behaviour operative in the mass 
distribution of vaccination can function to undermine the productive 
immunitary features of pregnancy. During the H1N1 pandemic, the notions of 
case, risk, danger, and crisis were invoked in such a way that the potential for 
disrupting the delicate immunitary balance necessary for pregnancy, was, at 
least in some parts of the world, completely overlooked. In a state of crisis, 
pregnant women were isolated for treatment, pressured to make an important 
decision in the absence of sufficient information, and given the false 
assurance that their decision to be vaccinated was the safest of all possible 
options. 
Perhaps more worrisome than reassuring, is the fact that this sort of 
biopower can discriminately impose risks on a certain segment of the 
population with absolutely no evidence of malfeasance. I agree with Biss that 
the mechanisms of vaccine distribution that may inadvertently endanger life 
are, in most cases, not the result of “researchers and health officials and 
doctors worldwide [who] would willfully harm children for money” (Biss 102). 
But recognizing them as nothing more than a function of vaccination's 
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recourse to risk analysis does not give me reason to rest assured. As Nikolas 
Rose observes, although the rise of risk analysis as the contemporary 
paradigm of biopolitics is more mundane than the racist and eugenist 
discourses that preceded it, it is by no means less hazardous: 
There are technical problems, for example the validity 
and appropriateness of the factors used to calculate the 
risk profiles through which individuals are allocated to risk 
groups, their generalizability to others given national and 
cultural variations, the effects of changes since the time 
when the scales were constructed and so forth . . . There 
are the problems that flow from the fact that, once known 
to fall within a risk group, the individual may be treated – 
by others and by themselves – as if they were, now or in 
the future, certain to be affected in the severest fashion 
(10). 
Adding to this list, I find it particularly disconcerting that, when the singularity 
of susceptibility to disease is generalized as a phenomenon affecting entire 
demographics, biopower is well-poised to exercise its capacity to 
discriminately impose risks on certain fragments of the population. In view of 
the public health mandate to err on the side of safety, this is a necessary risk 
that health and state officials must impose on citizens in order to protect them.
But when we extend consideration to the alternative method of disease 
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prevention developed by Hahnemann, which adheres to the medical principle 
of non-maleficence, it becomes possible to recognize the seeming inevitability 
of this imposition of risk as a function of a particular, historically-situated 
medical practice, rather than as a necessary feature of community relations. 
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Chapter Five: The Romantic Response to the Indeterminacy of Life
While the calculus of probabilities has continued to develop as an integral part 
of the modern practice of immunization, the extension of mathematical 
analysis to legitimize the risks of prophylaxis was not always universally 
accepted. Despite the high rate of morbidity and mortality caused by smallpox, 
the number of inoculations reported in the German territories remained small 
compared to those in England (Maehle, “Conflicting Attitudes,” 200; Baldwin 
250). It is not that the objections raised in Germany against variolation were 
somehow unique or particularly difficult to overcome, but rather that the 
numerical legitimization of the technique was not as well received there as it 
had been in England or even, to a lesser extent, in France.84 Although the 
numerical advantages of inoculation were sometimes cited in German 
publications on inoculation, they never effectively quieted the local controversy 
surrounding the procedure.85  
In order to contextualize the uniqueness of Germany's medical tradition 
in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, it is illuminating to also consider its 
distinction from England and France in light of its unique philosophical 
tradition. While Locke's philosophy had a lasting impact on medical practice in 
84 On France's relatively chilly reception of inoculation and its later use of numerical analyses, see 
Miller and Cohen. 
85 One of the most fervent supporters of inoculation in Germany was Juncker, who, after the Halle 
epidemic in 1791, launched an extensive campaign to eradicate smallpox. In addition to quarantine 
and hygiene protocols, he strongly emphasized the value of widespread inoculation. One of the most 
fascinating and unique aspects of Juncker's campaign, in view of similar efforts in England and 
France, was his request for professors of philosophy to comment on the moral implications of 
inoculation as such. On the German reception of inoculation, see Maehl, “Conflicting Attitudes” and 
“Ethics of Prevention.”
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England and, through the interpretation of Locke's ideas by Condillac, in 
France, in Germany it was Kant's enlightened philosophy that exerted the 
greatest influence on the early nineteenth-century medical tradition, spurring 
physicians and philosophers alike towards an unprecedented intermingling 
between medicine and philosophy (Flatten 17; Risse, “Kant-Schelling,” 146-
47; Tsouyopoulos, Röschlaub, 47). The central concern was essentially the 
same in Germany as it was in England and France – namely, to address the 
question of certainty in medicine and, by extension, to find a basis for 
establishing medical authority – but the responses to this problematic were 
incredibly varied, as were their political implications for the medical tradition in 
general and, in particular, the project of immunizing communities. 
Critical Philosophy and the Rise of Medical Skepticism 
Medical writings from around 1800 indicate that most medical professionals 
were extremely dissatisfied with the medical system in Germany and were 
trying to reform it by establishing a scientific basis for therapeutics. As 
Tsouyopoulos points out, physicians' lack of scientific authority was 
inextricably related to their low economic and social status. Since most people 
preferred to seek treatment from traditional healers and more affordable non-
doctors, unless a doctor was fortunate enough to be employed by the state, 
he could barely earn a living (“Influence” 68). In the effort to secure state 
recognition for their profession, physicians quickly realized that “it would be 
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difficult to demand protection against quackery from the authorities if regular 
medicine itself was not able to distinguish between genuine medical practice 
on the one hand and blind empiricism and quackery on the other” (“Influence” 
68). But how, exactly, could physicians elevate themselves above the swarm 
of so-called healers? As Guenter Risse rhetorically asks, “If theories were 
bankrupt, medical practice uncertain and guided largely by shifting 
impressions, and the nexus between theory and practice questionable, what 
body of knowledge should be taught to the fledgling professional?” 
(“'Philosophical' Medicine” 75). Without a scientific foundation, physicians 
were simply ill-equipped to prove their competence as administrators of state-
sanctioned public medicine, which demanded “viable definitions of health and 
disease, proper concepts of nutrition and hygiene, as well as knowledge about 
the control and prevention of epidemics” (Risse, “'Philosophical' Medicine,” 
75).
Although physicians' problems were not primarily philosophical, the 
need to establish an authoritative scientific medicine prompted many to turn to 
Kant's critical philosophy, which was, at the time, the authoritative reference 
point for intellectual and social considerations in Germany (Tsouyopoulos, 
“Influence,” 69). Physicians interested in a systematic revision of medicine's 
principles were confident that “the new limits posed for human reason by 
Kantian philosophy facilitated such a task” (Risse, “Philosophical Medicine,” 
75). In his Critique of Pure Reason, Kant distinguishes a priori knowledge, 
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which is independent of experience and all sensory impressions, from a 
posteriori knowledge, which is empirical, that is, derived from experience (19). 
Acknowledging that all knowledge is based on experience, Kant qualifies that 
a priori knowledge is not immediately derived from experience, but rather from 
a general rule, which itself may have been informed by experience. As such, 
although it may not be independent of this or that kind of experience, it can 
nevertheless be attained prior to experience because it is true of all 
experience (19-20),86 providing the kind of certain and necessary knowledge 
physicians hoped would improve the success rate of their medical 
interventions. In fact, its defense of the possibility of a priori knowledge proved 
to be one of the most compelling aspects of Kantian epistemology for the 
medical profession (or, more precisely, for the professionalization of 
medicine). Yet, as it turned out, the physicians' turn to Kantian epistemology 
threatened to undermine medical practice as much as it promised to improve 
it.
After all, Kant was clear that the only concepts that could be used as a 
priori principles are those with a mathematical structure (Tsouyopoulos, 
“Influence,” 70).87 He was willing to designate, for example, Newtonian 
physics, mathematics, and Euclidean geometry as “pure sciences,” but 
maintained that “pseudosciences” such as chemistry and physiology, which 
86 He gives the example of a man who knows that a house will fall if he removes its supports without 
having to wait for the experience of it actually falling. Yet, “that bodies are heavy, and, 
consequently, that they fall when their supports are taken away, must have been known to him 
previously, by means of experience” (20). 
87 See also Risse, “Kant-Schelling” and “'Philosophical' Medicine.”
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were derived from empirical a posteriori propositions, could be transformed 
into “pure sciences” only if they were granted a priori principles through 
human reason. The primary question that haunted physicians intent on 
following Kant's scientific criteria was how the principles of medicine could be 
translated into certain and necessary a priori axioms and still be well-suited to 
address the complexity of life that physicians encountered in practice (Risse, 
“Kant-Schelling” and “Philosophical Medicine”; Tsouyopoulos “Influence”; 
Wiesing, Kunst oder Wissenschaft, 51-6; Schwanitz 24-31). 
Reinforcing the difficulty physicians faced in the effort to translate the 
principles of medicine into an axiomatic science, Kant acknowledged that our 
experience of organisms differs from that of mechanically structured beings in 
two fundamental ways that exhaust mechanical explanations. First, we 
recognize the parts of an organism to be interrelated in such a way that 
ensures the proper functioning of the whole. That is, all of the parts seem to 
act in accordance with an organizing principle. Second, this organizing 
principle does not seem to be externally imposed on an organism, as it is on a 
machine, but rather internal to each of the parts (Critique of Judgment §65; p. 
341). In short, the parts of an organism seem to “reciprocally reproduce each 
other,” such that the organism appears to be “both cause and effect of itself” 
(Nassar, Romantic Absolute, 61). In view of the basic incommensurability 
between living organisms and mechanical causation, Kant admits that natural 
researchers have reason to also entertain archetypal or teleological 
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considerations in their investigations. “Absolutely no human Reason,” he 
insists “can hope to understand the production of even a blade of grass by 
mere mechanical causes. As regards the possibility of such an object, the 
teleological connexion of causes and effects is quite indispensable for the 
Judgment” (Critique of Judgment §77; p. 393). But he is also careful to qualify 
that such ideas can function only as heuristic aids, necessary handmaidens to 
true science, which he limits to the mechanical explanations enabled by 
Newtonian categories (Richards 9; 309). 
Kant privileges mechanical explanations over their teleological 
counterparts in view of his understanding of the discursive quality of the 
human mind. He distinguishes human cognitive faculties from what he posits 
as the 'intuitive intellect' on the basis that we require both sense perception 
and concepts in order to gain knowledge. In this way, our discursive intellect 
proceeds from the isolated parts of nature and subsumes these parts under 
the universal concepts of the understanding. As a result, there is always a gap 
between the particular (what is given in sensibility) and the universal (the 
concept), such that it can never grasp unity in its diversity (Nassar, Romantic 
Absolute, 61-2). More specifically, by proceeding from the parts to construct a 
whole, the discursive intellect is incapable of grasping organisms, which are 
composed of inherently distinctive but mutually supporting parts. Were we 
capable of perceiving a whole prior to its parts and deriving the latter from the 
former, then organisms would be an object of knowledge in the strictest sense. 
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But Kant insists that our understanding is entirely incommensurate with this 
task. 
Gesturing towards the kind of understanding that could grasp living 
organisms, Kant acknowledges that, although such a capacity exceeds the 
limits of discursive thought, we can nevertheless consider the possibility of an 
understanding for which knowledge of the whole would precede that of the 
parts:
We can however think of an Understanding which, being, 
not like ours, discursive, but intuitive, proceeds from the 
synthetical-universal (the intuition of the whole as such) 
to the particular, i.e. from the whole to the parts. (Critique 
of Judgment §77; p. 389). 
It is precisely this mode of thought that the early German Romantics sought to 
elaborate. Prompted to push beyond Kant's delineation of knowledge and the 
limits of discursive rationality, they were intent on developing rather than 
denying the human capacity to grasp organisms as integrated identities, 
namely intellectual intuition. Though they sometimes used different names to 
describe it, the German Romantics agreed that this form of apprehension 
must be intellectual because it must be capable of seeing ideas and not 
merely sensible data. And it must be intuitive, as opposed to discursive, 
because it does not grasp empirical objects as things determined by and 
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known in terms of external conditions, but as a self-subsisting, self-producing 
unity (Nassar, Romantic Absolute, 6). In direct contrast with the discursive 
intellect, “intellectual intuition grasps the whole as a whole [. . . and] thus 
discerns the ideal unity that underlies and determines the parts and their 
relations” (Nassar, Romantic Absolute, 5). But for Kant it is only in its absence 
that a finite rationality can relate to this faculty. Albeit entirely reasonable for 
human cognition to conceive of intellectual intuition as that which enables 
discursive thought,88 he maintains that we are wholly incapable of actually 
enacting it. In short, the challenge issued by Kant's critical philosophy to 
convert empirical pseudosciences into a genuine science of a priori principles 
was particularly difficult to implement in the fields of the life sciences and, by 
extension, in medicine. 
'Romantic' Reactions to the Problem of Medical Uncertainty
While the seeming impossibility of cultivating medical knowledge had been 
percolating in the medical community since Kant published his writings on the 
limits of human knowledge in the late 1780s,89 the urgency of the quest to find 
88 As Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi famously noted, the discursive intellect results in infinite regress 
precisely because it seeks to understand something by means of something else. “This implies that 
the discursive intellect has two options: either it locates an ultimate or final condition, from which 
all conditions are then derived or derivable or, lacking such an ultimate condition, it fails to grant 
knowledge of anything. In other words, discursive thought – precisely because it is discursive – has 
no access to and thus cannot positively assume an unconditioned. After all, for the discursive mind, 
knowledge is based on conditions; an unconditioned, therefore, is beyond its grasp. This means that 
another, nondiscursive capacity, which would be able to grasp or at least posit an unconditioned, 
must be assumed” (Nassar, Romantic Absolute, 6).
89 According to Lesky, the question of certainty in medicine was circulating in the field of public 
health well before the influence of Kant's philosophy and was a central concern of the medizinische 
Polizei. 
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a rational basis of medicine intensified in August 1795, when a “devastatingly 
critical review of the state of medical knowledge” (Broman 131) was published 
in the Teutscher Merkur, one of the more influential periodicals of its time: 
“About Medicine. Arkesilas and Ekdemus” (“Ueber die Medicin. Arkesilas und 
Ekdemus”). Written anonymously by Johann Benjamin Erhard (1766-1827), a 
physician and Kantian philosopher, the article exposes the uncertainty of 
every area of existing medical knowledge and its failure to meet the Kantian 
criteria of a true science. Though Erhard's provocation was met with 
considerable opposition,90 his criticisms gave voice to the general 
disillusionment with medicine felt by physicians and patients alike and 
“Arkelias” accordingly became the catch-phrase under which medical 
skepticism in Germany reared its head (Lesky 177).91 
In response to Erhard's article, numerous German physicians 
embraced the challenge to ground a rational a priori medical system from 
which medical phenomena could be deduced, an effort that the medical 
historian Karl Rothschuh identifies as one of the main streams in the romantic 
movement of medicine.92 This response represents the first direct impact of 
Kant's philosophy on the medical profession in Germany and was spear-
headed by Andreas Röschlaub (1768-1835), a professor of medicine at 
90 Such criticism included a sharp rebuttal from Hufeland, who did not agree that medicine was in a 
state of crisis and was deeply critical of the attempt to further – and, in his opinion, unjustly! – 
discredit an already undervalued medical profession. 
91 To read more about Erhard's article and its impact, see Broman; Lesky; Tsouyopoulos, Röschlaub, 
181-84; and Wiesing, Kunst oder Wissenschaft?, 56-66.
92 See Rothschuh, “Deutsche Medizin im Zeitalter der Romantik.” 
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Bamberg who endeavored to develop John Brown's (1735-1788) principles of 
health and disease into an a priori medical system that assured certainty in 
medical practice.93 The central principle in Brown's system is that of 
excitability, which denotes a basic quality of living matter to perceive and 
respond to outside impressions. Comparing his contribution to medicine with 
that of Newton to physics, Brown was convinced that “if gravity is sufficient to 
explain the planetary motions, so his [theory of] excitability . . . exhibits the 
same universality” (Risse, “Brownian System,” 45). He maintained that all life 
consists of stimulus and that both over-abundance and deficiency lead to 
disease. In view of these two polar extremes, he endeavored to quantify the 
excitability of an organism on a scale of 80 degrees, with 40 constituting the 
state of health. He was hopeful that the Brownian physician would be able to 
“express mathematically any given state of excitement, and in the case of 
disease, the correct number of degrees necessary to restore health” (Risse, 
“Brownian System,” 48). 
In view of its numerical elegance, many German physicians recognized 
in Brown's system the potential to establish a scientific basis of medicine and 
thereby achieve greater (mathematical) certitude in practice.94 Kant himself 
was hopeful that Brown's principles could provide a scientific basis for 
medicine and encouraged physicians to pursue this course. In a personal 
93 For a description of this response, with examples of participating physicians, see Tsouyopoulos, 
Röschlaub 207-09. 
94 See Risse, “The Brownian System of Medicine” for more details on how Brown's system promised 
mathematical certainty. 
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letter addressed to Erhard, he writes: “That you want to adopt the Brownian 
system and contribute to its reputation, is, in my judgment, well justified, 
concerning its formal principles” (qtd. in Risse, “Kant-Schelling,” 146).95 And 
yet, despite Kant's validation of this endeavor, many physicians remained 
critical of the effort to build an a priori medical system. Chief among its critics, 
Hufeland rejected the preference for speculation exhibited by many Kantian 
physicians who adopted Brown's principles; he warned that their recourse to 
theoretical categories did not illuminate but rather invented medical 
experience (Schwanitz 25). Hahnemann also weighed in on the controversy, 
remarking that “no medical sectarian, apparently, knew less about nature, 
than [Brown]” (“Observations” 545). Based on the contradiction between 
Brown's recommendations and his own clinical experience, Hahnemann 
concluded that Brown's treatment of disease must be the result of theoretical 
study rather than practical experience –  “he speaks as a blind man would do 
about colours” (“Observations” 549) –  and accordingly regretted that so many 
physicians mistook the one-sidedness of Brown's system of medicine for 
genuine simplicity (“On the Value” 494).96 
Similar criticisms of excessive speculation were also charged against 
physicians who fell under the influence of Schelling's Naturphilosophie, 
another distinct stream in the romantic revolution of medicine, though one with 
important points of convergence with Röschlaub's reception of Brownian 
95 See Risse, “Kant-Schelling” and Wiesing, “Immanuel Kant.”
96 See also Hahnemann's “Fragmentary Observations on Brown's Elements of Medicine.”
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medicine.97 According to Risse, Schelling became “an influential and powerful 
ally of those 'philosophical' physicians who were bent on unraveling the 
ultimate secrets of organic nature as the necessary precondition for a genuine 
science of medicine” (“Kant, Schelling” 155). Indeed, as Nassar observes in 
her detailed overview of the development of his philosophy of nature, 
Schelling's first response to the apparent impossibility of understanding 
organic nature was to deny its independence from human thought. Nassar 
explains that, insofar as he was still influenced by the idealism of his mentor, 
Johann Gottlieb Fichte (1762-1814), Schelling's early attempts to explain 
nature in non-mechanistic terms lead him to understand it as the product of 
self-intuition, (“From a Philosophy of Self” 313) a move that prompted 
numerous physicians to turn away from empiricism. They hoped that by 
engaging with nature through the lenses of speculative philosophy, they would 
finally escape the bewildering array of biological and medical half-truths that 
surrounded them. In the words of Risse: “Once the key operative principles in 
nature were apprehended, with Schelling showing the way, one could by 
simple deduction erect a complete set of necessary propositions into which all 
dispersed empirical data could be placed”  (“'Philosophical' Medicine” 77).  
Insofar as it endorsed German physicians' turn away from empiricism 
and foray into speculative philosophy, Schelling's influence on the medical 
tradition has been severely criticized by both his contemporaries and later 
97 To read more about the ambivalent relationship between Schelling and Röschlaub, see all cited 
works by  Tsouyopoulos.
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historians of medicine. As Tsouyopoulos observes, Schelling's philosophy is, 
as a rule, the one held responsible for corrupting the trajectory of German 
medicine (Röschlaub 7). According to Bernard Cohen, 
It has become a tradition among those who talk glibly 
about science that the romantic Naturphilosophie of 
Schelling and his followers represents the lowest 
degradation of science and that only by completely 
freeing themselves from that nightmare were modern 
biology and medical science able to resume their 
scientific progress. The incident has been used by 
empiricists as a moral to warn us against speculative 
philosophy in the natural sciences (qtd. in Peterson xii).
Reinforcing this interpretation, as a contemporary of the Naturphilosophen, 
Hahnemann writes: 
We have to thank the natural philosophers for the 
disorder and dislocation of many a young doctor's 
understanding. . . How impossible is it by all these 
barren a prioris to obtain such a just view of the different 
maladies as shall point out the remedy suited to each – 
the sole genuine aim of the healing art! How can one 
justify to a sound judgment the seeking to make these 
speculative subtleties, which can never be made 
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concrete and applicable, the chief study of the practical 
physician (“On the Value” 495-96). 
Since the primary danger associated with the physicians' turn to speculative 
philosophy has been the severance of medicine from observation, 
contemporaries who resisted its seductive allure are generally celebrated for 
their conservative reception of and influence on the romantic tradition. Widely 
recognized as the leader of this more traditional and empirically-based stream 
in the history of romantic medicine, Hufeland engaged with the theories 
circulating around him with an explicit interest in their practical consequences. 
His role as editor of the world renowned “Journals der praktischen Wund- und 
Arzneikunst” exemplifies this approach. He published a rich plurality of articles 
all under the motto “Test all things, and retain the best [Prüfet alles, und das 
beste behaltet]!” (Flatten 34) and promised that “this journal should be neither 
polemic, nor theoretical, but rather practical [Dies Journal soll weder 
polemisch, noch theoretisch, sondern practisch seyn]” (qtd. in Wiesing, Kunst 
oder Wissenschaft?, 76). His commitment to tradition and reverence for 
clinical observation are often credited for his capacity to dismiss the “Errors of 
the Time [Irrungen der Zeit]” (Wiesling, Kunst oder Wissenschaft?, 76; Pfeifer, 
Christoph Wilhelm Hufeland, 74). And yet, it is precisely these qualities that 
facilitated the integration of certain romantic ideals into the practice of 
medicine. Hufeland and other empirically-minded doctors were among the 
most influential in the field of medicine and their openness to medical 
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innovations they deemed compatible with the tradition of hippocratic medicine 
allowed the development of certain romantic impulses that would have 
otherwise remained theoretical ideals (Tsouyopoulos, Röschlaub, 154). It is, 
accordingly, in the work of some of the most scathing critics of romanticism 
and Naturphilosophie, such as Hahnemann, that we find the influence of 
romanticism and Naturphilosophie most fully operative in practice. 
The tendency toward speculation and system building was, after all, not 
the only outcome of the unprecedented intermingling between philosophy and 
medicine that Germany witnessed in the first half of the nineteenth century. 
While Brownian medicine did not deliver in its promise to reform the medical 
system by providing certain, a priori, principles to guide medical practice, the 
lasting impact of Brown's ideas on German medicine, in particular his principle 
of excitability, cannot be overstated. Indeed, one of the most novel and 
compelling aspects of Brown's contribution was his insistence that life is only 
ever a response to outside influences that act upon it. It is neither 
spontaneous nor independent, but always relies on continual exchange with 
its environment. As Risse observes: 
Brown's stress on the external powers as the active 
forces governing life and the bodily functions was fruitful 
for further physiological inquiries. It sharply highlighted 
the importance of the environment in shaping and 
conditioning the activities of the organism. Life takes 
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place and shape only as a response to external 
influences and is not an independent, internal principle of 
force (“Brownian System” 46). 
According to Tsouyopoulos, Brown's conviction that life is a variable 
phenomenon, dependent on environmental demands, had a lasting impact on 
the German medical tradition. After Brown and the Romantics, she argues, 
“German medicine never returned to the pure mechanism of the eighteenth 
century” (“Influence” 73). She observes that, since then, the idea of an 
interactive power mediating organisms and their role in the world has “never 
ceased to resonate in German medical thinking” (“Influence” 73).  
Tsouyopoulos identifies the most important contribution of the 
'excitation theory' in its capacity to show that living processes – including 
disease – are an expression of the interaction between the organism and its 
environment and, by extension, to demonstrate that it is possible to provide 
medical explanations of physical effects that are not exclusively mechanistic. 
With the theory of excitability, she argues, German physicians in the early 
nineteenth century were able to develop a more sophisticated understanding 
of pathogenesis than their mechanistic forefathers, one that involved a 
process of mediation between the organism and the environment in which the 
organism was simultaneously receptive and resistant. From this perspective, 
pathogenesis is an interactive play between the outer cause and the 
counteraction of the organism. Emphasizing the importance of an organism's 
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susceptibility, this perspective implies that a disease agent is no cause of 
disease as such, until the organism responds. 
Insofar as the non-mechanistic, dynamic accounts of natural organisms 
proliferating in the German Romantic movement of medicine reinforced a turn 
away from empiricism, the practical medical benefits of such an ontology have 
been either completely lost or significantly compromised. Yet, as we will 
consider in greater detail, although Schelling's early denial of nature's 
independence of mind was interpreted by many as an epistemological 
justification for unravelling the principles of nature through speculative 
philosophy rather than through empiricism, his mature work in the philosophy 
of nature explicitly emphasizes the importance of observation – albeit in a 
nuanced way. And while some physicians continued to divorce medicine from 
bedside practice despite Schelling's own acknowledgment of the importance 
of observation, others went on to recognize the dialectical interaction between 
an organism and its environment as an ontological, observable, claim which, 
as we will see in the case of Hahnemann, concretely informed their treatment 
of disease. As Kuzniar observes, “Like the Naturphilosophen at the start of the 
nineteenth century, Hahnemann poetically believed in the relatedness of 
everything. Yet, unlike them, he also set out to empirically prove it” (“Romantic 
Vitalism” 171). 
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The Power to Observe, the Power of Life 
Though openly critical of the theoretical excesses of Naturphilosophie, 
Hahnemann was, as a select few historians of medicine would later come to 
be, sympathetic to its emphasis on the integrity of the organism and the 
organism's receptivity to the world. In his review of Die Lehre von den 
ansteckenden Krankheiten und Seuchen (The Teachings of Contagious 
Diseases and Epidemics) by D. Gutfelt, a book that Hahnemann celebrates 
for its concrete approach to the dynamic nature of the organism, Hahnemann 
emphasizes the need to overcome the mysticism of Naturphilosophie in order 
to realize its potential remedial applications, most specifically its approach to 
observing organisms insofar as they are composed of inherently distinctive 
but mutually supporting parts:
It is a welcomed prospect for medicine that the euphoric 
Naturphilosophie discards its mystical, poetic skin and 
purges its external and internal aspects. Its ethereal 
flight has inspired a lot of good, excellent, young minds 
to contemplation, and they have elevated it to a level 
from which it became possible for them to consider the 
apparatus of the body in health and sickness, as well as 
all of its parts and functions, as an indivisible whole, and
to discover with the eyes of the spirit, a finer, dynamic 
context in the organism than the former mechanical-
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chemical physiologists and one-sided solidar- and 
humoral-pathologists were able to perceive.
[Es ist eine erfreuliche Aussicht für die Arzneykunde, 
daß die schwärmerische Naturphilosophie ihre mystisch 
poetische Haut ablegt, und ihr Äußeres und Inneres 
läutert. Ihr ätherischer Flug erregte eine Menge guter, 
vorzüglich jugendlicher Köpfe zum Nachdenken, und 
erhob sie mit sich bis zu einer Höhe, von wo aus es 
ihnen möglich ward, die Einrichtung des menschlichen 
Körpers in gesunden und kranken Tagen, so wie alle 
seine Theile und Funktionen, als ein unzertrennliches 
Ganzes zu betrachten, und einen feineren dynamischen 
Zusammenhang in diesem Organism mit den Augen 
des Geistes zu entdecken, als unsere bisherigen 
mechanisch-chemischen Physiologen und einseitigen 
Solidar- und Humoral-Pathologen wahrzunehmen 
vermochten] (428-29; my emphasis). 
In its appreciation of the interrelated integrity of the organism and, more 
importantly, of the capacity to observe organisms in their animated contexts, 
Hahnemann's position resembles that of Goethe, whose nuanced 
understanding of observation helped salvage the development of the life 
sciences after Kant's delineation of knowledge and, by extension, supported 
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the effort to integrate the romantic ideal of interconnectivity into clinical 
practice. Goethe's contributions also played a significant role in the 
development of Schelling's Naturphilosophie, which, in turn, supplied 
“enduring structural supports for Romantic theory both in Germany and 
England” (Richards 46). In short, although he engaged with German 
Romanticism from a careful distance, Goethe's interest in developing our 
capacity to observe nature had a lasting impact on the romantic movement 
and, in particular, its influence on scientific and medical practice. 
Indeed, although it is often overlooked in historical accounts of the 
romantic era of medicine, the impact that Goethe's insights had on the 
development of the life sciences after Kant cannot be overstated.98 In direct 
contrast with Kant, who attributes our recognition of an organism's growth and 
development to heuristic aids, Goethe maintained that human knowledge can 
penetrate the inner secrets of an organism without reducing it to Newtonian 
categories. His detailed observation of plant growth provided a living 
testament of a natural researcher's capacity to grasp the unity that underlies 
and determines the parts and their relations. In agreement with Kant that only 
an intuitive intelligence can grasp organisms, Goethe was unwilling to deprive 
98 Throughout his ambivalent reception of Kant, ranging from distain and disinterest to active 
engagement and endorsement, Goethe remains consistent in his commitment to discovering the 
ways in which Nature's secrets may be disclosed. More specifically, throughout his scientific 
writings, he remains a strong advocate of careful – one may even say reverent – observation of 
natural phenomena. Robert Richards notes that prior to his association with Schiller, Goethe 
regarded Kantian epistemology as too subjective and insensitive to the “rights of nature” (330). 
Even after Schiller influenced him to reconsider Kant's emphasis on the mind's active role in 
scientific inquiry and admit the justice of Kantian epistemology, Goethe still lamented its hostility to 
a more immediate congress with nature (330; 429). 
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the patient observer of this capacity. His sojourn in Italy from 1786 to 1788, 
during which he devoted himself to studying the metamorphosis of plants, had 
convinced him that the veil surrounding nature was not as impenetrable as 
Kant's epistemology dictates.
In The Metamorphosis of Plants (1790), the book that  “seeded a 
revolution in thought that would transform biological science during the 
nineteenth century” (Richards 407) – Goethe seeks to elaborate the basic 
insight that “anyone who has paid even a little attention to plant growth will 
readily see,” namely, “that certain external parts of the plant undergo frequent 
change and take on the shape of the adjacent parts – sometimes fully, 
sometimes more, and sometimes less” (5). Though Goethe limits his 
investigation to the growth of annual flowers, the impact of his unique 
approach to the development of the life sciences is extensive. His observation 
of plant development seeks to penetrate “the hidden relationship among 
various external parts of the plant that develop one after the other and, as it 
were, one out of the other (for example, leaves, calyx, corolla, and stamens)” 
(6). In contrast with previous researchers, who focused on the different parts 
of the plant that appear at various stages of development, Goethe emphasizes 
the process by which one and the same organ appears in a variety of forms 
(6). He demonstrates that if plant parts are perceived alongside one another, 
one can begin to recognize continuity between the parts. More specifically, he 
identifies each part as a moment of either contraction or expansion: “While the 
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seed is a contraction, the stem leaves are the first expansion. The calyx is a 
contraction, and the petals are an expansion. The sexual organs are once 
again a contraction, while the fruit is the 'maximum expansion' and the seed 
within it is the 'maximum concentration'” (Nassar, “From a Philosophy of Self,” 
309). From top to bottom, Goethe conceives of the entire plant as different 
representations of a mutable plant part; this protean “leaf” is united so 
inseparably with the future bud that one cannot be imagined without the other. 
By this Goethe does not intend to reduce the plant to the leaf, and reminds his 
reader that he adopts a common word 'leaf' simply to designate the organ that 
transforms into the various forms assumed by different parts of the plant.99 
That is, each plant part assumes a form that is to some degree related to the 
other parts. At every moment of development, each plant part is a 
manifestation of the plant whole. 
As the developing interrelation between inherently connected parts, 
what grants a plant unity, for Goethe, is neither a static substance nor a quasi-
platonic form that precedes its parts. What unifies a plant is a lawful process 
of metamorphosis. As Nassar elaborates, “this means that the archetypal plant 
is only in its parts, but is nevertheless not reducible to any of its parts. 
99 Holland describes Goethe's difficulty in finding an adequate language to describe living phenomena 
in a state of change. She notes that the very first of his notes are marked by intense self-questioning 
concerning both the gendered language of procreation and a proper description of the process of 
metamorphosis (22). She argues that Goethe's “makeshift solution of 'leaf' ultimately called 
attention to the fact that there is no available word – indeed, no available language, with which to 
capture the complexity of the plant's growth and reproduction” (49). This in turn, she argues, led 
Goethe to the unsatisfactory possibility of tautological definitions whereby he identifies continguous 
organs in terms of one another, a problem that can be overcome only if the reader acquires the 
intuition that the narrator wishes to communicate discursively (49). 
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Therefore, although the archetypal plant is an ideal reality, it is not separable 
from the real. It is what constitutes the real, informing its growth and 
transformation” (Romantic Absolute 197). In short, what grants plants unity, 
informs the parts, but does not in any substantial way precede them. As a 
scientist, Goethe's fundamental premise – the premise that countless others 
after him immediately dismissed – is that “metamorphosis is an ontological 
principle in which the empirical and the transcendental, the real and the ideal, 
are not separated. In other words, the metamorphosis of plants refers to a 
constitutive principle that is not imposed upon the organism by the mind” 
(Nassar, “From a Philosophy of Self,” 310). 
 Though he admits that the act of recognition implies a cognitive 
division, Goethe maintains that we have been granted the ability to 
reconstitute artificially that which should not have been divided in the first 
place in order to understand the natural world. In other words, he “affirms that 
humans have the ability to replicate . . . organic processes. . . as intellectual 
operations” (Holland 40). It is precisely on this point that Goethe's 
ambivalence towards Kant's philosophy is most intensified. As he writes:
In seeking to penetrate Kant’s philosophy . . . I often get the 
impression that this good man had a roguishly ironic way of 
working: at times he seemed determined to put the narrowest limits 
on our ability to know things, and at times, with a casual gesture, he 
pointed beyond the limits he himself set. . .  Thus our master limits 
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his thinking person to a reflective, discursive faculty of judgment 
and absolutely forbids us one which is determinative. But then, after 
he has succeeded in driving us to the wall, to the verge of despair 
in fact, he makes the most liberal statements and leaves it to us to 
decide how to enjoy the freedom he allows us. . . Why should it 
not . . . hold true in the intellectual area that through an intuitive 
perception of eternally creative nature we may become worthy of 
participating spiritually in its creative processes? (100-1). 
From Goethe's perspective, intuitive thought and imagination are integral 
aspects of good science and he recognizes no good reason to deny their 
possibility. On the contrary, he recognizes all the reason in the world to 
actively pursue them.   
Under Goethe's influence, Schelling developed an aspect of 
Naturphilosophie that he had previously neglected, namely the important role 
of experiment and observation (Richards 464). More specifically, through his 
close collaboration with Goethe and his introduction to the theory of 
metamorphosis, “Schelling was able to put forward a philosophy of nature as 
self-productive, and, as such, independent” (Nassar, “From a Philosophy of 
Self,” 306-7). In sharp contrast with his earlier position, Schelling later 
admonished the idea that nature's ground is something other than nature itself 
and recognized the imperative to think of nature as independent and real 
(Nassar, “From a Philosophy of Self,” 314). For this reason, he argues that 
206
. . . there is no place in this science [Naturphilosophie] for idealistic 
methods of explanation, such as transcendental philosophy is fitted 
to supply, since for it Nature is nothing more than the organ of self-
consciousness . . . The first maxim of all true natural science, to 
explain everything by the forces of Nature, is therefore accepted in 
its widest extent in our science (195).
According to Schelling, nature could be self-productive only if there is an 
original opposition in nature – a primordial duality. Such an opposition, 
however, is possible only if the products of nature are in a state of infinite 
development, that is, in a process of metamorphosis. For it is only through 
infinite development that nature can both infinitely produce and infinitely limit 
itself. In light of Goethe's description of plant growth as a process of 
expansion and contraction, Schelling discovered a way to account for duality 
within a non-reflective, non-conscious being. That is, through the idea of 
metamorphosis, he could overcome his earlier understanding that duality and 
productivity are necessarily born out of self-reflection and, as such, grant to 
nature that which he had previously granted only to the self – independence 
(Nassar, Romantic Absolute, 319). 
As Nassar observes, the key to thinking of nature as self-productive is 
to recognize that what nature is cannot be reduced to the products of nature. 
In other words, nature is not a composite of its parts but the process that 
underlies and constitutes these parts. Coinciding with Goethe's shift from plant 
207
parts to the process of plant growth, Schelling's later contributions to 
Naturphilosophie prompt us to conceive of nature not merely as product, but 
as productivity, namely that which underlies and produces the products. It is 
on this basis that Schelling distinguishes his project from empirical 
investigation: 
Insofar as we regard the totality of objects not merely as a product, 
but at the same time necessarily as productive, it becomes Nature 
for us, and this identity of the product and the productivity, and this 
alone, is implied by the idea of Nature, even in the most ordinary 
use of language. Nature as productivity (natura naturans) we call 
Nature as subject (with this alone all theory deals) (202).
While Schelling is critical of those “warm panegyrists of empiricism, who exalt 
it at the expense of science” (201ft), he is precise in criticizing the fact that 
they take as their object Nature as a mere product. He does not altogether 
denigrate empiricism. On the contrary, he maintains that “empiricism extended 
to include unconditionedness is precisely philosophy of nature” (22). Indicative 
of the importance Schelling grants empirical observation, immediately after 
ascribing unconditionedness to Nature through its absolute activity, he 
considers “how can Nature be observed as absolutely active, or more clearly 
expressed: in what light must the totality of Nature appear to us, if it is 
absolutely active?” (15). He recognizes that without providing a corresponding 
intuition for all of its concepts, the philosophy of nature would “degrade into an 
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empty play with concepts” (15). 
In view of the limitations of 'blind' empiricism on the one hand and 
complete disengagement from empiricism on the other, Schelling's 
Naturphilosophie endorses a more nuanced view of observation. In resonance 
with Goethe's scientific method, Schelling attributes our capacity to recognize 
the activity in nature's 'apparent products' to an absolute (intellectual) infinity 
whose intuition is originally in us, but which could never come to 
consciousness without external, empirical exhibition (15). That is, we 
encounter the unconditioned in Nature as an idea, but, as Nassar 
emphasizes, it is not thereby heuristic: “it is not a creation of the mind for the 
sake of ordering and understanding nature. Rather, as nature’s productivity, it 
is inseparable from nature’s products. It is ideal and not empirical because it is 
what underlies empirical phenomena, and thus cannot be equivocated with 
them” (Romantic Absolute 318). 
And so, in direct contrast with Kant's critical philosophy, Goethe and 
Schelling affirm our capacity to experience, through a nuanced relationship 
between careful observation and active imagination, the infinite productivity of 
organic nature. They elaborate, rather than deny, our capacity to intuit natural 
phenomena. By extension, they defend the integrity of the life sciences 
against Kant's concerns that non-mechanistic accounts of biological 
organization would inevitably betray reason into poetic swooning. “Despite the 
fancies of critics who hold the contrary,” (Richards 311) a close reading of their 
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approach reveals an active engagement with empirical experience. Moreover, 
their contributions prompt us to reconsider the facile prejudice that the 
romantic tradition that they influenced is an aberration of sound science. 
Without denying that the influence of Kantian philosophy and 
Naturphilosophie prompted many physicians to turn away from clinical 
observation, others, albeit often without acknowledging the philosophical basis 
for their approach, applied the romantic ideal of observing nature as a 
dynamic process. And, as we will see in the case of Hahnemann, the capacity 
to observe disease as a dynamic process rather than in terms of the material 
products that it produces played an instrumental role in implementing the 
romantic ideals of interconnectivity in medical practice. 
Back to the Germinal Stages of Germ Theory  
Goethe's experience as a natural researcher convinced him that if we allow 
intuitive thinking a place in scientific method, then – provided these are 
deployed in agreement with exact observation and clear thought – a much 
fuller and more complete experience of nature would be possible. He insists 
that a “great scientist without this high gift [of imagination] is impossible” (118). 
But he is also careful to qualify that by this he does “not mean an imagination 
that goes into the vague and imagines things that do not exist . . . [but rather] 
one that does not abandon the actual soil of the earth, and steps to supposed 
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and conjectured things by the standard of the real and the known” (118).100  
Similarly, as indicated by his recognition of the important contribution to the 
medical tradition made by Naturphilosophie, Hahnemann was interested in 
cultivating physicians' capacity to observe organisms with the eyes of the 
spirit. As Kuzniar observes, “just as the botanist Goethe developed Kant into 
realms the philosopher cautioned against, so too did Hahnemann” (Birth of 
Homeopathy, Conclusion, location 3144, par. 29). More specifically, although 
he refrained from claiming medical knowledge of anything that is not rooted in 
experience,101 he also refused to deny discerning physicians the potential for 
medical certainty.102  He maintained that it was, in fact, possible to accurately 
observe the processes in which living organisms participate and, more 
importantly, that such observations provided a sufficient basis for effective 
remediation. He advised that: “There is nothing remediably diseased nor any 
remediable invisible disease alteration in the human interior, that would not 
100 Indicative of Goethe's complex relationship with Kant, it was actually his engagement with the 
Critique of Judgment that prompted him to recognize the imagination as an essential faculty for both 
art and science. Prior to his engagement with the romantic reception of Kant, Goethe warned that 
the imagination could easily mislead the careful scientist (Richards 377). As Richards observes, 
“After the tutelage of Schiller and his friendship with Schelling, Goethe would find the message of 
Kant’s third Critique – or at least the romantic interpretation of that book – more compelling: 
namely, that art and science had deep foundations within a nature that encompassed both the 
subjective and the objective. He would find in imagination not the betrayer of truth but the faculty 
of creative possibility. And he would be more circumspect concerning scientific theory and the way 
it might guide one to sound observation. Indeed, after a more studied examination of Kant and the 
constant urgings of Schiller, Goethe would come to hold that observation itself was theory-laden. 
One simply had to be aware of that fact and become reflectively cautious (438-39).
101 Confirming the attribution that Josef Schmidt makes in his annotations to Organon der Heilkunst, 
Kuzniar writes that Hahnemann is most definitely alluding to Kant in the sixth section of the 
Organon, where he writes of the futility of medical speculations that are not confirmed by 
experience (Birth of Homeopathy, Conclusion, location 3146, par 29). 
102 See his essay on “Are the Obstacles to Certainty and Simplicity in Practical Medicine 
Insurmountable?”
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present itself for discernment to the exactly observing physician by disease 
signs and symptoms” (§14). Keenly aware of the futility of empty speculations 
that cannot be grounded in experience, Hahnemann instructed that, for the 
discerning physician, disease consists solely in the totality of its symptoms 
(§6). That is, he recognized the capacity for physicians to apprehend disease 
as a unified entity by observing the disparate parts (i.e. the myriad symptoms) 
that it manifests. He affirmed the capacity to intuitively grasp the way in which 
parts fit into a whole and extended this romantic method of making visible the 
invisible to the realm of disease and its remediation. 
Further reinforcing his commitment to the Romantics' power of 
observation, in contrast with other contemporary physicians who reference 
Lebenskraft as an animating principle separate from the body's chemical and 
mechanical processes, Hahnemann understood it as an objective reality 
beyond human sight but nonetheless permeating all matter and accessible to 
the human mind through scientific investigation (Kuzniar, “Romantic Vitalism,” 
173). Furthermore, in the attempt to grasp the disease process as a 
misattunement of Lebenskraft, he turned his attention toward the process of 
symptom formation generated by an organism's attempt to restore health. Just 
as the underlying unity connecting disparate plant parts can be observed 
through the process of metamorphosis, as Hahnemann presents it, so too can 
the animating force that preserves the integrity of an organism in health and 
disease, Lebenskraft, be observed through the process of symptom formation 
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that ensues when an organism is impinged upon by a disease agent or 
medicinal substance. From this perspective, an organism can only ever be 
distinguished as such in view of its unique responsiveness and resistance to 
its environment. Its singularity is a function of its open exchange with the 
world.  
Approaching the life principle that regulates an organism as it responds 
to external stimuli, Hahnemann described disease and remedial processes in 
terms of the initial- and counter-action of remedies. He observed that “most 
medicines have more than one action; the first a direct action, which gradually 
changes into the second (. . . the indirect secondary action). The latter is 
generally a state exactly the opposite of the former” (“Suggestions for 
Ascertaining” 266). Reinforcing the Romantics' dynamic understanding of a life 
principle that is both receptive and resistant to the world, Hahnemann 
explained the dual-action of remedies by distinguishing the symptoms 
generated by an organism's initial contact with an external stimulus from those 
resulting from the organism's reaction or counter-action. In §64 of the 
Organon, he observes that during the initial-action of a disease agent or 
remedy on a healthy body, the organism's Lebenskraft appears entirely 
receptive, as if passively taking in impressions from the outside world. It is 
only ever in the counter-action of the remedy or disease agent that we 
experience the reactivity of Lebenskraft as it attempts to restore balance by 
countering the foreign influence, often producing symptoms opposite to those 
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experienced during the initial encounter. 
It is from this dynamic perspective of an organism's relation with the 
world that Hahnemann could deepen his understanding of the “law of 
similars,” which, since the time of Hippocrates, had been articulated numerous 
times throughout the history of medicine. Providing a distinctly romantic 
perspective from which to consider this age old medical maxim, Hahnemann 
described its remedial action in terms of an organism's dynamic relations with 
external stimuli. He reasoned that, if physicians intend to introduce lasting 
change to a disease state, they should prescribe a remedy that induces an 
initial action similar to and stronger than the patient's existing symptoms, 
trusting that the counter-action of the remedy, or, considered from another 
perspective, the counter-reaction of the organism, will effectively restore 
health. As he writes in “The Medicine of Experience”:
In order therefore to be able to cure, we shall only require
to oppose to the existing abnormal irritation of the 
disease an appropriate medicine, that is to say, another 
morbific power whose effect is very similar to that the 
disease displays . . . It is only by this property of 
producing in the healthy body a series of specific morbid 
symptoms, that medicines can cure diseases, that is to 
say, remove and extinguish the morbid irritation by a 
suitable counter-irritation (451). 
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Understood as a dynamic exchange of passive reception and active 
resistance with external stimuli, Hahnemann's capacity to observe organisms 
as they engage in living processes and corresponding application of the law of 
similars preserves organisms as they exist in fluid and porous exchange with 
the external world. 
Informed by radically different epistemological and ontological 
assumptions, while Hahnemann assigns Lebenskraft the role of preserving life 
amidst a bombardment of foreign influences, his understanding of health and 
disease differ in important ways from those operative in modern immunology. 
Distinguishing his method of remediation from the mechanisms of modern 
medicine, although Hahnemann understood epidemic diseases to be 
contagious, that is, transmissible from person to person (as opposed to 
atmospheric), he did not thereby accept that disease material caused disease. 
Rather, he advocated a dynamic, that is, an immaterial, understanding of 
disease. In the introduction to the Organon, Hahnemann extensively criticizes 
the “Old Medicine” for presupposing in the treatment of diseases nothing other 
than material causes.103 He discounts this approach not only for its vain 
attempt to gain privileged access to the cause of disease, but also for 
augmenting patients' suffering: Bloodletting, drawing plasters, and emetics are 
just a few of the examples that Hahnemann cites to detail the 
counterproductive practices that the “Old Medicine” developed under the 
103 To read more about Hahnemann's criticism of materialistic theories of disease causation and their 
anatamo-political implications, see my essay on “The Embodiment of Chronic Disease in Heilkunst 
Medicine.”
215
misguided pretense that it had located the source of disease in disease tissue. 
Careful not to deny the degenerate materials visible in diseases, he 
nevertheless viewed them as nothing other than byproducts of disease such 
that the organism is always engendering new ones as long as it is suffering 
from disease. Like Schelling, he was critical of forms of empiricism that 
focused on the products of nature rather than on its processes. In the 
Organon, he accordingly discredits attempts to reduce disease to its final 
manifestation. “What nosologist,” he asks rhetorically, “ever saw with bodily 
eyes such a disease-matter, that he could so confidently speak of it and want 
to build a medical system upon it?” (§23.4). In his assessment, medical men 
were so overwhelmed by the absence of a sensible cause of disease that they 
devised a cause for themselves rather than acknowledge that health and 
disease involve a dynamic interplay between the organism and the 
environment and accordingly develop their capacities to observe these living 
processes. 
Although Hahnemann's sophisticated observations of contagion have 
been viewed by some as an early prototype of modern germ theory, his 
dynamic understanding of disease and related methods of observing living 
organisms distinguishes his understanding of etiology from the two pillars that 
would eventually provide the foundation for modern medicine: immunity and 
germ theory (Cohen 18). As Cohen observes, the concept of immunity-as-
defense “lends germ theory some of its legal force, helping it achieve the 
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status of natural law” (Introduction, location 162, par. 9). After all, the 
conviction that germs cause disease begs the question of why they cause 
disease in some organisms and not in others. Cohen argues that a defensive 
theory of immunity helped establish the supremacy of “germ theory” over other 
competing models of disease causality by addressing the fundamental 
question that it raised, that is, by accounting for how some remained 
unscathed by the presence of disease-causing pathogens (Introduction, 
location 162, par. 9). He understands this theoretical maneuver to be a 
definitive one: “Instead of evoking the organism's essential connection to the 
world in which it lives,” Cohen tells us, immunity-as-defense “refigures 
medicine as a powerful weapon in the body's necessary struggle to defend 
itself from its life-threatening context” (Introduction, location 171, par. 10). 
In direct contrast with this modern development, Hahnemann 
references the observation that some organisms are unaffected by the 
transmission of disease in order to discredit the theory that disease material 
causes disease. Rather than reinforce the theory that morbific agents cause 
disease by positing a defensive immunitary mechanism to save the 
phenomenon that would otherwise suggest that contagious diseases are 
discriminating, he dismisses it in light of the evidence. 
The causes of our diseases cannot be material, since 
even the slightest foreign material substance, even when 
it appears to us as ever so mild, brought into our blood 
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vessels is suddenly expelled by the Living Power 
(Lebenskraft), like a poison; or, where this is not the 
case, death is the consequence. 
[Materiell können die Ursachen unsrer Krankheiten nicht 
seyn, da die mindeste fremdartige materielle Substanz, 
sie scheine uns auch noch so mild, in unsre Blutgefäße 
gebracht, plötzlich, wie ein Gift, von der Lebenskraft 
ausgestoßen wird, oder, wo dieß nicht angeht, den Tod 
zur Folge hat (§23.1). 
Acknowledging that disease spreads through noxious disease material, in 
“Spirit of the Homeopathic Doctrine,” Hahnemann argues that if morbific 
injurious agents, which surround us every day and every hour, could derange 
health unconditionally, they would not leave a single person in good health. 
But this is not the case. He insists that disease is, for the most part, an 
exceptional state of human health, one that requires a number of enabling 
conditions on the side of both the disease agent and the affected individual. In 
other words, “the individual is so little liable to be affected by such injurious 
agencies, that they can never unconditionally make him ill” (627). 
Hahnemann's observation that such disease material does not have the power 
to derange unconditionally the health of an organism prevents him from 
venturing claims of material causation and, by extension, from assuming the 
kind of organic uniformity necessary to generalize the effects of medical 
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intervention. Instead, he accounts for the exemption of certain individuals from 
falling prey to communicable disease in terms of their unique capacity to 
maintain and restore equilibrium in relation with the environment. His 
understanding of Lebenskraft as an observable dynamic of simultaneous 
receptivity and resistance prevents him from positioning organisms in 
exclusively defensive relations with the world, as modern immunology would 
later do. By extension, his approach to preventing epidemics implies an 
alternative approach to individuating life and immunizing communities than 
that operative in the contemporary practice of vaccination. 
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Chapter Six: The Romanticization of Immunization 
In order to understand the significance of the “alternative” to vaccination that 
homeopathy represents, it is important to first acknowledge how deeply 
intertwined the histories of these disparate medical traditions are. While the 
homeopathic community would later develop to include some of the most 
salient critics of vaccination, on numerous occasions Hahnemann himself 
cited the efficacy of inoculation with cowpox against smallpox as a vivid 
confirmation of the “law of similars”—the medical principle that “like cures 
like,” which was the philosophical basis for his own remedial system. Yet, in 
contrast with the modern trajectory of Jenner's findings—findings that would 
rely on mathematical analyses for legitimation before discoveries in 
immunology could retroactively explain vaccination’s mechanism of action—
the observed efficacy of vaccination did not lack theoretical foundation within 
the context of homeopathy. Within Hahnemann's remedial system, vaccination 
not only did not require the calculus of probabilities to usher it into an 
accepted mode of rationality; its appropriation by homeopathy categorically 
precluded recourse to risk analysis. 
Hahnemann recognized in the prophylactic power of vaccination a 
preventative strategy that could be extended to protect people from other 
contagious diseases without actively introducing harm. In fact, the critical point 
that distinguishes his innovations from the modern development of vaccination 
is that Hahnemann was intent on developing this technique in a way that could 
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not possibly introduce an element of risk. Describing himself as a man of 
“conscientious scruples,” his fear of inadvertently bringing harm to patients in 
his efforts to heal them was so great that he abandoned his medical practice 
for some time, occupying himself with chemistry and literary pursuits until the 
sickness of his own children prompted him to return to the medical field in 
search of safe and effective forms of treatment (“Extract from a Letter” 512). 
Throughout his career, he maintained that a true remedial artist who works 
according to principles will never put the life of his patient in risk (Organon 
§285.1). His sustained observation of Lebenskraft's protective capacities 
prompted Hahnemann to look for non-invasive methods to stimulate this 
capacity rather than opt for methods of preventing disease that could actively 
introduce harm. 
Refusing on principle to justify a medical intervention in terms of its 
numerical advantages, Hahnemann's evaluation of vaccination stands in stark 
contrast with the medical arithmetic that would effectively dissolve the ethical 
difference between death or injury caused by disease versus by prophylactic 
intervention. That is, he was primarily concerned not with the relative safety of 
vaccination (as compared with variolation or natural exposure), but with its 
actual safety104—a concern evidenced by his reservations about the way 
104 This remained one of the most distinctive features of the homeopathic response to vaccination. In 
his nuanced and comprehensive reading of the late-nineteenth-century response of American 
homeopaths to smallpox vaccination, “Sectarian Identity and the Aim of Integration,” Eberhard 
Wolff identifies a remarkable concern about the side effects of vaccination as the most 
distinguishing feature of homeopathy's response to vaccines. While it was certainly not uncommon 
for critics of vaccination to emphasize its deleterious effects, conventional physicians in favour of 
the practice in orthodox and heterodox circles alike tended to defend it as a harmless procedure. Yet, 
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vaccines were administered and his continuous search for prophylactic 
strategies that were risk-free. Providing a fascinating counterhistory to the 
modern development of vaccination, Hahnemann's reception of Jenner's 
technique provides critical insight into the modern mechanisms that ushered 
vaccination into mainstream practice, and, more importantly, their historical 
contingency. 
Hahnemann's Initial Response to Infectious Disease  
Well before Jenner's discovery, Hahnemann considered the prevention of 
infectious disease to be a critically important area of medicine. In 1784 he 
worked briefly as a public health officer in the provincial town of Gommern, a 
post that had been established in response to the plea that the majority of the 
town would otherwise perish in the face of disease—and he continued to 
apply for such posts throughout his career (Jütte 18). Like other physicians 
vying for such prestigious positions, several of his early writings focus on 
preventative public health strategies105 and, in the absence of specific 
strikingly, in the homeopathic community, even pro-vaccination authors frequently stressed the side 
effects of vaccination. Although basically approving vaccination, Wolff finds, they were always 
aware of its potentially dangerous, long-term, effects. Furthermore, those who, despite the various 
side effects, nevertheless recommended the practice, only very rarely did so by weighing the risks 
and the benefits and concluding that the risks were fewer than those of withholding vaccination. 
More common was the optimism that any adverse effects from the vaccines could be in turn 
addressed with homeopathic remedies (106). In other words, homeopathic practitioners reached 
their decision to vaccinate not by relativizing the risks of vaccination to those of acquiring an 
infectious disease, nor by considering the net outcome of the procedure in view of the population (in 
order to argue, for example, that only a negligible fraction of it would fall prey to vaccination’s side 
effects). 
105 See, for example, the sections on “Protection Against Infection in Epidemic Diseases,” and 
“Suggestions for the Prevention of Epidemics in General, Especially in Towns.” 
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prophylactic protocols for the various contagious diseases of his time, 
Hahnemann found it necessary to provide general guidelines for preserving 
health.106 To this end, he advocated good hygiene, social distancing, 
conscientious diet, and supportive supplements, having witnessed such 
preventative strategies arrest an epidemic in full:
I have seen extremely malignant sporadic dysentery and 
putrid fever nipped in the bud at the very onset and 
without consequence by hygiene, good visitation 
guidelines, appropriate diet, and helpful medicaments. 
Yes, I have seen entire epidemics contained by the 
replication of similar efforts, like a swelling sea that is 
stopped by the dunes. I accordingly do not venture too 
much when I help clarify the nature of contagious 
diseases by making the following claim: in the early 
stages, epidemics are to a large extent easily 
suppressible diseases of the individual, which, through 
negligence and ignorance, degenerate into an angel of 
death and, finally, through the spread and accumulation 
of disease material, become infinitely more than they 
were when they first emerged. If I remove longstanding, 
106 “Now as we know of no specific antidotes for the several kinds of contagious matters, we must 
content ourselves with general prophylactic means. Some of these means are sometimes in the 
power of the patient, but most of them are solely available by the nurse, the physician, and the 
clergyman, who visit the sick” (“Protection Against Infection” 168). 
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unhealthy inclement weather, deficiency, and poverty 
from my consideration, the remaining blame must be 
placed almost exclusively on the institutions, nurses, and 
doctors who are in a position to create malicious 
diseases out of relatively mediocre ones through their 
poor conduct.
[Ich habe sehr bösartige sporadische Ruhren und 
Faulfieber gesehen, die durch Reinlichkeit, gut 
Aufwartung, zweckmäßige Diät, und hülfreiche 
Arzneymittel in ihrer Geburt ohne Folgen erstickt 
wurden. Ja, ganze Epidemien habe ich gesehen, die 
durch ähnliche nur vervielfältigter Bemühungen, wie das 
aufgeschwollene Meer durch Dünen, aufgehalten 
worden sind. Ich wage also nicht zu viel, wenn ich, um 
durch meine Aufmerksamkeit auch etwas zur Aufklärung 
der Natur ansteckender Krankheiten beizutragen, 
behaupte: dass Epidemien in ihren Anfängen 
gröstentheils leicht zu unterdrückende Krankheiten 
einzelner Personen sind, die nur durch Nachläßigkeit 
und Unwissenheit zu einem allgemeinen Würgeengel 
ausarten, und zulezt durch Mittheilung und Anhäufung 
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der Krankheitsmaterie unendlich mehr werden, als sie 
bey ihrer Entstehung waren. Nehme ich also eine 
anhaltend ungesunde Witterung, nehme ich Mangel und 
Armuth aus, so fällt die übrige Schuld fast allein auf 
Anstalten, Krankenwärter und Aerzte, die durch 
vereinigtes schlechtes Betragen allein schon im Stande 
sind, mittelmäßige Krankheiten zu bösartigen 
umzuschaffen.] (“Ueber ein katharralisches Faulfieber” 
35). 
In view of his understanding of the aspect of an organism's Lebenskraft that 
preserves its health [Lebens-Erhaltungs-Kraft], Hahnemann's initial response 
to epidemics emphasized the importance of effectively treating contagious 
diseases when they first emerge, at the level of the individual organism and its 
immediate surroundings, and of preventing them from spreading with proper 
regimen, lifestyle practices, and socially distancing. 
In Hahnemann's early writings on preventing the spread of infection, 
Kuzniar recognizes echoes of “the notion of guarding and protecting the self 
that inoculation and/or vaccination represent,” that is, that “a small dose of a 
poison will boost one in the face of a dangerous exposure” (Birth of 
Homeopathy, Ch. 3, location 2724, par. 61) or, in Hahnemann's words, that 
“[t]he Creator of mankind has so ordained that habit shall be a protector 
against many dangers” (“The Visitor of the Sick” 166). In particular, she points 
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to Hahnemann's writings on “Protection Against Infection in Epidemic 
Diseases,” where he advises clergymen and physicians who approach a sick 
patient to “see their patients more frequently, but each time stay beside them 
as short a time as possible” (169). Hahnemann's recommendations are based 
on his general opinion that “as in the case with accustoming ourselves to 
everything, the advance from one extreme to the other must be made with the 
utmost caution, and by very small degrees” (168-9). From this perspective, he 
believes that “only cautious nurses and physicians” can enjoy immunity from 
infection against epidemic diseases; that is, only those who “accustom 
themselves to it very gradually, continue to habituate themselves and employ 
various precautions in order not to be destroyed by the murderous exhalation” 
(167). Such precautions include keeping as far away from the sickbed as 
possible, arranging for the room to be aired before arrival (169), and, of no 
less importance, maintaining one's “mind and body in a good equilibrium” 
(170). 
While resonating with the general idea that careful exposure to disease 
can help establish later protection against it, Hahnemann's advice on how to 
most prudently approach communicable diseases differs from the modern 
development of vaccination in significant ways. Most notably, although 
Hahnemann recognizes that a toxin in small doses can ultimately strengthen 
an organism, he does not use this observation to formulate a general 
prophylactic strategy or to issue blanket recommendations. On the contrary, 
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he is careful to reserve his advice on approaching sick individuals to 
clergymen, physicians, nurses, and family members of the patient, that is, to 
those who cannot avoid exposure. Indeed, in view of the contagious nature of 
epidemic diseases, he considers it to be “highly criminal, [or] at least very 
imprudent, for the healthy lady to sit beside her deadly-sick gossip for hours at 
a time without the slightest necessity” (166). Since the casual visitor is “totally 
unused to the insidious miasm,” he argues that if she insists on visiting her 
infected friend, “she runs the greatest risk to her life. She may be happy if her 
imprudence does not make orphans of her children, or even cause the death 
of all of them, without any fault of theirs” (167). As indicated by this cautionary 
note, Hahnemann understood an organism's robustness against disease in 
terms of an ongoing and uniquely individual process of exchange with its 
environment rather than herald it as a state of immunity that can readily be 
achieved by all through a single encounter with disease material. He 
appropriately focused on an individual's unique susceptibility to infection 
instead of generalizing the risks of immunization across the population.
This perspective is also apparent in his general criticism of approaches 
to health that involve a defensive hardening of the organism, a list on which 
Kuzniar includes vaccination. In Hahnemann's commentary “On Making the 
Body Hardy,” published in 1792, he remarks that “modern hardening methods 
seem to bear a great resemblance to the incautious transference of hot-house 
plants to the open air in February” (194), a rather apt criticism of the naïve 
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assumptions surrounding the early practices of inoculation. That is, he 
criticizes modern methods of building robustness insofar as they have been 
removed from the necessary preparatory processes that nature always 
provides. As Hahnemann observes, 
Nature does nothing without preparation; all her operations are 
performed gradually, and the more complex and artistic the 
work is that she performs, so much the more cautiously and 
gradually does she do it. She never goes from summer to 
winter without interposing the transition period of autumn 
(193).
Extending this metaphor, Hahnemann urges his fellow physicians to “imitate 
nature – let us never make January to follow close upon June, nor July upon 
January, if we do not wish our tender plants to be blasted and withered by 
both of those extremes” (194). As a further precaution against exposing 
individuals to dangerous extremes, Hahnemann advises that each and every 
individual must be allowed to engage in such practices according to his own 
strength and “must be allowed to draw back when he wishes to do so” (196). 
And as we will see, the respect for an individual's unique balance of 
receptivity and resistance that Hahnemann expressed early in his medical 
career remains consistent throughout his later work on preventing epidemic 
disease, including his ambivalent reception of vaccination. 
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Hahnemann's Developing Views on Vaccination
At the time that Jenner first published his findings, although the German 
territories had significantly rebuilt the population they had lost during the Thirty 
Years' War, the aim of increasing the population was continually jeopardized 
by crop failures, famines, and epidemics. Government officials were 
particularly concerned about the high infant mortality rate. Roughly half of all 
children died before the age of six; many of them were victims of whooping 
cough, measles, scarlet fever, diphtheria, and above all, smallpox. Claudia 
Huerkamp reports: 
In years of severe smallpox epidemics, like 1766, 1786 
and 1801, more than 20 per cent of all deaths in Berlin 
were caused by smallpox. According to contemporary 
estimates, toward the end of the eighteenth century in 
the German states, there were 70,000 deaths a year 
from smallpox and in Prussia alone over 40,000 a year 
(62). 
According to late eighteenth-century German statistics, nearly one fifth of total 
deaths in the population was due to smallpox (Maehle, “Conflicting Attitudes,” 
200).  
Despite the general disinterest in or resistance to variolation, the hope 
that smallpox could one day be eradicated persisted as a central theme 
(Maehle, “Conflicting Attitudes,” 211). It is therefore of little surprise that 
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German physicians and government officials were eager to implement 
Jenner's method. After all, vaccination “offered an apparently harmless 
remedy for smallpox, which was easy to apply and avoided the dangers of 
inoculation” (Huerkamp 620). With less competition from older methods, such 
as variolation, Jenner's innovation of inoculation was embraced early 
(Baldwin 250). Unlike the diffusion of information about variolation that had 
circulated slowly over the course of a century, knowledge about Jenner's 
cowpox experiments spread rapidly. A German translation of the Inquiry was 
published in Hannover in 1799 (Jannetta 36), and since Britain was at war 
with France and the Netherlands when Jenner published his findings, 
Germany was the first foreign country to receive vaccine material, which was 
delivered as parcels of dried lymph the following year (Baldwin 250). The 
boards of health in all German states were urged to test vaccination and, 
once its efficacy could be demonstrated, encouraged to promote its 
widespread use. 
In view of the state's active engagement in the implementation of this 
prophylactic method, the medical profession—including university-trained 
physicians and barber-surgeons alike—recognized vaccination as a chance 
to increase their prestige and their influence on public health affairs. While 
state authorities had previously viewed as utopian the medical professions' 
efforts to bring the whole population under medical control, vaccination made 
this goal seem that much more attainable (Huerkamp 621-22), and quickly 
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became the most attractive field of intervention for the medical police (Wolff, 
Einschneidende, 25).107 Although Hahnemann continually positioned himself 
in antagonistic relation with the medical profession and its methods—which 
he himself had been taught at medical school but which he was quick to 
criticize (Handley 53; Thoms 174)—he recognized vaccination as one of the 
few effective techniques available to his contemporaries.108 
Indeed, despite his confidence in the possibility of mitigating the most 
devastating effects of contagious disease through healthful living, Hahnemann 
was still inclined to approve of Jenner's prophylactic strategy. Moreover, he 
considered the prevention of smallpox by cowpox inoculation to be a 
serendipitous discovery—a Glucksfund—that further confirmed his medical 
principle, “similia similibus” (“Auszug eines Briefs” 497). On several occasions, 
he explicitly references cowpox as an effective prophylactic measure against 
smallpox because of the similarity between these two diseases, that is, the 
similarity of the symptoms that they generate. As early as 1801, he writes that:
It is only in accordance with my well known maxim (the 
new principle) that small-pox, to give one example from 
107 Frank organized a vaccination trial in September 1801, vaccinating thirteen children at the General 
Hospital of Vienna. When none of the children reacted to the subsequent smallpox inoculation, this 
successful trial was used as official support for the method (Rusnock, “Medical Statistics,” 342), 
and Frank's followers enthusiastically embraced Jenner's protocol for their own purposes. In 
retrospect, Frank considered his endorsement of Jenner's method to be one of his finest moments 
(Cohen 270).
108  As Inge Christina Heinz observes, it was especially doctors, like Hahnemann, who were committed 
to the ideals of the Enlightenment and the hope of diminishing, or better yet eradicating, the effects 
of a devastating disease, who were most enthusiastic about the promise of vaccination (Heinz, 
“Hahnemann und die Pockenimpfung,” 181). And vaccination was, in the words of Wolff, a vivid 
incarnation of enlightenment ideals in practice (“Inkarnation praktizierter Aufklärung”) (Wolff, 
Einschneidende, 12).
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among many, has an important prophylactic in the cow-
pox, which is an exanthematous disease, whose 
pustules break out after the sixth day of inoculation, with 
pain and swelling of the axillary glands, pain in the back 
and loins and fever, and surrounded by an erythematous 
inflammation—that is to say, constituting altogether a 
disease very similar to variola (“Cure and Prevention of 
Scarlet Fever” 370). 
Notwithstanding its resonance with vaccination, it is important to note that 
Hahnemann's application of the principle of similars was primarily grounded in 
the observable processes induced by remedies on diseases producing similar 
symptoms rather than the mechanical transfer of disease material. His first 
expression of this principle, which would later become the foundation of his 
remedial system, appears in Hahnemann's translation of William Cullen's 
Treatise of Materia Medica in 1790. In an extended footnote, Hahnemann 
disputes Cullen's claim that Peruvian Bark effectively treats intermittent fever 
because of its “tonic” effect on the stomach. Referring to his own experiments 
ingesting the substance, he observes that it produces symptoms similar to 
those produced by the disease it is intended to treat and suggests that it was 
this similarity that was curative and nothing else (Handley 60-61; Jütte 2012, 
22). 
It was not until 1796 however—noted by many as the year in which 
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Jenner performed his first vaccination—that Hahnemann presented his 
hypothesis as a new principle of medicine. In an article published in 
Hufeland's Journal for Applied Medical Science, appropriately entitled, “Essay 
on a New Principle for Ascertaining the Curative Power of Drugs,” he offers a 
more detailed description of his proposed art of healing: 
Every powerful medicinal substance produces in the 
human body a kind of peculiar disease; the more 
powerful the medicine, the more peculiar, marked, and 
violent the disease. 
We should imitate nature, which sometimes cures a 
chronic disease by superadding another, and employ in 
the (especially chronic) disease we wish to cure, that 
medicine which is able to produce another very similar 
artificial disease, and the former will be cured; similia 
similibus (265, original emphasis). 
In the Organon, he specifies that a remedy can have a remedial effect when it 
excites an artificial disease in the organism that is not only similar to, but also 
more intense than, the natural disease (§26; §58.1). 
Although Hahnemann grounds his principle in the observation that the 
natural occurrence of a disease has the capacity to cure an existing chronic 
disease if it is sufficiently similar and stronger, he attempts to mimic this 
mechanism with medicine, which, insofar as it produces symptoms, he defines 
233
as a kind of artificial disease. He substantiates his proposed principle with 
numerous examples of the medicinal effects of various substances and their 
potential (or actual) use: he draws on cases of accidental poisonings, his own 
experiences testing remedies on himself, and examples from the 
contemporary medical literature. According to historian Rima Handley, 
Hahnemann had independently considered the injection of disease material to 
be an extension of his principle, but rejected it because of the risks involved in 
introducing matter derived from the human body (64). His wariness of applying 
the 'law of similars' with crude disease material is especially apparent in 
section 50 of the Organon. Having listed numerous examples in the medical 
literature of “the itch,” measles, and smallpox resolving diseases of similar 
symptomology in those infected, he adds that these morbific agents, though 
they have the potential to act as homeopathic remedies, are either more life-
threatening than the disease they are poised to cure or themselves require 
treatment. In both cases he considers their employment as homeopathic 
remedies to be difficult, uncertain, and dangerous. More specifically, he 
prefers the homeopathic application of remedies over the inoculation of 
disease material because the former can be diminished according to 
circumstances, while the latter must run its tedious course.109 Furthermore, he 
109 According to supporters of isopathy, it is possible to harness the curative power of disease material 
with the same precision that Hahnemann attributes to the administration of medicine, that is, by 
preparing and administering it in the same way that homeopathic remedies are prepared (i.e. through 
dilution and potentization). In a footnote added to section 56 of the Organon, Hahnemann addresses 
this mode of administering medicine as a method of curing a given diseaes by the same contagious 
principle that produces it. Responding to isopaths' attempts to displace homeopathy, the treatment of 
similars, with isopathy, the treatment of equals and the same, Hahnemann insists that, even granting 
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remarks, there are so few diseases that find their similar remedy in infectious 
diseases! And so, in order to both extend and perfect nature's method of 
curing disease through the principle of similars, he recognizes the importance 
of turning to remedies. 
It is, I think, in view of Hahnemann's acknowledgment of both the 
efficacy of Jenner's method and the inherent risks involved in its application 
that we can best understand the nuances of the former’s response to this 
prophylactic procedure. On the one hand, his identification of vaccination’s 
agreement with the principle of similars provided the basis for his 
understanding of its efficacy. In the Organon, Hahnemann references the 
observation that the contraction of smallpox can immediately lift a case of 
cowpox as an indication of the similarity between the two diseases and the 
greater intensity of smallpox. He reasons that although cowpox cannot, due to 
its relative weakness, entirely prevent smallpox, it can at least greatly diminish 
the malignancy of the disease.110 In view of this capacity, Hahnemann 
accordingly attributes the dramatic reduction of smallpox that he observed in 
his lifetime to the widespread acceptance of the procedure. In the sixth edition 
of his Organon, prepared in 1842,111 one year before his death, he observes 
that it is possible to cure a given disease by the same contagious principle that produces it, since the 
infectious agent is given to the patient in a highly potentized form, that is, in an altered condition, 
the resulting cure can be accomplished by nothing other than the principle of similars. See Decker 
and Verspoor, “Hahnemann's Views on Isopathy and Isopathic Remedies,” 38-40. 
110 As Rudi Verspoor explicates, “[t]he conclusion is that the weaker similar disease (cowpox) does not 
act preventatively against the incoming disease but lessens its impact.”  
111 “Due to a combination of adverse circumstance this manuscript remained unpublished for 79 years, 
until Richard Haehl (1921) and William Boericke (1922) edited and published German and English 
editions respectively” (Schmidt 42). 
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that since the general distribution of Jenner's Cow Pox vaccination, human 
smallpox never appeared as epidemically or as virulently as it did forty years 
before its introduction when some cities lost at least one half and often three-
quarters of its children to this miserable disease (footnote 47; §46; see 
Organon-Synopse 339). On the other hand, Hahnemann's understanding of 
vaccination’s mechanism of action did not blind him to the potential risks of the 
procedure. His careful attention to the process of symptom formation induced 
in an organism by the deliberate transfer of disease – and general preference 
for gradual, incremental exposure over abrupt transplantation – prompted him 
to also hone in on the adverse effects of this medical intervention. He 
accordingly expressed concern over the possible contaminants conveyed 
through arm-to-arm transmission, and considered it both safer and more 
effective to obtain cowpox material from cow udders rather than from the arms 
of poor children. In a letter to Dr. Schreeter of Lemberg, for example, written 
on 19 December 1831, Hahnemann expresses his preference for inoculation 
with cowpox material derived directly from the cow, and offers practical advice 
when this is unavailable:
In order to provide the dear little Patty with the protective 
cow pox, the safest plan would certainly be to obtain the 
lymph direct from the cow; but if this cannot be done . . . I 
would advise you to inoculate another child with the 
protective pox, and as soon as slight redness of the 
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puncture shows it has taken, I would immediately for two 
successive days give Sulphur 1-30, and inoculate your 
child from the pox that it produced (qtd. in Davidovitch 
13).112 
Further substantiating his preference for cow lymph, in a letter to Clemens 
Bönninghausen, dated 13 May 1832, Hahnemann expresses his concerns 
about the unintended infections transmitted by arm-to-arm vaccination: 
I have been spared from those infected by the malignant 
smallpox, who are not seldom circulating here. Why do 
we not graft cowpox directly on the udders of cows, 
which would certainly provide more protection and avoid 
the danger of transmitting Psora that exists when 
vaccine material from sick children is used?
[Von bösartigen Menschenpocken-Kranken bin ich noch 
verschont geblieben, die hier herum nicht selten sind. 
Warum pflanzt man die Kuhpocken nicht an Kuheitern 
fort, da diese gewiß mehr schützen werden und wobei 
man nicht Gefahr läuft, Psora mit einzuimpften, wie 
durch den Impfstoff von elenden Kindern?] (57-58).
Notwithstanding these concerns, in both his publications and letters written to 
colleagues, Hahnemann remained an unambiguous supporter of vaccination. 
112 For the original letter by Hahnemann, see “Briefe an Dr. Schréter in Lemberg.”
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Though he expressed reservations about the safety of how it was being 
administered, his conviction about its mechanism of action prompted him to 
refine the technique rather than abandon the underlying principle. This 
nuanced position is perhaps most clearly articulated in a letter written on 3 
January 1825 to Herr Gevatter, regarding critics of vaccination. On the one 
hand, Hahnemann recognizes in vaccination the therapeutic principle 
underlying his own teachings; on the other hand, he insists that criticisms of 
the practice can only ever help to improve the method of vaccination. After 
comparing those who criticize his remedial system with those who resisted the 
truth of Martin Luther's reformation, he turns to the subject of anti-vaccination:
What harm have the shameful refutations of the cowpox 
inoculation done? Nothing, absolutely nothing! In fact, 
they have contributed to the excellence of vaccination 
by demanding more thorough examination and 
understanding. No need to worry! Everyone stands by 
the truth, which can be neither blurred nor corrupted. In 
the future people will stick more to my words of 
experience. 
[Was haben die schädlichen Gegenschriften der 
Kuhpockenimpfung geschadet? Nichts, garnichts! Sie 
haben mehr dazu gedient, ihre Vortrefflichkeit desto 
gründlicher zu untersuchen und einzusehen. Also nur 
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ruhig! Ein Jeder bleibe bei der Wahrheit stehen; diese 
kann nun nicht weiter verwischt, auch nicht verfälscht 
werden. Man wird sich doch dereinst mehr an meine 
Erfahrungsworte halten] (390).
While he was clearly interested in refining the technique rather than 
abandoning the principle of vaccination, in his own practice, Hahnemann did 
not always consider inoculation with cowpox to be a viable option, and he 
accordingly sought gentler alternatives for his sensitive patients. As Inge 
Heinz observes in her comprehensive review of Hahnemann's treatment of the 
Prussian Princess Luise, he was certainly aware of, and at least in her case 
showed preference for, prophylactic alternatives to vaccination. In March of 
1833, the princess wrote to Hahnemann for advice about how she and her 
family could protect themselves from contracting the smallpox that had been 
circulating in their community. Assuming that the princess' vaccination from 
thirty years ago would no longer be effective, Hahnemann nevertheless did 
not recommend revaccination. In a letter written in April 1833 to the Princess' 
general practitioner Aegidi, Hahnemann writes: 
I have experienced on several occasions an entire 
family, in which one of its members had smallpox, 
remain protected when I let every family member smell 
rhus toxicodendron every 10-14 days. You could do this 
for both princes. The princess herself, however, is much 
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too sensitive for such a remedy. She has to keep her 
distance from people who have been in smallpox-
infected households. For her there is no other 
preventative remedy. 
[Ich habe einige Erfahrung gemacht, daß ganze 
Familien, in deren Haus ein Pockenkranker entstand, 
geschützt worden, in dem ich jedes Familienmitglied alle 
10-14 Tage einmal an toxic [rhus toxicodendron] riechen 
ließ. Dieß könnten Sie mit den beiden Prinzen thun. Die 
Prinzessin selbst aber is viel zu reizbar gegen eine 
solche Arznei. Diese muß sich bloß vor / Nähe von / 
Personen hüten, die in Pockenhäusern gewesen sind. 
Anders giebts für dieselbe kein Vorbauung Mittel] (qtd. in 
Heinz 193).
Indicative of his emphasis on the singularity of an individual's susceptibility, 
even in the case of prescribing homeopathic remedies specifically prepared to 
ensure safe administration, he did not issue blanket recommendations: for the 
princess' sensitive disposition, he considered social distancing to be the only 
available option. In response to the princess' expressed preference for 
homeopathic alternatives to vaccination, for the princes he extended Jenner's 
prophylactic principles to the use of homeopathically prepared remedies. 
As evidenced by his early writings on prevention epidemic diseases, 
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Hahnemann was well aware that infection occurs most frequently and most 
fatally in previously unexposed individuals. And it is with this dynamic 
understanding of contagion that Hahnemann advised, on the one hand, highly 
susceptible individuals (such as Princess Luise) to avoid social contact when 
a contagious disease is in circulation and, on the other hand, that he 
recognized that robustness is acquired through continual re-exposure, a 
process that he endeavored to facilitate with the use of homeopathically 
selected remedies. Approaching contagion and immunity as a delicate 
interchange between an organism and its environment, Hahnemann 
consistently favoured individualized recommendations. His nuanced 
understanding of disease etiology precluded uniform prescriptions. 
From this perspective, it is not surprising that Hahnemann was 
prepared to acknowledge that the protection provided by vaccination was 
neither absolute nor lifelong. Demonstrating the development of his thought, 
Hahnemann was initially open to the suggestion that the protection provided 
by cowpox could last an entire lifetime. In the second (1819), third (1824), and 
fourth (1829) editions of his Organon, he reasoned that since, as a rule, the 
human organism usually contracts only one disease of this kind (smallpox or 
cowpox) in a lifetime, susceptibility to smallpox can be prevented for life: 
So cowpox brings forth a disease that is very 
similar (homeopathically) to smallpox, which, after 
it has run its course, all susceptibility of the human 
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body to cowpox or smallpox is prevented for a 
lifetime, because the human body is, as a rule, 
capable of having only one of this once-in-a-
lifetime kind of disease (cowpox or smallpox). 
[So bringt die Kuhpocke eine der Menschenpocke 
sehr ähnliche (homöopathische) Krankheit hervor, 
nach deren Verfluß, da der menschliche Körper in 
der Regel nur einer im Leben einmaligen Krankheit 
dieser Art (der Kuhpocke, oder der 
Menschenpocke) fähig ist, alle Ansteckbarkeit 
desselben durch (Kuh- oder) Menschenpocke auf 
Lebzeiten gehoben ist (Organon-Synopse 193).] 
But by the fifth edition, published in 1833, this passage had been omitted, and 
we know from his case notes for Princess Luise that he did not expect her to 
still be immune thirty years after being vaccinated (Heinz 192).113 Unrestrained 
by the epistemology of risk analysis and its suppression of waning or failed 
immunity, Hahnemann's romantic proclivity for honing in on individual 
variations led him to adopt what is retrospectively considered to be a more 
sophisticated and nuanced understanding of immunity than most early 
113 Directly involved in the practice of vaccination, like Hahnemann, Hufeland also did not show 
unrestrained enthusiasm for vaccination. Although he was instrumental in introducing and 
popularizing the procedure in Germany, he was skeptical that it could provide lifelong protection. 
Based on numerous articles published in his journal on the subject and his own experience, he 
eventually introduced revaccination at a later point in time to achieve longer-lasting protection 
(Pfeifer, Medizin der Goethezeit,197). 
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supporters of variolation and vaccination. 
Dynamize the Medicine to Singularize the Response
It was early in his reception of vaccination that Hahnemann recognized in the 
procedure a principle that could be further developed to prevent the spread of 
contagious diseases in a safe and effective way. In 1801 he extended his 
understanding of Jenner's findings to the use of belladonna in the prevention 
of scarlet fever, arguing that its mechanism is the same as cowpox inoculation 
against smallpox, namely, that the remedy generates symptoms similar to 
those of the disease it is meant to prevent. In view of the remedy's capacity to 
immediately arrest the development of scarlet fever when administered at the 
onset of the disease, Hahnemann reasoned that its most effective use would 
be prophylactic. In an article outlining the process of his discovery, he 
describes how his suspicion was confirmed when he observed three children 
of a family fall ill to scarlet fever, while the eldest daughter, who happened to 
be taking belladonna for another complaint, remained untouched by the 
epidemic that surrounded her, even though she was usually the first in her 
family to be infected by a contagious disease. After prescribing the remedy to 
the five other children in the family as a precautionary measure, a dose which 
they repeated every seventy-two hours, they all remained well throughout the 
entire epidemic, without the slightest indication of the disease. Acknowledging 
that these observations needed to be further corroborated before any firm 
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conclusions could be drawn, Hahnemann called on others to test his 
hypothesis carefully and impartially and to refrain from hastily discrediting it 
with the slightest counterevidence. Echoing Jenner's sentiments, he writes, “I 
should esteem myself happy if I should see, some years hence, this scourge 
of mankind in any measure diminished by my labours” (“Cure and Prevention 
of Scarlet Fever” 370). 
Despite his early hopes that belladonna would, like cowpox, 
significantly reduce the incidences of a potentially dangerous and contagious 
childhood disease, Hahnemann's reported observations were met with 
considerable skepticism. His attempt to distribute the remedy to subscribers 
who paid in advance for his observations “On the Cure and Prevention of 
Scarlet Fever” subjected him to accusations of being a mercenary that would 
follow him for years to come (Jütte 17). Adding to the controversy, Hahnemann 
recommended a diluted—or, more precisely, a potentized—form of 
belladonna, which could not possibly have a biochemical effect—an aspect of 
homeopathy that remains contentious to this day.114 
In defense of his recommendation, in an essay “On the Power of Small 
Doses of Medicine” Hahnemann argued that the pertinent question was not, 
as skeptics suggested, “what effect can 1/100 000th part of a grain of 
belladonna have?” but rather, “what effect has 1/100 000th part of a grain of 
114 For a summary of the controversy surrounding the dilution of homeopathic remedies and pertinent 
scientific studies, see Jacobi, “Der Hochpotenzstreit,” and Der Hochpotenzstreit von Hahnemann 
bis Heute. See Kuzniar's “Romantic Vitalism” for a fascinating review of how Hahnemann's use of 
potentized remedies reveals his romantic influences. 
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belladonna?” (385-86; my emphasis). Submitting the question to medical 
observation, Hahnemann acknowledged that a dry pill of extract of belladonna
would usually not produce any effect on a perfectly healthy countryman or 
laborer, but that this by no means meant that the same dose would be too 
weak if the same man, or a similar man, was ill (or if the grain was given in a 
solution). He cites examples of individuals who are sick or predisposed to 
sickness reacting with extreme sensitivity to food, drink, or medicine that they 
would not exhibit in a state of health: 
What an enormous quantity of freshly made soup it 
would take to excite a healthy stomach to violent 
vomiting! But look, the patient ill of an acute fever does 
not require a drop for this purpose; the mere smell of it, 
perhaps the millionth part of a drop, coming in contact 
with the mucous membrane of the nose, suffices to 
produce this result (388). 
Stating what he considers to be a self-evident principle of medical practice, 
Hahnemann argues that if, excepting himself, no other physician has ever 
observed the remarkable action of belladonna (or of other medicines) in 
minute doses, it is, in part, due to the fact that physicians' ignorance of the 
dynamic action of medicines prevents them from designing such experiments 
(387). For Hahnemann, it was obvious that an organism's inner disposition 
altered its receptivity to the environment and, in turn, that its receptivity to the 
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environment altered its inner disposition. He accordingly interpreted varying 
reactions among individuals exposed to the same disease or remedy as 
evidence that disease is a function of dynamic interchange rather than the 
result of mechanical causation. In short, his method of observing symptom 
formation as a process elicited by potentized remedies both reinforced and 
was reinforced by his dynamic understanding of disease etiology. And he was 
keenly aware that a materialistic or mechanistic conception of disease would 
preclude the kind of observation necessary to draw the conclusions that he 
drew. 
Rather than deny individual nuances by generalizing a standard 
response across the population, Hahnemann's method was developed in light 
of these fundamental differences. In the prevention of scarlet fever, for 
example, the homeopathic dilution of belladonna was designed to alter the 
receptivity of an organism that is susceptible to contagion by scarlet fever and, 
insofar as belladonna produces a similar, artificial disease, is responsive also 
to its action. As Hahnemann acknowledges, if a healthy labourer is not 
susceptible to the disease, the remedy will have no effect. In other words, the 
remedy is prepared in such a way as to not have an effect on an organism 
unless it is well-indicated.  
Refusing to posit uniformity or necessity in the distribution of disease, 
and then account for exceptions, Hahnemann instead based his approach on 
the infinite variability of health and disease and the irreducible singularity of an 
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organism's interaction with its surroundings. In the Organon, for example, it is 
in view of the fact that exposure to disease cannot produce illness in every 
one, nor at all times, that Hahnemann expresses his preferences for the use 
of remedies over inoculated disease material in introducing artificial disease to 
an organism: he finds the living organism to be much more disposed to, and to 
have a greater chance of being affected by, medicine than by infectious 
agents (§31; 32). From this perspective, his preference for using homeopathic 
remedies over inoculated disease material as a prophylactic measure was 
informed not only by his interest in reducing the risks of medical intervention, 
but also in enhancing its efficacy. After all, the fact that certain people may not 
be susceptible to a certain disease at a certain time accounts not only for the 
fact that some resist illness during an epidemic, but also for the fact that some 
resist the deliberate injection of disease material, that is, that some fail to 
respond to immunization. While the problem of failed and waning immunity 
was suppressed by risk analysts who were concerned that this element of 
uncertainty would compromise people's willingness to assume the risks of 
immunization, Hahnemann's prophylactic methods allowed for a diversity of 
responses to treatment. Rather than deny the singularity of an individual's 
response to both disease and medical intervention, the efficacy of 
homeoprophylaxis was explained explicitly in terms of an individual's unique 
susceptibility. 
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Finally, while I have emphasized the way in which Hahnemann's 
respect for individual variation coincides with his ethical commitment to first do 
no harm, it is important to recognize how it also follows from his distinctly 
romantic capacity to observe organisms as differentiated unities, even at the 
level of the population. In section 102 of the Organon, he demonstrates his 
capacity to extend the method of observing the totality of symptoms in 
individual organisms to the community as a whole in the general instructions 
he provides for selecting a homeopathic remedy for epidemics. He advises 
that, although all those infected by an epidemic disease are infected with the 
same disease,115 the entirety of the disease and the totality of its symptoms 
cannot be observed in a single individual patient. In order to select the 
appropriate homeopathic remedy to both prevent and treat the epidemic 
disease, he instructs, it is necessary to observe its manifestations in several 
patients of different physical constitutional. That it, it is only by observing the 
myriad, differentiated, expressions of an epidemic disease that one can 
ascertain its unity as a distinct, remedial, entity. By extension, it is only by 
observing the multiplicity of individuals in their irreducible singularity, that one 
can effectively address community health. 
Hufeland's Reception of Homeopathy  
Hahnemann's method of preventing epidemics without abstracting the 
115 Note, he does not say that the different manifestations of disease observed in different patients are in 
fact different diseases. 
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community from the multiplicity of individuals that comprise it proved to be 
effective. Although his effort to prevent scarlet fever with the prophylactic 
administration of belladonna is most often remembered for the initial 
controversy it sparked, the efficacy of his method was later confirmed by 
numerous physicians. In 1807, six years after Hahnemann first published his 
observations, Hufeland called on doctors and non-doctors alike to report their 
findings on using belladonna to prevent scarlet fever („Anfrage an Aerzte und 
Nichtärzte über das Hahnemannsche Präservatif gegen das Scharlachfieber“).
He asserted that when a respected doctor like Hahnemann believes to have 
found an effective strategy for preventing a virulent disease like scarlet fever, 
which Hufeland believed to have taken the place of smallpox in terms of its 
seriousness, the entire medical community should be attentive (162). Based 
on his experience of the protective properties of cowpox against smallpox, 
Hufeland was convinced that it was possible to alter the susceptibility of an 
organism to a specific contagious disease by qualitatively altering the 
receptivity of the organism (die „Aufhebung der Empfänglichkeit des 
Organismus“) (162). He found it highly probable that the protective 
mechanism operative in vaccination could be extended to infectious diseases 
other than smallpox and found no reason to doubt that a remedy could alter 
the susceptibility of an organism as effectively as inoculation with disease 
material derived from animals (163). In view of its potentially far-reaching 
implications for public health, he regretted that Hahnemann had received so 
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much grief regarding his use of small doses, and reminded physicians that this 
practice was based on many years of studying the effects of medicinal 
substances on human organisms. He considered the criticisms to be 
unscientific, and reinforced Hahnemann's call to other physicians to observe 
the effects of diluted belladonna rather than preclude their possibility. For his 
part, Hufeland had witnessed entire regions spared from infection where 
Hahnemann's recommendations had been followed, and took it upon himself 
to report his observations in an unbiased way that urged other physicians to 
follow suit (164). 
Over the course of twenty years, Hufeland collected responses from 
physicians and published them in a book, The Protective Power of Belladonna 
against Scarlet Fever Subjected to Further Examination (Die Schutzkraft der 
Belladonna gegen das Scharlachfieber zu fernerer Prüfung aufgestellt).116 Dr. 
Düsterberg from Warburg, for example, reports that, having administered 
belladonna during three outbreaks of scarlet fever, he was convinced that, 
even if it did not provide complete protection, that its prophylactic powers were 
as reliable as those of vaccination (78-9). Drawing on seven years of clinical 
experience, Dr. Muhrbeck from Demmin similarly compares the protective 
action of belladonna against scarlet fever with vaccination against smallpox, 
though he speculates that the former is probably of much shorter duration 
116 According to Ameke, Dr. Jani of Gera was the first to write about Hahnemann's remedy and 
prophylactic for scarlet fever, Belladonna, concluding as early as 1800 that although it provided 
good results in several cases, it was not an unconditional prophylactic. Jani reasoned that 
Hahnemann's observations may have been made under more favourable conditions (175).
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than the former (68). 
In view of the extensive corroborating evidence that he received, 
Hufeland concluded that belladonna has the power to protect an organism 
from scarlet fever, albeit not absolutely—as nothing in medicine is absolute—
but with conditions and exceptions (224). At the time that he published his 
study, he acknowledged that the duration of protection offered by belladonna 
had not yet been measured and found it unreasonable to assume that it would 
be lifelong, but that even protection during a single epidemic would be 
valuable for humanity (218). In his opinion, the fact that the efficacy of the 
remedy had so many confirmations and, more importantly, that it in itself did 
not risk harming the organism, made it advisable for physicians to use it every 
time there was a danger of infection, especially in the case of particularly 
dangerous epidemics. Even in the case of relatively mild outbreaks he 
recommended its use, since an individual's unique disposition can transform a 
harmless disease into a very malignant and dangerous case (98). He 
reasoned that otherwise it would be difficult for a physician to avoid the burden 
of knowing that he had not done everything in his power to prevent a 
potentially life-threatening disease,117 a consideration that has significantly 
different implications when the prophylactic method does not itself introduce 
an element of harm.118 
117 “Du hättest vielleicht dieses Unglück verhüten können. Du hast wenigstens nicht alles, was in 
deiner Gewalt war, gethan, um es zu verhüten” (226).
118 According to Kuzniar, despite his early support of vaccination, “Hufeland himself was later to 
recommend against the smallpox vaccination because it represented to him an invasion of the body's 
integrity” (Birth of Homeopathy, Ch. 3, location 2722, par. 61).  
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In view of the documented success of belladonna in preventing cases of 
scarlet fever, in his essay on homeopathy and its place in a rational system of 
medicine, Hufeland identified the task of discerning specific remedies for 
various contagious disease as the most important work that homeopaths 
could pursue (12; 44). Although he ultimately rejected Hahnemann's attempt 
to replace the existing system of medicine with a new remedial system based 
exclusively on the law of similars, Hufeland acknowledged the importance of 
the homeopathic method within the wider context of a rational medical system. 
His own observations had convinced him that homeopathy is sometimes 
highly remarkable and has offered effective relief even when other, more 
invasive, methods have proven to be ineffective (16-17). He recognized in the 
principle of similars an effective method of addressing disease and found it 
indisputable that Hahnemann's method of observation had offered new insight 
into the deep inner workings of the organism, which helped carry this principle
—as old as medicine itself—further. Most importantly, he celebrated 
Hahnemann's development of administering remedies in accordance with the 
law of similars in a way that never directly harmed the organism.119 
Largely unacknowledged in the history of medicine, Hufeland's 
endorsement, albeit qualified, of homeoprophylaxis points to an alternative 
development than that offered by the modern uptake of vaccination. It 
represents a true alternative insofar as the generalization of risks across the 
119 To read more about Hufeland's ambivalent reception of homeopathy, see Saeger, Über: Die Stellung 
Hufelands zur Homöopathie and Thoms, “Konfliktfall Homöopathie. Die klinischen Versuche zur 
Prüfung des Wertes der Homöopathie beim Militär und in der Berliner Charité 1820 bis 1840.” 
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population, operative in the distribution of vaccination, is precluded by an 
approach to life that acknowledges the irreducible singularity of an organism's 
interaction with its environment, follows the medical maxim of non-
maleficence, and, by extension, does not violently abstract the health of the 
community from that of its members. By pursuing the possibility that a medical 
intervention can effectively prevent infectious disease without introducing risk 
to the very lives in need of protection, this untold chapter suggests a new way 
of understanding biopolitics. It is a story that prompts us to consider the 
possibility that the paradox at the heart of biopolitics—the fact that our efforts 
to promote life often endanger it—is in fact historically contingent. 
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Conclusion: A Conscientious Objection 
Before 'conscientious objection' acquired its contemporary meaning as the 
right to refuse conscription to the military, the term was originally applied to 
those who resisted mandatory vaccination (Durbach Introduction, location 
302, par. 20). But its extended use in the context of war remains apt.120 In both 
cases, the objection is issued in an effort to disengage from a war waged by 
others against a perceived enemy. While there were usually allowances made 
for medical exemptions, those who otherwise refused their responsibility to the 
public have historically been criticized by government officials and subjected 
to significant public pressure. Regardless of the particular nuances of their 
arguments, “nay sayers” continue to evoke hostility insofar as they are thought 
to benefit from the sacrifices of others without themselves contributing to the 
social good. What “reason” can there possibly be to remain under the shelter 
of homeland security without actively defending the front lines? 
The most compelling reason, I find, is that the current strategies of war 
may not actually protect us. Although I can sympathize with the righteous 
indignation that arises in response to the free-rider phenomenon, I contend 
that in the case of conscientious objection, this reaction misses the mark 
120 In making this assertion, I clearly part ways with Susan Sontag's response to the militarization of 
medicine as a uniquely destructive metaphor and corresponding call to “Give it back to the war-
makers” (95). Though I am equally, if not more, critical of approaches to health that initiate a 
defensive attack on pathogens, thus turning the body into a battlefield, I adamantly do not agree that 
this problem is best addressed by changing our metaphors. On the contrary, I contend that such an 
approach threatens to obscure our capacity to recognize militaristic approaches to medicine as such 
and, by extension, to dismantle the epistemological and ontological assumptions that inform them. I 
accordingly find it much more fitting to use militaristic language to describe militaristic approaches 
to disease. 
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insofar as it fails to recognize that the conviction that “war is not the answer” is 
not only a declaration of conscience but also a serious critique of what does 
not work (Wallis).121 While it may well be that certain “conchies” are motivated 
by cowardice rather than nobility and that certain vaccine refusers are secretly 
trying to enjoy a free ride under the pretense of political activism, an important 
critical perspective is lost when our debates center on either pointing out or 
defending such apparent hypocrisy. Stated otherwise, the categorical criticism 
of all those who resist enlistment into a war of uncertain efficacy fails to 
sufficiently question whether the collective action from which some wish to 
exempt themselves in fact generates a social good. 
In the case of immunizing communities, the observation that we may 
actually need continual exposure to pathogens in order to build robust 
immunity is a humbling one. It points to the hubris of the modern quest for 
immunity, which denies the essential symbiotic relationships through which we 
acquire our strength. And it provides a vivid example of the fact that, however 
vigilant we may be, engaging in a state of perpetual war often does little to 
protect us from the declared enemy. As German romantic physicians were 
keenly aware, the preservation of life requires ongoing exposure to 
challenging stimuli. 
If the smallpox eradication campaign is any indication, even annihilating 
121 As Cooper observes, “In the year 2000 the World Health Organization (WHO) officially announced 
that the truce [with pathogens] was over: the return of infectious diseases worldwide represented a 
deadlier threat than war; we had been caught off guard; the microbes had been preparing an 
underground counter-resistance just when we thought we were finally safe” (115).
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an infectious disease by interrupting all possible paths of transmission does 
not thereby render a population invulnerable.122 As evidenced by the 
bioterrorism threats that emerged after the WHO declared the eradication of 
smallpox, it is precisely because a disease is no longer in circulation that the 
population is rendered especially susceptible to infection. While the smallpox 
incident is often referenced to highlight the ways in which, in a state of war, 
medical advances are often perverted to destroy rather than preserve life, it 
also points to another paradox, one inherent in the efficacy of all mass 
vaccination campaigns: when a disease is no longer in circulation, a 
population can no longer build immunity to it. 
As Claire-Anne Siegrist explains, the long-term protection associated 
with live attenuated viral vaccines, such as measles, rubella, and varicella 
vaccines – which are considered to be prototypical inducers of lifelong 
immunity – is derived in part “from the induction of sustained antibody 
responses, which, however, tend to slowly decline in the absence of recurrent 
exposure and might eventually result in a growing proportion of seronegative 
vaccinated young adults, including women of childbearing age” (26). In other 
words, the capacity for vaccinations to provide longterm protection is 
122 The smallpox virus, widely thought to have been eradicated worldwide through vaccination, is now 
known to exist in only two laboratories: one in the United States and one in Russia. While the World 
Health Organization has set a number of deadlines for the destruction of these stores, neither 
country has complied. As Biss observes: “Smallpox has now ceased to be a disease and is only a 
potential weapon. And even if the last stores are destroyed, it may remain a weapon. There is plenty 
we do not know about smallpox, including why it is such a virulent disease, but we know enough, in 
theory, to resurrect it in a laboratory” (Biss 86). For a detailed account of the campaign to eradicate 
smallpox and the threat of bioterrorism, see Henderson, Smallpox. 
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compromised by the efficacy with which they interrupt the transmission of 
pathogens. This synergistic relationship between disease circulation and 
immunity gives literal meaning to the observation that “vaccines are the 
victims of their own success.” While this truism is often repeated to lament the 
fact that vaccine compliance decreases when vaccines effectively reduce the 
incidents of infectious disease such that people are no longer willing to 
assume the risks of vaccination, the fact that vaccine efficacy also decreases 
is often overlooked. 
But a recent resurgence of vaccine-preventable diseases in populations 
with high vaccine coverage has raised critical questions about the impact that 
waning immunity has on generating problematic patterns of susceptibility in 
the population. Back when diseases still circulated freely, individuals who 
enjoyed “lifelong” immunity not only survived their own bout of disease; they 
were also continually re-exposed whenever another epidemic broke out. And 
in larger cities where the disease was endemic, exposure was constant. In 
contrast, the “quasi-sterile epidemiological situations” manufactured by the 
“extinction of smallpox and attempts to eradicate measles virus or poliovirus” 
actually “increase the risk of outbreaks, be it by mutational selection or 
biological warfare. Under such conditions, unhindered reemergence of old 
pathogens could be like the first smallpox encounter in Europe during the 
fourteenth century” (Navarini et al. 115): in a word, devastating.123 
123 In Society Must be Defended, Foucault presents human intervention in the circulation of viruses as a 
paradigmatic example of biopower's unbridled capacity for widespread destruction. More 
specifically, he warns that such an “excess of biopower”:
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This unintended consequence of mass vaccination is brought to the 
fore in a paper by epidemiologists J.M Heffernan and M.J Keeling, in which 
they examine the “Implications of Vaccination and Waning Immunity.” 
Heffernan and Keeling incorporate the relatively recent immunological 
postulate that “the continued lifelong immunity observed for many diseases 
could be the product of waning immunity and immune boosting through 
continued exposure to infection” (2071) into their calculations of the outcomes 
of mass vaccination programs. More concretely, they reason that “in the 
absence of vaccination, lifelong immunity is maintained through frequent 
encounters with infection, which acts to boost the waning immune memory . . . 
However, when vaccination is introduced the prevalence of infection declines, 
which in turn reduces the amount of boosting and hence the level of immunity” 
(2078). With this immunological insight, they remain in agreement with 
previous epidemiological models that vaccination will likely reduce “the 
number of newborn susceptibles and hence should have some of the usual 
public-health benefits reducing the number of cases in young children” (2076). 
However, they also warn that “this reduction in cases will lead to a reduction in 
boosting and therefore a greater susceptibility to infection in older age 
classes” (2076). Aware that “vaccination can have a range of unexpected 
consequences,” they predict that “after a long disease-free period, the 
appears when it becomes technologically and politically possible for man not only to 
manage life but to make it proliferate, to create living matter, to build the monster, and 
ultimately, to build viruses that cannot be controlled and that are universally destructive. 
This formidable extension of biopower, unlike what I was just saying about atomic power, 
will put it beyond all human sovereignty (254).
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introduction of infection will lead to far larger epidemics than that predicted by 
standard models” (2071).124
In view of the fact that the decreased circulation of viruses achieved by 
mass childhood vaccination can actually increase susceptibility in certain 
populations to the re-importation of such diseases, the most commonly 
proposed solution is simply to vaccinate and revaccinate more people, earlier 
and more often. While early supporters of immunization were concerned that 
instances of infection in 'immunized' individuals could be used to discredit the 
procedure’s efficacy, the widely acknowledged fact of imperfect immunity is 
today used not to undermine mass immunization, but to defend it. 
Summarizing this argument, Biss acknowledges that any given vaccine can 
fail to produce immunity in an individual and that some vaccines are less 
effective than others. But, she insists that “when enough people are 
vaccinated with even a relatively ineffective vaccine, viruses have trouble 
moving from host to host and cease to spread, sparing both the unvaccinated 
and those in whom vaccination has not produced immunity” (22). After all, 
when the observation that vaccine-induced protection can fail or wane is 
considered in view of the indirect protection that vaccines provide, “mass 
vaccination becomes far more effective than individual vaccination” (22). In 
124 In the case of measles, although routine infant vaccination initially achieved a dramatic reduction of 
the disease in all countries where programs had been implemented, in recent years, measles has 
made a comeback in populations in which effective vaccination programs have been in place for 
decades: the United States of America, Australia, England, Germany, and other European countries. 
This resurgence has prompted researchers to revise estimates of the vaccination coverage needed, to 
prevent the virus from circulating, to more than ninety-four percent of the entire population 
(Holzmann et al. 204-05).
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short, the fact that vaccines do not always convey full or lasting immunity is all 
the more reason for everyone to opt for this prophylactic method. 
The urgent need to meet and maintain sufficient levels of herd immunity 
is especially emphasized in response to newly vulnerable, yet vaccine-
ineligible, segments of the population, namely infants and pregnant women. 
While these demographics were once typically immune to the “childhood 
diseases” of the past (either through previous exposure or protective 
antibodies provided by their mothers), by effectively delaying disease 
susceptibility until adulthood, mass childhood immunization has produced a 
generation of vulnerable women with insufficient antibodies to protect their 
young.125 As Gans and Maldonado explain, the titers of passive antibodies 
transferred from a mother to her infant are, in part, determined by the number 
of antibody titers present in the mother during pregnancy, which is typically 
lower in vaccinated mothers than in those who acquired immunity to the 
natural disease. As a result, vaccine-induced protective antibodies have been 
shown to wane earlier in infants as compared to the protective antibodies 
derived from maternal natural infection (1). In other words, there is an 
“evolving susceptibility of young infants in highly vaccinated populations to 
some vaccine-preventable diseases” (2). Since live-attenuated viral vaccines 
are not usually recommended for either pregnant women or young infants, the 
125 See Waaijenborg et al., “Waning of Maternal Antibodies Against Measles, Mumps, Rubella, and 
Varicella in Communities with Contrasting Vaccination Coverage” and Gans and Maldonado, “Loss 
of Passively Acquired Maternal Antibodies in Highly Vaccinated Populations: An Emerging Need to 
Define the Ontogeny of Infant Immune Responses.” 
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most commonly proposed solution to this vaccine-generated problem—within 
the paradigm of vaccination—has been to strive for higher vaccine coverage 
in order to indirectly protect mothers and their newborn children through the 
herd effect.
In some cases, mass childhood immunization is premised first and 
foremost on the goal of reducing the circulation of diseases throughout the 
population, rather than on protecting children from diseases thought to put 
them especially at risk. In the case of rubella, for example, children are 
routinely vaccinated against this disease even though it is not considered 
dangerous for their demographic. Rubella is, after all, a “mild infection” and 
“once you've had the disease, you're usually permanently immune” (Mayo 
Clinic Staff). Why not, then, simply allow this mild disease to circulate, so that 
children can contract it at a time when complications are minimal, and develop 
lasting immunity? The reason, we are told, is that, because of the indirect 
action of vaccination, mass childhood immunization against this disease can 
protect pregnant women and their unborn children, who are themselves 
vaccine-ineligible. Although rubella presents children with little risk of 
complications, the consequences of contracting this disease during the first 
trimester of pregnancy can be very severe for the fetus: up to ninety percent of 
infants born to mothers who contract rubella during the first twelve weeks of 
pregnancy develop congenital rubella syndrome, the symptoms of which 
include growth retardation, cataracts, deafness, congenital heart defects, and 
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mental retardation (Mayo Clinic Staff). For pregnant women who have not 
developed natural immunity before reaching childbearing age, and who are 
susceptible to infection due to the waning efficacy of their childhood vaccines, 
vaccination is no longer a viable option. Live-attenuated viral vaccines are, as 
previously mentioned, usually contraindicated during pregnancy. And so, 
within the parameters of protection provided by vaccines, they have no 
recourse but to rely on the protection of those around them.126 Yet even within 
the logic of risk analysis this remains a problematic strategy. As Beck 
observes, “Risk acceptability depends on whether those who carry the losses 
also receive the benefits” (“Interview” 101). 
In this way, the decision to be vaccinated or to have one’s child 
vaccinated is often regarded as an act of altruism, since an individual 
assumes the risks of vaccination not only for one’s own protection, but also, 
sometimes primarily, for the benefit of more vulnerable members of the 
community. As Biss explains, herd immunity operates on the basis of enlisting 
the majority to protect the minority, that is, the portion of the population that is 
particularly vulnerable to a given disease but may not be eligible for 
126 It should be noted that it is unclear whether mass childhood immunization against rubella can in fact 
reduce incidents of congenital rubella syndrome. See Klock and Rachelefsky, “Failure of Rubella 
Herd Immunity During an Epidemic.” This study outlines an incident that occurred in 1970 in 
Casper, Wyoming, where elementary-school children were vaccinated en masse against rubella. 
Notwithstanding the good intention that motivated this public health initiative, namely to protect 
pregnant women and put an end to congenital rubella in the community, nine months after this local 
campaign, an outbreak of rubella hit Casper, involving more than one thousand cases and reaching 
several pregnant women. Unable to explain why the expected herd immunity effect did not 
materialize, the perplexed authors concluded that “[t]he concept that a highly immune group of 
prepubertal children will prevent the spread of rubella in the rest of the community was shown by 
this epidemic not always to be valid” (71).
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protection: “The elderly, in the case of influenza. Newborns, in the case of 
pertussis. Pregnant women, in the case of rubella” (Biss 30). Biss accordingly 
encourages us to imagine the action of a vaccine not only in terms of how it 
affects a single body, but also in terms of how it impacts the collective body of 
the community. From this perspective, she considers vaccination “as a kind of 
banking of immunity. Contributions to this bank are donations to those who 
cannot or will not be protected by their own immunity” (22). 
The ethical position that Biss describes is no doubt a compelling one. 
But it fails to address the ways in which the indirect action of vaccination – 
which she celebrates for its potential to protect susceptible individuals – also 
inadvertently produces new pockets of vulnerability. Identifying some of the 
disadvantages of establishing herd immunity, Fine et al. note that 
[m]easles and mumps outbreaks among university 
students, and pertussis in adults, are among examples 
of the consequences of accumulation of susceptible 
individuals who have not been [or are no longer] 
protected by vaccination, and escaped infection 
because of a herd immunity effect earlier in their lives 
(915).
They also acknowledge that, in some cases, by delaying infection until a later 
stage in life, mass childhood immunization can lead to serious complications 
that affect not only older populations, but also their offspring. This is especially 
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apparent in the case of rubella, which has its most severe consequences in 
the first trimester of pregnancy. “In at least one instance,” Fine et al. note, 
“herd immunity and associated delays in infection of unvaccinated individuals 
led to increased congenital rubella syndrome” (“Herd Immunity” 915).127 
Similarly, Gans and Maldonado identify “the emergence of measles 
susceptibility in young infants living in highly vaccinated populations” as an 
unexpected and paradoxical consequence of “the success of the measles 
vaccine programs” (1). It was, after all, with the explicit intention of 
maintaining herd immunity against measles that communities inadvertently 
increased the susceptibility of newborns to this disease and, by extension, the 
risk of disease transmission in highly vaccinated populations (Waaijenborg et 
al. 10). More specifically, by effectively interrupting the circulation of the 
measles virus, mass childhood immunization campaigns also reduced the 
supply of protective antibodies that mothers could pass on to their young,128 a 
population in which complications from this disease are considered most life-
threatening.129 Or in other words, it is a “minority” population that the “majority” 
127 See Panagiotopoulos et al., “Increase in Congenital Rubella Occurrence After Immunisation in 
Greece: Retrospective Survey and Systematic Review.” For a more recent account of a similar 
phenomenon in Japan, see Kinoshita and Nishiura, “Assessing Herd Immunity Against Rubella in 
Japan: a Retrospective Seroepidemiological Analysis of Age-Dependent Transmission Dynamics.”
128 This is a widely documented phenomenon. See, for example, Balé et al., “Risk Factors for Measles 
in Young Infants in an Urban African Area with High Measles Vaccination Coverage”; Brugha et 
al.,“A Study of Maternally Derived Measles Antibody in Infants born to Naturally Infected and 
Vaccinated Women”; De Serres et al., “Passive Immunity Against Measles During the First 8 
Months of Life of Infants Born to Vaccinated Mothers or to Mothers who Sustained Measles”; 
Haney, “As Vaccinated Girls Group Up, Their Babies Face Higher Risk for Measles”; Papania et al., 
“Increased Susceptibility to Measles in Infants in the United States”; Szenborn et al. “Passive 
Acquired Immunity Against Measles in Infants Born to Naturally Infected and Vaccinated Mothers”; 
and Zhao et al., “Low Titers of Measles Antibody in Mothers whose Infants Suffered from Measles 
Before Eligible Age for Measles.” 
129 Globally, measles remains the leading cause of vaccine-preventable childhood mortality, with 164 
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should be enlisted to protect. 
In view of its unforeseen consequences, the ethics of building herd 
immunity acquires a new layer of complexity. Insofar as vaccination has an 
indirect effect on others by interrupting the circulation of pathogens, from 
which perspective do we designate it as “good”? What is our basis for 
celebrating those who assume the risks of vaccination for the benefit of the 
whole as “altruistic?” If we do in fact build immunity through episodes of 
waning immunity and reinfection, why do we not rather fault them for 
contributing to problematic patterns of susceptibility and for pushing relatively 
benign childhood diseases into life stages in which complications are most 
severe? Conversely, why do we not express our gratitude to those who, by 
assuming the risks of natural infection, help keep the virus in circulation and 
so contribute to more stable, predictable, patterns of herd immunity? 
As these questions indicate, implicit in our assessment of the decision 
to either contribute to vaccine-induced herd immunity or not is another, often 
unacknowledged, evaluation: whether or not doing so constitutes a social 
good. Does reducing the circulation of pathogens through mass immunization 
foster the health of communities or does it inadvertently increase our 
vulnerability? Should we continue to invest in this strategy or would we 
benefit, collectively, from an approach that promotes coexistence with 
pathogens? How might our response to infectious diseases change – how 
000 deaths annually and the highest fatality rates occurring during the first year of life (Gans and 
Maldonado 2). 
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might we change – if we pursued ongoing exposure as the basis for robust 
immunity rather than limit or eliminate the circulation of diseases that threaten 
us? The fact is that we simply cannot anticipate all of the long-term 
consequences of mass childhood immunization. And, in view of the inevitable 
uncertainty surrounding our public health interventions, I propose that our 
responses to ever changing patterns of susceptibility would be more 
constructive if they centered on continually revisiting this fundamental 
question – do our existing strategies of preventing infectious disease (still) 
constitute a social good? – rather than on immediately ostracizing voices of 
dissent as if they unequivocally threaten the health of the community. 
As Cohen reminds us, “[r]esisting biomedical explanations and 
protocols. . . does not necessarily indicate 'wrong, immoral, [or] indefensible 
ideas' . . . but may reveal a fundamental value conflict that bioscience 
obscures when it declares its own universal validity” (241). And, as evidenced 
by the divergence between Hahnemann's method of preventing epidemics 
and the modern trajectory of vaccination, what begins as a fundamental 
difference in epistemological and ontological commitments can ultimately give 
rise to a difference in medical intervention. Although Hahnemann agreed with 
the early observation that the inoculation of cowpox prevented smallpox, his 
core values prompted him to develop an alternative to the practice of 
indiscriminate immunization. More specifically, his commitment to the medical 
principle of non-maleficence and his attention to an organism's receptivity to 
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its environment compelled him to respond to infectious disease in a way that 
did not impose harm and that was sensitive to an organism's unique 
susceptibility. Similarly, while contemporary scientists, doctors, parents, and 
policy-makers may reach a consensus on the details surrounding changing 
patterns of susceptibility among vaccinated populations, diverging value 
systems and philosophical commitments will invariably generate a plurality of 
responses.130 I believe that when we fail to explicate the underlying 
assumptions involved in competing responses to infectious disease, we end 
up engaging in divisive conflicts rather than assessing whether or to what 
extent a proposed solution corresponds with our shared commitment to 
promote community health. When we approach the unforeseen, paradoxical 
consequences of vaccination, for example, as a necessary feature of all 
interventions into life rather than as the result of a particular set of 
epistemological and ontological commitments, we undermine our capacity to 
find innovative solutions to the problems that we have, whether directly or 
indirectly, collectively generated. 
Pointing to some of the promising aspects of living in a risk society, 
Beck identifies its democratizing potential. Indeed, the upshot of the fact that 
infectious disease affect us all and that our individual responses indirectly 
affect the health of others, is that all voices should be involved in the decision-
making process. Beck is confident that under the dictates of necessity, people 
130 That is, of course, only if we interrupt the tendency to only ever pursue path-dependent behaviours 
in the face of uncertainty. 
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have passed a kind of “crash course” in the contradictions that arise in a risk 
society: “on the arbitrariness of acceptable levels and calculation procedures 
or the unimaginability of the long-term consequences and the possibilities of 
making them anonymous through statistics” (67). In view of the practical 
expertise that we have acquired as a function of living in a world risk society, 
he suggests that “with regard to all issues that are central to society, 
dissenting voices, alternative experts, an interdisciplinary variety and, not 
least, alternatives to be developed systematically must always be combined” 
(World Risk Society 70). The capacity to survive in a culture of uncertainty, he 
insists, requires a “willingness to negotiate between different rationalities, 
rather than to engage in mutual denunciation” (“Interview” 106).
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